The National Guard In War: An Historical Analysis Of The 27th Infantry Division (New York National Guard) In World War II
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the degree
Master Of Military Art And Science
CHARLES S. KAUNE, MAJ., USA .
B.A., The Virginia Military Institute, 1975
M.S., Columbus College, 1988
Fort Levenworth, Kansas
(Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.)
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of candidate: Major Charles S. Kaune
Title of thesis: The National Guard in War: An Historical Analysis of the 27th Infantry Division (New York National Guard) in World War II
Approved by: Dr. Jerry M. Cooper, Ph.D, Thesis Committee Chairman; LTC Robert B. James, Jr., M.Ed., Member, Graduate Faculty; LTC Joseph B. Bondurant, M.Ed., Member, Graduate Faculty
Accepted this 1st day of June 1990 by: Director, Graduate Degree Programs, Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Collage or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)i
The National Guard In War: An Historical Analysis Of The 27Th Infantry Division (New York National Guard) In World War II
by Charles S. Kaune, USA, 173 pages.
This study is an historical analysis of the 27th Division in World War II. The performance that division is illustrative of all divisions which were mobilized in 1940-1941 from the National Guard. The focus was on personnel, training, organization, military education of the leadership, and external influences.
A number of conclusions resulted from this study. As was the case with all National Guard divisions, the Congress denied adequate funds to equip or train them to a standard which would enable them to function in War. Once mobilization began the Army systematically disintegrated the National Guard divisions sending it's soldiers to service schools and to other newly activated divisions. The Army's theory that all soldiers were but interchangeable parts that could be inserted anywhere disregarded the major potential contribution of the National Guard. This contribution was the cohesion developed through years of close association. The senior leadership of the National Guard was a particular weakness in both tactical and technical matters and leadership.
The upshot of the study is that the post-mobilization Army failed to capitalize on the strengths of the National Guard, it's cohesion, while permitting it's gravest vulnerability, the ineptitude of the senior leadership.
Report Docmentation Page (Standard Form 298)
Table of Contents:
|CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION||
|CHAPTER TWO: THE NATIONAL GUARD BETWEEN THE WARS||
|CHAPTER THREE: REORGANIZATION AND TRAINING||
|CHAPTER FOUR: MAKIN||
|CHAPTER FIVE: SAIPAN||
|CHAPTER SIX: OKINAWA||
|CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS||