Union Blue and Militia Gray: The Role of the New York State Militia in the Civil War - Chapter 5 - Pennsylvania and New York City
The state National Guard continued to expand in 1863 in terms of strength and professionalism. On 15 April the legislature appropriated $200,000 to pay the expenses of the state militia. An additional act, on 24 April, appropriated $500,000 for the purchase of arms and accoutrements. [1]
In the late Spring, the first 38 volunteer regiments reached the end of their two-year enlistments. Many soldiers re-enlisted in other units to continue their valuable service, and those soldiers who did so received a state bounty of $150. On 11 February the 19th National Guard Regiment at Newburgh mustered into the service for nine months as the 168th New York Volunteers. [2]
By the end of the year the entire state National Guard force stood at 31,500 men, distributed in 85 regiments. Because of the rapid turnover and the departure of officers on active service with the volunteer regiments, 1,753 members of the National Guard received commissions during 1863. [3] The quality of the leadership varied widely. George Wingate, a private in the 22nd Regiment and a future general officer, although impressed with the competence of the regimental and company officers, commented on the senior leadership:
The majority of the regimental officers and men were soldiers, and the new men soon learned their duties from their associates. But the experience that had been acquired by the regiments did not extend to the division and brigade commanders. Major General Sandford had held his commission since 1837, Brigadier General (William) Hall since 1844 and Brigadier General (John) Ewen since 1847. During this period their duties had been confined to street parades, with the occasional exception of an annual brigade drill when the brigade commander had his instructions carefully written out and put on his spectacles to read them. There were no reports, no inspections, and no discipline outside that maintained by the regiments themselves.
While these gentlemen were of high standing and character, they were utterly destitute of either the military knowledge or experience to command troops in the field and were too old to learn. Above all, they had not the slightest idea of discipline or its enforcement. [4]
The inspector general later claimed, with some justification, that politics played a strong role in the militia, since returning combat officers of the volunteer forces often were unable to obtain commands in the National Guard units. [5]
Major General Joseph Hooker, dubbed "Fighting Joe" by the press, had been appointed to command the Army of the Potomac. Hooker endeavored to reorganize the army and revive morale, yet his efforts were negated by the humiliating defeat at the battle of Chancellorsville which ended on 6 May. Shortly thereafter, Lee launched his second invasion of the North. In the early part of June, the Federal government became convinced from reports received that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania would be threatened by invasion by Confederate forces from the area of the Rappahannock River. To provide better administration of the troops that would be called upon to defend that locality, the secretary of war decided to create two new military departments. On 10 June Stanton issued an order constituting the Departments of the Monongahela and the Susquehanna. The Department of the Susquehanna consisted of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania lying east of Johnstown and the Laurel Hill range of mountains. Major General Darius Couch received the command on 11 June. Three days later he moved his headquarters to Harrisburg (see Map #2). Soon after the defeat at Chancellorsville,Couch had requested relief of command of the II Army Corps, since he refused to serve under Hooker any longer. He would prove an excellent choice for that new position. [6]
The invasion of Pennsylvania took place generally as expected. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia entered the commonwealth at Greencastle from Boonsboro, Maryland, and advanced along the Cumberland Valley to Chambersburg, with a part of Lieutenant General Richard Swell's Second Corps going by way of Waynesboro. Ewell continued his march toward Carlisle, and one division advanced to the Susquehanna River at Wrightsville.
On 12 June, Governor Andrew Curtin of Pennsylvania issued a proclamation addressed to the people telling them of the danger which threatened them, and calling for volunteers to meet the emergency. Stanton appealed to New York for 20,000 men to be hurried forward. As a private appeal to Governor Horatio Seymour, it received a response as prompt as an order. Stanton had little faith in the efficiency of the traditional state militia systems, and he decided to raise a force of militia which would be recruited, maintained and controlled by the national government. The Confederates, however, did not cooperate, and by appearing suddenly at Winchester and Martinsburg in Virginia on 13 and 14 June respectively, they forced the Union authorities to adopt more expeditious arrangements for raising troops. For that reason Stanton appealed to the New York governor for the assistance of cohesive, organized militia forces. For their part, New York authorities became concerned that Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the expected Confederate objective, was only 125 miles south of Elmira. [7]
For the third time in as many years, the 7th Regiment became the first National Guard regiment to depart from New York. Rain fell in torrents on the morning on 17 June, but did not dampen the enthusiasm of the crowd when the unit departed with full ranks. Twenty-five additional regiments, totaling almost 14,000 soldiers, left by 3 July. Of that number, one (47th) was assigned to Washington D.C., and five (6th, 7th, 55th, 69th and 84th) were ordered to Baltimore. All the rest operated in the vicinity of Harrisburg (see Appendix #4). [8]
Couch's estimate of the situation anticipated Lee forcing a crossing of the Susquehanna somewhere between Conowingo, Maryland, and Marysville, six miles upstream from Harrisburg. The most likely crossing points seemed at Wrightsville, and the commonwealth capital, where the highway and rail nets intersected. In Summer, the river could be forded at various places north of Harrisburg where there was a railroad bridge, and a covered wooden turnpike bridge. As a further protection, he enlisted civilians and soldiers to build rather elaborate fortifications on the west bank directly opposite the city. Here they threw up trenches, built earthworks and prepared artillery positions. The two main fortifications in this area were promptly named Forts Couch and Washington. [9]
Map 2 - Area of Operation Pennsylvania and Maryland, 1863
For the New York National Guard units, the journey to Harrisburg proved eventful. Feted at Philadelphia, George Wingate described how they had been cooped up in railway cattle cars for three days, even though the trip from New York City to Harrisburg normally took only eight hours. In Harrisburg the first units either bivouacked at Camp Curtin, on the northern outskirts of the city, or were put to work on the defenses on the west bank of the river. Wingate noted that "digging rifle pits (trenches) in a hot sun is so very like excavating a sewer that axe-work was fun itself compared with it." [10]
If New York had not had a large number of militia ready and willing to serve, Couch would have been without any kind of force on 22 June when Lee stood poised to cross the Potomac with the main body of his army. Couch had under his control near Harrisburg at the very outside 11,500 men, of whom a little over 8,000 were from New York. [11]
The New Yorkers remarked on the apathy of the citizens of Pennsylvania, and especially the failure of local men to join the defense forces. Hundreds of able-bodied men loitered in the streets, indifferent to the presence of the National Guardsmen. Reluctant to leave their homes to repel the threatened and imminent invasion, the residents of Harrisburg remembered the call for militia the previous September and how the "imminent invasion" never happened. At the same time, the people of Harrisburg did not warmly welcome the out-of-state guardsmen. The cool reception confused some of the guardsmen, disgruntled others, causing the visitors to assume an attitude of aloofness. Many New Yorkers viewed the Pennsylvanians with outright contempt. Chickens and eggs were stolen by foraging parties, whole orchards were pilfered, vacant houses were looted and buildings dismantled for firewood. Many disgruntled New Yorkers described the residents of Harrisburg as "poltroons" as they observed them closing their houses and fleeing. [12]
Camp Curtin, rapidly filling up with militia, must have been an unpleasant place in mid-June 1863, with the heat and ever-present clouds of dust turning everyone and everything filthy. The top-soil became pulverized by thousands of feet, and flooding became worse than even The rain drove the 74th Regiment out of their tents on the night of 21 June. Supply shortages still posed severe problems. The 74th's quartermaster drew uniforms for 450 men together with camp equipage, but of 450 Springfield rifle-muskets, not one was serviceable, having been previously used by nine month Pennsylvania volunteers. [13]
For days a continuous stream of refugees, all telling stories of the gray hordes right behind them, filled the roads from the south and west. Many of these people left their houses hurriedly and arrived tired and hungry by the time they reached Harrisburg. Also looking rather forlorn were the soldiers driving the supply trains of Major General Robert Milroy's division, which had escaped the Confederate attack on Martinsburg, Virginia the previous week. [14]
By this time all three of Swell's divisions moved toward the east with Brigadier General A.G. Jenkin's cavalry brigade as the advance guard. While the divisions of Major Generals Robert Rodes and Edward Johnson marched on 23 June toward Chambersburg, Major General Jubal Early's division took a parallel route, eight to ten miles east. On 25 June Early received orders to march on York, by way of Gettysburg. Early ordered Brigadier General John Gordon's brigade, and some cavalry, to Wrightsville to seize the Susquehanna Bridge. He then intended to cross the river with his whole division, cut the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, advance upon Lancaster and attack Harrisburg in the rear while the rest of Swell's corps threatened it from the west. [15]
With time running out, Couch began deploying his forces to meet the threat. Two National Guard regiments (67th & 68th) garrisoned Camp Curtin, Brigadier General Charles Yates, with his 5th and 12th Regiments, marched on 22 June to the crossing at Fenwick, about six miles north of the capital. The 65th and 74th Regiments, with some Pennsylvania militia, rode the railway to Mount Union, about 85 miles west of Harrisburg. On 20 June, Brigadier General William F. ("Baldy") Smith of the regular army, reported to Couch who appointed him to command the First Division consisting of five brigades. This force initially garrisoned Fort Washington and its environs, along with six batteries from the 4th and 8th New York National Guard Artillery Regiments. The first four brigades were composed exclusively of regiments of the New York National Guard, and the last by two regiments of Pennsylvania militia. [16]
On 18 June the 8th and 71st Regiments (1st Brigade) under Colonel Joshua Varian moved from Harrisburg to Shippensburg. Brigadier General Joseph Knipe, a regular army officer and resident of Harrisburg, was at home recuperating from malaria. He offered his services, and on 20 June Couch directed him to assume command of Varian's brigade. Knipe received an almost impossible mission: use two small regiments of citizen-soldiers that he had never seen before, to delay the advance of an entire army corps of combat veterans. By Monday, 22 June, after some hard marching, Knipe's brigade closed up south of Chambersburg when word arrived from his cavalry screen that Confederate forces were approaching rapidly. The 71st skirmished with the enemy cavalry on the Greencastle Road, and about this time Knipe received a telegraphic order from Couch to withdraw by rail to Carlisle. The troops complied with this order in such a headlong manner that they left their tents standing, with their extra clothing, some weapons and all their rations on the ground. Two brass cannon were also abandoned. Jacob Hoke, a contemporary observer, commented that the troops withdrew in a cowardly panic, and apparently Colonel Benjamin Trafford of the 71st created even more confusion by his indecision. In any event, the troops conducted a rapid foot-march the 22 miles to Carlisle, and subsequently the local townspeople looted their deserted camp. [17]
Arriving at Carlisle, Knipe placed his two tired regiments in line of battle to cover the western edge of the town. The New Yorkers remained there until 27 June when they began to withdraw toward Harrisburg. Despite their retreat, the New Yorkers were proud of themselves, and Couch later commended them by noting that their small force, without support, had advanced 52 miles beyond the main defenses and held the enemy in check for six days (22-28 June).
Knipe's brigade arrived at Oyster's Point, a small town a few miles west of Harrisburg, to link up with Brigadier General Jesse Smith's brigade (23rd, 52nd and 56th Regiments). Jenkins' cavalry appeared shortly thereafter and skirmishing commenced. The Confederate horse artillery began to shell the forward edge of the woods where the New York pickets were posted. The 71st began volley-fire, while the 8th and 56th Regiments withdrew. At the beginning of the cannonade, the rest of the troops in and around the defenses sprang to arms. Additional forces moved forward, and Brigadier General John Ewen's brigade (11th, 22nd and 37th Regiments) continued their feverish work on the fortifications around Forts Couch and Washington. They also threw pickets out to the south. The skirmishing died down toward the close of the afternoon, but flared up again briefly the following morning. [18]
Early's division had meanwhile arrived at Wrightsville where the defending Pennsylvania militia burned the Columbia Bridge over the Susquehanna and withdrew to the east bank. The stage was now set for a major confrontation between the Confederates and the militia forces defending Harrisburg. Fortunately for them, Lee ordered the withdrawal of Swell's corps on 29 June. Apprehensive over the approach of the Army of the Potomac, Lee began to concentrate his army at Gettysburg. That decision eliminated the probability of a major battle at Harrisburg which would have involved the significant participation of the New York National Guard.
The gray tide began to recede, but on the morning of 30 June Ewen's brigade deployed farther to the west where they skirmished with the enemy at Sportsman's Hill. Small arms firing by the 37th Regiment gave way to an artillery response by the Confederates. The 37th suffered some men slightly wounded, and the New Yorkers also confirmed the enemy's withdrawal. The campaign now entered a new phase. [19]
The battle at Gettysburg lasted from 1-3 July 1863. On 1 July General W.F. Smith, in command of the First Division, had advanced up the Cumberland Valley with Ewen's brigade and Brisbane's Pennsylvania militia brigade from the Harrisburg area. They arrived at Carlisle that afternoon. Knipe received orders to join him later with his own brigade. The troops had been ordered out in light marching order, without overcoats and blankets, and they suffered accordingly in the following days. During the afternoon, Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, of LE.B. Stuart's Confederate cavalry division, arrived to find Smith's troops occupying the town. Smith refused a demand for its surrender, and Lee opened with his horse artillery. The firing continued until about 1:00 A.M. on 2 July, and then, after burning Carlisle Barracks, the Confederate cavalry withdrew toward Gettysburg. [20]
George Wingate later remarked that Knipe's brigade made the journey to Carlisle by forced march and their brigadier refused to let them stop for food or rest. The weather continued excruciatingly hot and men began to drop out "with frightful rapidity." Arriving at Carlisle on 2 July, only 300 men were fit for duty out of the original 1100. The citizens greeted them warmly, however, and they immediately began to entrench. [21]
Late in the evening of 3 July, after the fighting at Gettysburg had ended, Couch received information from Major General George Meade (who had succeeded to the command of the Army of the Potomac on 28 June) that Lee would probably not attack again, and that he might retreat toward Virginia. In that event, Couch was to march in pursuit along the Cumberland Valley.
On 4 July Smith moved south from Carlisle with the brigades of Brisbane, Ewen and Knipe to Mount Holly, and then on to Pine Grove. By the following day his brigades covered the roads leading to Shippensburg, and by the 6th they marched by different routes to the Chambersburg Turnpike, only four miles east of Cashtown. The 8th of July found them at Waynesboro. During the first week of July, Smith's troops marched through excessive heat and drenching downpours. The roads turned to a "frightful mire" and the situation became alarming. At one point the column broke up into a vast stream of stragglers with regiments and brigades mixed "promiscuously together." The subsistence wagons had become mired in the rear with no prospect of their catching up, and the soldiers felt "buried in the depths of this untamed wilderness." [22]
On 7 July the 23rd Regiment (Jesse Smith's brigade) met up with troops of the VI Army Corps around Waynesboro. The Union veterans regarded their gray fatigue uniforms curiously and advised them to change into "Uncle Sam's blue" before other, more trigger-happy Federals mistook them for Confederates. [23]
On 3 July Brigadier General Phillip S. Crooke's brigade (13th and 28th Regiments) received orders to entrain for Carlisle. They had already spent a number of days at Marysville and Harrisburg. Their orders directed them to leave everything except blankets, haversacks and weapons. They arrived at Carlisle on 4 July, and Crooke immediately telegraphed Couch for further orders. That morning he received the following reply:
Harrisburg, July 4th 1863
An order was given to take rations last night. Do troops want me to tell them to breathe. Always have rations in your haversacks. You want no buggy, you are going in the mountains for a few days. Beef cattle go forward. Now is the time to aid your country; let trifles go; march.
D.N. Couch, Maj. Gen. [24]
Couch, a regular army officer, had little regard for militia (although virtually all of his command at this point fell into this category), and in his exasperation he attempted to inspire Crooke with the urgency of the situation.
About two miles south of Carlisle, a heavy rain storm broke, and here they encountered a few stragglers from the battle at Gettysburg: rebel deserters and paroled Union soldiers. They met some members of the red-trousered 14th Brooklyn (84th New York Volunteers) who had been captured on McPherson's Ridge on 1 July, and this unexpected encounter with friends from Brooklyn in the middle of Pennsylvania left them cheered and cheering. By 5 July they caught up with Ewen's brigade. Inadequate rations, heavy rain and overflowing streams continued to impede their progress south and west. On 14 July, Smith's division, now temporarily under the command of Knipe, crossed the Maryland border and went into bivouac about three miles northwest of Boonsboro. [25]
It has already been noted that the 65th and 74th Regiments had been dispatched to Mount Union to guard the lines of communication between Harrisburg and Pittsburgh. These regiments established picket lines, and guarded passes by obstructing roads through the mountains. On 5 July Colonel Hawley received orders to conduct his brigade to Harrisburg, and then on to Chambersburg. They eventually marched as far as Mercersburg before the campaign ended. [26]
The 7th Regiment had arrived in Baltimore on 5 July to garrison Fort Federal Hill. While on guard duty, they received orders to entrain for Frederick, Maryland, to participate in the pursuit of Lee's army. The 7th departed in light marching order with three days of cooked rations in their haversacks, and sixty rounds of ammunition per man. They turned over Fort Federal Hill to the 55th (Lafayette Garde) and 69th Regiments. At Frederick, Colonel Marshall Lefferts was appointed to the military governorship of that city, relieving Major General William H. French, who replaced Daniel Sickles in command of the III Army Corps. [27]
Lee's army, largely unimpeded by the Army of the Potomac, crossed the Potomac into Virginia near Williamsport on 12 and 13 July. In the midst of the relief that the rebels had been thrown back, events in New York City began to take center stage and everyone's attention. On 3 March 1863, President Lincoln had signed the National Conscription Act, which provided for the enrollment of all males between the ages of 18 and 45 for active military service. It set up provost marshal offices in designated enrollment districts and stipulated that at an unspecified date, the draft would be carried out under the direction of the various provost marshals. A complicated system of quotas evolved for each area. The names of enrollees would be placed in a large lottery wheel, and drawn pending completion of each district's quota. The draft law caused violent protests all around the country as being un-American and unconstitutional, and no more so than in pro-Democratic New York. [28]
On Saturday, 11 July, the first names were drawn in New York City. As newspapers published the names on the next day, crowds assembled in the streets. For some time, there had been unrest in the city, particularly because of the provisions that allowed substitutions and the purchase of exemptions. The situation brought further complications, since some state politicians were not giving their full support to the war. Some citizens would later attempt to avoid the draft by enlisting in the organized militia which gave them an immediate exemption. [29]
When the drawing resumed on the morning of 13 July, mobs gathered, and they soon engaged in widespread rioting. Draft headquarters was stormed, dwellings were entered and business establishments were looted. The insurgents started numerous fires. The rioting unfolded in two phases: through early afternoon of that Monday, much of the violence bore the stamp of rioters who conducted a one-day demonstration against the administration of the Conscription Act. By Tuesday, 14 July, rioters proceeded to connect the draft to many of the social ills of the community. Much vehemence, for example, was directed against the black sections of the city by immigrant groups, concerned over losing their jobs. [30]
The mobilization of most of the state National Guard for duty in Pennsylvania left New York City undefended except for some regular army troops in the harbor defenses and marines in the Navy Yard. The city police likewise could not effectively deal with the escalating violence. For those reasons the governor forwarded an immediate request to the president and the secretary of war for release of the National Guard for return to New York. On 14 July, Stanton released five regiments from duty in Maryland, and on the following day a further six regiments were relieved from Federal service to be forwarded to New York as soon as possible. [31]
On that day the National Guardsmen, camped around Hagerstown, Maryland received copies of the Baltimore newspapers which carried reports of the riots in New York City. The emotions of the soldiers were "turned with sharp vengeance against the insurgents at home," and throughout that evening observers noted "great demonstrations of joy in camp" at the prospect of their quick return to New York, George Wingate reported that most men were angry over news of the riots and "they set their minds against this group of Copperheads which had undertaken a counter-revolution in our own homes." [32]
The following day, formal orders directed Smith's division to march to Frederick, there to entrain for New York. At Frederick, lack of transport caused further delays. The 22nd Regiment had already marched 170 miles in three weeks in inclement weather, over abominable roads and through mountain passes, on only ten days' rations and without a change of clothing. This represented heavy campaigning indeed, and especially for citizen-soldiers more accustomed to the factory or the office rather than the forced-march and the line of battle. The troops were not in good humor at the prospect of fighting insurgents in their own home town. [33]
The 23rd and 56th Regiments packed themselves aboard 30 cattle cars at Frederick on 17 July. Between York and Harrisburg a new bridge over the Susquehanna had given way under a freight train only a few hours before their arrival. This accident caused a "frightful wreck," but in their haste to get home, the troops crossed over on a temporary light pontoon bridge, or clambered over the broken timbers and wrecked cars to board another train on the other side. [34]
Meanwhile in New York, a political impasse had developed. Major General Sandford, in command of the militia forces in Manhattan, reacted to Mayor George Opdyke's plea and established himself at the arsenal at 7th Avenue and 35th Street. Sandford, who only controlled two companies of the 10th National Guard Regiment, decided to concentrate on guarding the arsenals around the city. He was soon engaged in a dispute with Brigadier General Harvey Brown, Federal commander of the harbor and New York City. A verbal argument resulted, after which Sandford appealed to Major General James E. Wool, commander of the Department of the East, who issued the following order:
New York, July 13th 1863 Special Orders,
All the troops called out for the protection of the city are placed under the command of Major General Sandford, whose order they will implicitly obey.
By command of Major General Wool
C.T. Christensen, Ass't Adjutant General. [35]
Brown initially refused to serve under a militia general and more valuable time was wasted while this matter straightened itself out. In the end Brown retained command of all Federal forces while Sandford supervised the militia. Brown later received credit for devising a plan to divide the city into quadrants, and gathering forces at strategic points to deal with "plague spots." [36]
Reinforcements from Pennsylvania at last began to arrive. The 65th and 74th Regiments, both Buffalo units, reached the city on Wednesday evening, 15 July. The 7* Regiment disembarked at 4:00 A.M. the following morning at the foot of Canal Street and marched north on Broadway.
In 1857, Colonel Abram Duryee, the 7th's commander, had stated his own maxims for putting down a riot. He noted that "temporizing with a mob should be avoided; for any indication of timidity and weakness on the part of the troops, gives confidence to the timid and wavering, who are thus led to join the popular tumult." Officers were directed to acquaint themselves with any areas which they might have to protect, and operations were to be performed with promptness, energy and courage. "In a disturbed area, the troops ought to be formed the width of the street, allowing room for the companies to move to the rear after firing , reload and move forward again. Mountain howitzers are considered invaluable in street fighting as effectual antidotes to the most infuriated mob." [37] Arriving in strength, the National Guard proceeded to put those maxims into effect.
Wednesday, 15 July, was the critical day of the riot. The police and few Federal troops were worn out with the constant marching and fighting. The newspapers told of trouble over the draft in Boston, Hartford, Newark, Jersey City, and the communities of Hastings-on-Hudson, Tarrytown and Rye north of the city. The 65th Regiment went into action right away, fighting its way from 23rd to 28th Street in Manhattan, continually firing as it advanced. The 74th Regiment deployed its companies in Manhattan, Brooklyn and Staten Island, at Forts Hamilton and Lafayette, and Jersey City. On 19 July, one company was dispatched up the Hudson River to garrison various locations. [38]
Sandford reported that Major Fearing, of his staff, was seriously wounded while leading a charge upon the mob on 42nd Street. One soldier was killed and 53 officers and men wounded at the storming of barricades erected by the rioters on 29th Street, and in other conflicts which followed. [39]
Upon the outbreak of the riot in New York, Major General H.B. Duryea, commanding the Second National Guard Division in Brooklyn, retained only the 70th and part of the 16th Regiments to contain the rioting there. Duryea decided to guard considerable supplies at the Brooklyn arsenal and also to safeguard the Atlantic docks where the crowd had burned two large grain elevators. Fortunately, the timely arrival of the 13th, 23rd, 47th, 52nd and 56th Regiments from Pennsylvania and Virginia prevented further problems. [40]
The worst of the riots extended over a four-day period. However, many of the National Guard regiments continued on active duty through August; some were even embodied through mid-September. The draft lottery resumed, even though Brigadier General John Sprague, the adjutant general, traveled to Washington to recommend postponement of the draft until more regular troops could be assembled in New York to forestall further outbreaks of violence. [41]
Like everyone else in the city, Governor Seymour had become convinced that Sandford was not fit to command troops in combat, and as the Manhattan regiments returned from Pennsylvania and Maryland, he put them under the orders of Brown. To no one's surprise, Wool was relieved of his command and retired. He was quickly replaced by Major General John A. Dix. Sandford's dispute with Brown continued for a considerable time, and Brown's responses left little standing of Sandford's self-glorification. [42]
By late July, considerable forces of the Army of the Potomac began to arrive to relieve the National Guard forces which began to disperse. The 68th Regiment arrived in Elmira on 23 July for mustering-out after a miserable trip from Pennsylvania. The preparation of new company muster-rolls caused more delays, and the unit awaited the arrival of the paymaster. Colonel David Forbes, the regimental commander, endeavored to persuade the Federal quartermaster to allow his soldiers to keep their blankets "to which they had become attached," and which had become very worn and filthy in the recent campaign. An appeal by the regimental chaplain helped to win approval for this request, even though the blankets were technically Federal property. When word arrived that the paymaster would not arrive for another week a near-mutiny ensued. Forbes managed to arrange transportation as quickly as possible to get his unit back to Dunkirk where they were dismissed on 31 July. They finally received their pay on 10 August at Fredonia. The men of the 68th considered themselves quite fortunate since they returned with every man that departed with the regiment at the start of the campaign. [43]
The year 1863 had been one of crisis for the entire state National Guard. At no time during the war were resources so strained, and its members so willing to endure hardship in the defense of their state. Much of the National Guard may have operated as a social club, but no question existed that when the alarm was sounded the Guard responded with exceptional promptness and dedication.
Chapter Five Footnotes
1. New York State, Annual Report of the Adjutant General (Albany, NY: 1864), 14. Hereinafter cited as AG.
2. Ibid., 9.
3. Ibid., 14.
4. George Wingate, History of the 22nd Regiment NYSNG (New York: C.S. Westcott & Sons Printer, 1901), 150-151.
5. New York State, Inspector General's Report (New York: C. Wendell, Legislative Printer, 1863), 114.Hereinafter cited as IG.
6. Frank J. Welcher, The Union Army 1861-1865, The Eastern Theater (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989), I: 24.
7. Jacob Hoke, The Great Invasion (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), 93; William A. Swinton, History of the Seventh Regiment (New York: Charles T. Dillingham, 1876), 294; Edwin Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), 135-136.
8. Swinton, Seventh Regiment, 298; U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), Series I, Vol. XXVII, Part II, 227. Hereinafter cited as: OR,
9. William Nye, Here Come the Rebels (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 233; Coddington, Gettysburg Campaign, 146.
10. George Wingate, Last Campaign of the 22nd Regiment N.Y.S.M. (New York: C.S. Westcott & Sons Printer, 1864), 4, 7.
11. Coddington, Gettysburg Campaign, 143.
12. William J. Miller, The Training of an Army: Camp Curtin and the North's Civil War (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Co. Inc., 1990), 163, 170-171; John Lockwood, Our Campaign Around Gettysburg, 23rd Regiment N.Y.N.G. (Brooklyn, NY: A.H. Rowe & Co., 1864), 23.
13. Miller, Camp Curtin, 168.
14. Lockwood, Campaign Around Gettysburg, 44.
15. Coddington, Gettysburg Campaign, 169.
16. Welcher, Union Army, 127.
17.. Hoke, Great Invasion, 130; Nye, Here Come the Rebels, 250.
18. Nye, Here Come the Rebels, 333.
19. AG, 1864,333.
20. Ibid., 50; Welcher, Union Army, 128.
21. Wingate, Last Campaign, 21.
22. Lockwood, Campaign Around Gettysburg, 104.
23. Ibid., 122.
24. AG, 1864,343.
25. Ibid., 343.
26. OR, Series I, Vol. XXVII, Part II, 274-275.
27. Swinton, History of the Seventh, 322.
28. Irving Werstein, July 1863 (New York: Julian Mesner, Inc., 1957), 13.
29. Welcher, Union Army, 13.
30. Ibid., 14; Iver Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 44.
31. James McCague, The Second Rebellion: The Story of the New York City Draft Riots (New York: The Dial Press, Inc., 1968), 145.
32. Lockwood, Campaign Around Gettysburg, 147; Wingate, Last Campaign, 42.
33. Ibid., 41.
34. Lockwood, Campaign Around Gettysburg, 163.
35. AG, 1864,312.
36. Bernstein, New York Draft Riots, 61.
37. Adrian Cook, The Armies of the Streets (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 46.
38. AG, 1864,398.
39. Ibid., 313.
40. Ibid., 316.
41. Ibid., 25.
42. Cook, Armies of the Streets, 173.
43. OR, Series I, Vol. XXVII, Part II, 269-270.
| Back to Chapter Four |