

## CHAPTER XXII


### OPERATIONS OF THE 52D FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE



IN an earlier chapter relating to the overseas movement of the division, it was narrated how the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, having reached the Port of Embarkation at Newport News, Virginia, spent considerable time there before commencing its overseas movement, but finally did follow the division to France.

Upon its arrival in France, however, the brigade did not join the division, but was sent to Camp de Souge, near Bordeaux. There it spent six weeks in training. This training completed, it was moved by rail to Longeville, near Bar-le-Duc, where it was attached to the 33d American Division as its divisional artillery. This was during the first week of September, 1918.

As all the artillery brigade's fighting took place within a radius of twenty miles of Verdun, first on the left bank of the Meuse and then on the



*Sergeant Campbell, Headquarters Company, 106th Field Artillery, singing "The Star Spangled Banner," July 4, 1918, Bordeaux, Place Girondin*

right, a few words in regard to the geographic conditions and general situation should precede any account of its activities in that sector.

The terrain around Verdun is as if it had been made for battle. It is hilly, thereby furnishing protection for men and artillery positions. At the



*52d Field Artillery Headquarters Detachment  
en route Brest to Camp de Souge, France*

same time, it is in no sense impassable and the roads through it are splendid. That it was early recognized as a battle country is borne out by the elaborate citadel in the city itself, and by the chain of forts that extend completely around the city. The biggest of these forts is Fort Douaumont. On the right side of the river are Vaux and Tavannes. On the left bank of the river there are forts De Marre and Choissel and several others. These forts are prepared fortifications of concrete, and oppose themselves to attack on Verdun from every point of the compass.

Through this country the River Meuse runs generally north and south, but twists and turns on its journey. For example, through the city of Verdun itself there is a very abrupt turn to the left of Cote de Talou. To the right of the river and to the right of Verdun rise the heights of the Meuse. These heights form a high ridge cut by many ravines heavily wooded, bounded on the

west by the river and on the east by the plains of the Woevre.

On the left bank of the river, there is also high ground, but there is no consistent ridge as is true of the right bank. The highest points of the sector are Douaumont, the Hill 360, northeast of Samogneux; the Hill 357, near Sivry la Perche and Montfaucon. When the lines became stable, after General Guillaumont's attack in August, 1917, Montfaucon became the important observation post of the Germans, and Douaumont the observation post of the French. To the north of Douaumont, the more important high points are Cote de Poivre, Hill 344, Hill 360 and Hill 378. On the other side of the river are the Mort Homme and the Hill 304. During the time that the line lay stabilized for a year, there were important posts of

German command at Dun-sur-Meuse and Stenay; and, for the French, at the Citadel of Verdun, Rampont, and Souilly.

The Verdun sector had been the scene of very severe fighting and the word "La Meuse" connoted to the French soldier the most desperate fighting, the most terrible suffering and the most hotly contested area of the war. On the 22d of February, 1916, the army of the Crown Prince launched a tremendous attack. It was supported by the greatest group of artillery that had ever been assembled. This battle continued as a sustained effort for nearly five months, at the end of which time the pressure was still great, but Verdun remained untaken.

The fighting around Douaumont and Vaux, and around Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme, was most severe.

By early fall, the danger of the loss of Verdun had passed. But the enemy line was too close on the right bank of the River Meuse. Therefore there was organized, under General Mangin, those attacks of the fall and early winter which drove the Germans from the heights to the right of Verdun, and returned Douaumont and Vaux to the hands of the French.

It was not until the following summer that the pressure was relieved on the left bank of the river. Until August, the Germans held the Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme. In August of 1917, a carefully organized attack drove the Germans from these two important hills and also drove them from the Talou Hill on the right side of the river. These operations were conducted under General Guillaumont, who commanded the French 2d Army.

This advance left the French line in a position satisfactory to the French High Command. So long as the Germans had observation posts on Le Mort Homme and Hill 304, the maintenance of the line on the left of the river had been difficult. The same thing was true when the Germans held Douaumont on the right bank.

It was this line that the Americans found when they went into position in this sector in September, 1918. The line ran roughly as follows: starting on the left, the French held Avoucourt; extending to the eastward, the line ran through Haucourt and entered the valley formed by Forges Brook. At Haucourt, the little town of Malancourt was almost to the north, and Hill 304 to the south. Following the brook, the line passed just south of Bethincourt and north of Le Mort Homme. It extended practically due east, the German lines on the north side of the ravine and the French lines on the south. Crossing the river to the east of the ruined town of Forges, the line ran between Samogneux and Brabant-sur-Meuse. From that point, the line turned to the southeast, leaving Ornes in the possession of the Germans, and Bezongaux and Vaux in the hands of the French. To the south and the southeast of Vaux, the French held the heights and the Germans were completely down on the plains of the Woevre. As a result of this fighting, the country was completely devastated, the villages were destroyed by shell fire and the inhabitants had fled. There was nothing but destruction and desolation.

Within twenty-four hours after the arrival of the first regiment of

the brigade (104th Field Artillery), it proceeded by night marches with the 33d Division to the vicinity of Nixeville, southwest of Verdun, the other regiments of the brigade following as rapidly as their detrainment was completed. While the brigade was still en route orders were received for the 104th Field Artillery to take over the positions of the artillery of the 157th and 120th French Divisions in the Le Mort Homme-Hill 304 sectors, which divisions had been suddenly ordered to withdraw and proceed to other parts of the front. To accomplish this relief it became necessary to bring forward in motor trucks the regimental, battalion and battery commanders of the 105th Field Artillery and their reconnaissance details, and one battalion commander and the battery commanders of three batteries of the 106th Field Artillery. The howitzers of the three batteries of the 106th Field Artillery and their gun crews were also rushed forward in tow of motor trucks. Notwithstanding the difficulties encountered the relief was accomplished on time. On the nights of September 8th-9th, the 104th Field Artillery and 1st Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery relieved the 53d Regiment A. C. (French), the 2d Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery relieving the 33d Regiment A. C. (French) and Batteries A, C and D of the 106th Field Artillery, under command of Major Guido F. Verbeck, relieving the French heavy artillery units. The Artillery Brigade Headquarters was established at Fromerville. The division was attached to the XVII French Corps under command of Major General Henri Claudel. While in these positions the brigade participated in the St. Mihiel Offensive on September 12th, firing continuously for seventeen hours from 1 A. M. on that day to 6 P. M., at about the maximum capacity of its guns. All the artillery of the XVII French Corps, of which the 33d American Division and the 52d Field Artillery Brigade were a part, participated in this attack, which was the attack in which the 1st American Army reduced the St. Mihiel salient. The firing by the 52d Field Artillery Brigade was for demonstration purposes, no attack being made on the front of the 33d American Division.

On the 14th of September the 33d American Division was transferred from the XVII French Army Corps to the III American Corps, Major General Robert L. Bullard commanding, and participated in the American offensive which became known as the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The 52d Field Artillery Brigade during the first part of this offensive continued its assignment with the 33d American Division.

This division attacked on September 26th, northwest of Verdun from Passerelle du Don (exclusive), 800 meters east of Bethincourt, to the Meuse River, after closing to the right to make room on its left for the other divisions of the III American Corps and establishing headquarters for the division and the artillery brigade at La Hutte in the Bois Bourrus. The attack was carried out by the 66th Infantry Brigade with Company A, 1st Gas and Flame Regiment, attached. The brigade attacked with the 132d Infantry on the right and the 131st Infantry on the left, each regiment with two battalions in the line and one in support.



*The market at Bordeaux*

The 132d Infantry was to advance through the Bois de Forges and organize a line of defense along the west bank of the River Meuse from the Cote de l'Oie (inclusive) to the road fork at .0993, 400 meters north of the north corner of Bois de Forges (exclusive).

The 131st Infantry was to attack and reach quickly the open ground east and north of Drillancourt and Gercourt et Drillancourt and the Trench du Bois Jure, to assist the 132d Infantry in the reduction of the Bois de Forges, to capture Drillancourt, Gercourt et Drillancourt, Trench du Bois Jure, Trench du Bois Rond and to organize a line of defense along the west bank of the Meuse from road fork at .0993, 400 meters north of the



*Cafe de Bordeaux at Bordeaux*

north corner of Bois de Forges (inclusive), to the Laiterie de Belhaine (exclusive).

The 52d Field Artillery Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General George Albert Wingate, consisting of the 104th, 105th and 106th Field Artillery Regiments, reinforced by the 212th R. A. C. (French 75 mm.) and the 2d Battalion of the 308th R. L. C. (French 155 mm. howitzer), was to support the attack as follows:

Two battalions of the 212th R. A. C. were assigned to furnish the standing and rolling barrage on the front of the 131st Infantry. The 104th and 105th Field Artillery Regiments were assigned to the same missions for the 132d Infantry. The 3d Battalion of the 212th R. A. C. was to furnish a standing and rolling barrage of limited duration from the right flank of the 132d Infantry to the village of Forges, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in relation to the front of the attack. After this barrage lifted, the trenches in this vicinity were to be taken in the flank and rear by mopping up parties from the 132d Infantry. The 106th Field Artillery and the 2d Battalion of the 308th R. L. C. were to place concentrations of fire on specified points in the divisional sector, lifting successively as the attack progressed.

The 102d Ammunition Train was employed in supplying ammunition and the replenishment thereof during the night before the action until midnight.

The 102d Trench Mortar Battery was in reserve due to the fact that the width of no man's land exceeded its maximum range.

The Brigade Commander's post of command was at La Hutte 14.93 1,000 meters southeast of La Claire, with the Commanding General of the 33d Division.

At 11:30 P. M., September 25th, the army artillery preparation commenced, the three corps artilleries joining at 2:30 A. M. of the 26th. At 5:30 A. M. the divisional artillery preparation commenced. It consisted of concentrations by the 155 mm. units on the enemy front line and specified points in the zone of advance, the concentrations lifting successively upon the approach of the infantry. The standing barrage by the 75 mm. units was placed along the Forges-Bethincourt Road for twenty-five minutes in order to cover the crossing of the Forges Brook and swamp by the infantry. It then rolled forward 300 meters, remaining there for twenty minutes to permit the infantry to form up along the road. The barrage in front of the 131st Infantry, which was 800 meters in width, was fired by six batteries of the 212th R. A. C., and lasted for five hours and fifteen minutes. It progressed for a distance of approximately six kilometers at a rate of 100 meters in four minutes for three hours and five minutes, and at a rate of 100 meters in five minutes for two hours and ten minutes. The barrage in front of the 132d Infantry, which was about 1,300 meters in width, was fired by the 104th and 105th Field Artillery Regiments, one half by each. It lasted for three hours and fifteen minutes, progressing at a rate of 100 meters in four minutes for one hour and twenty-five minutes, and 100 meters in five minutes for one



BARRAGE MAP  
 OPERATIONS OF 52<sup>ND</sup> FIELD  
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE NORTH OF  
 VERDUN, SEPTEMBER 26<sup>TH</sup> TO  
 NOVEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup> 1918.  
 THIS MAP SHOWS BARRAGES AT  
 COMMENCEMENT OF THE MEUSE  
 ARGONNE OPERATION SEPT 26<sup>TH</sup> 1918  
 AND OF THE SECOND PHASE ON OCT 8<sup>TH</sup>  
 1918.

hour and fifty minutes. On the right of the 132d Infantry the barrage of 1,500 meters in width was placed to deceive the enemy. It progressed at a rate of 100 meters in four minutes for one hour and seventeen minutes.

The infantry regiments reported that the standing barrage and concentrations mentioned so effectively covered the crossing of the Forges Brook and swamp that they suffered few losses during that period.

The rolling barrage, the rate of which was prescribed by Corps Headquarters, was reported by the infantry to be accurate and effective, and that they were able to follow it closely. The 131st Infantry, which went over open country for the greater part of its route, reported, however, that the barrage retarded their advance, while the 132d Infantry, advancing almost entirely through woods, reported that at times they had to run to keep up. Both barrages were carried through to the final objective without interruption.

The infantry, following the barrage closely, organized their front lines on the final objective, in front of which the light artillery had provided a defensive barrage. The heavy artillery had prepared to lay down concentrations on the river crossings and at other points.

The barrage opened at zero hour, which was 5:30 A. M.

The 104th Field Artillery fired from positions on the high ground, 1,700 meters south of Chattancourt, Batteries E and F of the 105th Field Artillery from positions immediately west of Marre, the remainder of the 105th Field Artillery from the high ground 1,200 meters southwest of Cumieres on the southern slopes of Le Mort Homme and the 106th Field Artillery from the high ground 900 meters southeast of Le Mort Homme. Owing to the dense concentration of artillery for this attack, all battery positions were designated by Corps Headquarters. The accuracy, destruction and depth of the fire were favorably acclaimed by the infantry which made the attack.

In this attack the 33d Division was the right division of the American army, and was the pivot of the American army's movement. It swung around in a half circle until its front reached the west bank of the Meuse River, when it consolidated its positions and held a line from Forges to the Laiterie de Belhaine.

Despite the fact that it was subjected to fire from both the front and the flank, the division carried all its objectives on schedule time. It captured 1,500 prisoners, 42 pieces of artillery and 161 machine guns. It continued to hold these positions until October 2d, when it was ordered to extend its lines to the west, taking over the sector of the 80th Division to western edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont, giving it a front of over 14,000 yards.

The 52d Field Artillery Brigade, in order to effectively support the infantry on this front, which was substantially a right angle, was called upon to fire barrages and attack targets in two directions. From the time of its advance, on the 26th, the division was under continual observed enemy artillery fire from the much higher and heavily wooded terrain on the east bank of the Meuse River.



The following extracts from the operations diary of General Wingate will indicate the character of work of his brigade during the succeeding days and until October 4th.

SEPTEMBER 27TH

- 8:05 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to put one battalion 308th R. L. C. in position in Ravin des Caurettes.
- 10:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 104th Field Artillery, to occupy positions near M.88.67 with one battalion, consisting of Batteries C, D and E. Movement to commence at 10:30 o'clock.
- 11:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to send details to operate captured German guns near Drillancourt.
- 15:50 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on three enemy batteries located in Bois de Chaume and near Consenvoye.
- 17:40 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on enemy battery near Consenvoye.
- 22:00 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on enemy battery at H.43.11.
- 22:00 Ordered readjustment of normal barrage to cover withdrawal of battalion changing position.

SEPTEMBER 28TH


- 1:30 Movement of enemy troops into Brabant reported. Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on Brabant with one battery and on the Brabant-Malbrouck Road with one battery.
- 13:15 80th Division requested assistance against six batteries attacking it. Batteries out of our range. Transmitted request to Verdun Grouping, Corps Artillery.
- 13:45 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery, to fire on Brabant with one battery.
- 14:30 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on Brabant with one battery against reported enemy movement.
- 15:00 Ordered 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, to occupy positions in vicinity of M.88.67.
- 17:00 80th Division requested fire against batteries in Bois de Chatillon. Notified Counter-battery Office at Corps Headquarters.

SEPTEMBER 29TH

- 15:10 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on enemy battery H.22.14.
- 15:15 Requested Corps Artillery for counter-battery work on enemy batteries at H.19.19, H.39.19, H.48.20, H.41.13, H.47.17, firing heavily on 132d Infantry.
- 16:30 Notified Corps Artillery that men were proceeding from south to the Haraumont-Ecurey Road, H.47.68.
- 18:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery (Batteries C, D and E), to support front of 65th Infantry Brigade.

SEPTEMBER 30TH

- 9:00 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on trench mortar battery at G.82.42, firing on 65th Infantry Brigade front.
- 14:30 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on batteries G.39.62, G.18.34.
- 16:30 Ordered Commanding Officer, 212th R. A. C., to fire on all observed batteries on front between left flank of his sector to Consenvoye and respond to all requests for fire from 131st Infantry.
- 19:00 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on battery on H.28.97.
- 19:15 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on outpost at H.23.62 and railroad gun H.29.62.
- 19:25 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on trench mortar at G.82.42.
- 22:50 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire on batteries at H.17.11 and H.18.92.



*Battery D, 106th Field Artillery (Captain John W. Pulleyn), in action along Samogeneux Road, Meuse-Argonne Offensive, November 1, 1918*



*German artillery put out of action between Gercourt and Meuse, October 12, 1918, by 52d Field Artillery Brigade*

#### OCTOBER 1ST

- 8:00 Notified Commanding Officer, 212th R. A. C., of order relieving them from duty with brigade.
- 11:40 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to move three batteries to positions near Moulin de Raffecourt.
- 15:30 Ordered 106th Field Artillery to fire with two batteries on Trench Anatolie and Trench de Balis at request of 18th French Division in support of attack to be made by them next morning at about 4:30 A. M.
- 17:00 212th R. A. C. Regiment commenced withdrawal.
- 19:35 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on battery at H.09.35.

#### OCTOBER 2D

- 6:30 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, fired on and silenced batteries at H.18.94 at request of Commanding General, 65th Infantry Brigade.
- 15:00 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery, to send 1st Battalion, 105th Field Artillery, forward to vicinity of Bois Jure.
- 17:30 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to fire on battery in Bois de Consenvoye.
- 19:35 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to fire on battery at H.19.11.

#### OCTOBER 3D


- 4:10 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to fire on machine guns at H.16.94, H.18.92, H.19.90.
- 12:45 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on batteries at H.86.70 and H.83.70.
- 13:00 Ordered 102d Ammunition Train to proceed with all available trucks loaded with ammunition to 4th Division at Cuisy.
- 15:30 Requested Corps Artillery to fire on battery at G.89.71.
- 16:25 Ordered Commanding Officer, 105th Field Artillery, to move the 1st Battalion into concealed positions along the northwest edge of Bois de la Cote Lemont. This was ordered by Division Commander.
- 18:00 Issued Field Order No. 3 covering missions of the units of the brigade for protection of the right flank of the 4th Division—which was participating in the attack of the III Army Corps (F. O. 26—33d Division, October 3, 1918).
- 19:35 Ordered Commanding Officer, 106th Field Artillery, to fire on battery at H.09.30.

During the above period the casualties in the brigade were three officers wounded; two enlisted men killed and seventeen wounded.

On October 4th a new operation was undertaken. The III American Corps was to continue its attack on the hostile positions west of the Meuse. The 33d Division was the right division of the corps and was to hold its position and protect the east flank of the 4th Division, which was in the center. The 52d Field Artillery Brigade was to give artillery support in protection of this flank and to neutralize the enemy artillery in the Bois de Chatillon, Bois de Sartelle and the two ravines east of Liny-devant-Dun. Brioules and the ravine north, as well as the trench northwest of Brioules, were to be bombarded between H and H plus 2. Special attention was to be given to eventual counter-attacks from the latter region.

Batteries C, D and E of the 106th Field Artillery continued in their positions south of Le Mort Homme as did Batteries E and F of the 105th Field Artillery. The 106th Field Artillery less the batteries mentioned fired from positions about 3,000 meters west of Forges.

It was the mission of the 106th Field Artillery to neutralize the



*Lieutenant Lilly and men, 106th Field Artillery, examining captured 37 c. m. gun*



*Near post command of 79th Division, Bois de Consenvoye, November 10, 1918*

enemy artillery in the Bois de Chatillon, in the Bois de Sartelle and in the two ravines east of Liny-devant-Dun and east of the Meuse within its zone of fire.

The 105th Field Artillery was directed to move the 1st Battalion to the northwest edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont to neutralize hostile fire and to break up possible enemy counter-attacks. The 2d Battalion of this regiment was directed to fire on enemy batteries within its zone of fire east of the Meuse.

The 104th Field Artillery was ordered to neutralize fire from points in the vicinity of Vilosnes with one battalion, and to attack enemy batteries east of the Meuse with the other battalion.

The zero hour was fixed at 5:25 A. M., on October 4th. The attack went off as scheduled. At 6:00 A. M. the 1st Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery was directed not to fire until a specific mission was given the batteries. At 9:45 A. M. the Commanding Officer of the 105th Field Artillery was directed to change the position of his 1st Battalion to the vicinity of Bois Jure in order to fire north of Vilosnes in aid of the 4th Division. At 1:40 P. M. the Regimental Commander was directed to have the 2d Battalion fire on Brabant and Consenvoye. Numerous other missions for batteries of the brigade were imposed on them throughout the day.

The following day, October 5th, the 106th Field Artillery was directed to fire on Haraumont and Liny-devant-Dun at 12:50 P. M. Parts of regiments of the brigade continued in action throughout the day.

On the following day, October 6th, fire action was continued by the brigade. Late in the afternoon the 2d Battalion of the 104th Field Artillery moved to the vicinity of Ravin de Raffecourt.

On October 6th the 33d Division, including the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, was transferred to the XVII French Army Corps, Major General Henri Claudel commanding, for the purpose of attacking enemy positions on the heights on the east bank of the Meuse. From these positions a constant enfilading artillery fire had been directed against the American army's front lines and approaches so effectively as to seriously menace its progress and cause heavy casualties. The divisions participating in this attack were, in their order from right to left, the 26th French, the 18th French, the 29th American and the 33d American, which latter was to operate on the east bank of the Meuse River, from the river bank to the 24th parallel.

The original plan, so far as it concerned the 33d Division, called for the participation of one battalion of the 132d Infantry, supported by the machine gun battalions and a groupement of artillery consisting of the 104th Field Artillery, the 2d Battalion of the 105th Field Artillery and the 2d Battalion of the 106th Field Artillery, under the command of Colonel Emery T. Smith of the 106th Field Artillery. The remainder of the artillery brigade was retained by the Artillery Brigade Commander for additional artillery support. The attack commenced at 5 A. M. on October 8th and, as it progressed, the amount of opposition which developed required the reinforcement of the attacking troops by the entire 66th

Infantry Brigade, supported by all the machine gun battalions, and the subsequent relief of that brigade by the 65th Infantry Brigade. The infantry on three successive days carried its attack to its objective opposite the Giselher Stellung, but was ordered each time to retire to make contact with the 29th Division on its right, which had been unable to overcome the strong enemy opposition in the Bois de Consenvoye, Bois de la Grande Montagne and Bois d'Ormont. During this battle over 5,000 prisoners were captured by the XVII French Army Corps.

From October 11th to 13th the 52d Field Artillery Brigade was occupied continually in responding to calls from the infantry for supporting fire and counter battery work.

On October 14th the 52d Field Artillery Brigade supported by its fire an attack by the 29th Division on the heights of the Grande Montagne.

On October 18th the Artillery Brigade Commander moved his P. C. forward to .9579, on the northwest edge of the Bois de Forges, and on October 19th the groupement under Colonel Smith was terminated and all units regrouped as a brigade.

From this time the brigade continued to assist the 33d Division in holding the position attained by them and held under heavy observed enemy artillery fire which continued day and night.

On October 21st the brigade was relieved by the artillery of the 15th Colonial Division (French) and directed to march to rest billets in the vicinity of Dieue, south of Verdun.

On October 25th, while the units of the brigade were en route to their rest billets, orders were received detaching the 52d Field Artillery Brigade from the 33d Division and attaching it to the 79th Division for immediate return to the line. During the night of October 29th-30 the 79th Division relieved the 29th Division, becoming part of the 17th French Corps, and in support of the 79th Division the brigade relieved the 158th Field Artillery Brigade in the Grande Montagne sector. Brigade Headquarters were established at Vacherauville with the headquarters of the 79th Division. On the 30th orders were issued for the brigade to take over part of the sector held by the 51st Field Artillery Brigade, namely from Belleau Wood to Bois d'Ormont, inclusive. This extension was effected by the 105th Field Artillery taking over the added sector, the 104th Field Artillery assuming the missions of the 105th Field Artillery, and the 106th Field Artillery assuming those of the howitzer regiment of the 51st Field Artillery Brigade.

On November 1st, 2d and 3d, in addition to responding to calls for artillery support from the 79th Division, the brigade participated with its fire in the attack by the III American Corps to advance its line along the Cunel-Brieulle road and farther to the west of the Meuse, and from Brieulle to Dun-sur-Meuse to the north, which resulted in forcing the enemy from the heights on the west bank of the Meuse.

On November 4th the 158th Infantry Brigade, supported by the 105th Field Artillery, started a reconnaissance in force in the direction of the Borne de Cornouiller, and the 157th Brigade, supported by the 104th Field

Artillery, commenced two reconnaissances in force in the direction of the Bois de la Grande Montagne toward Reveille and Etrayes. In conjunction with this attack the 15th Colonial French Division attacked on the left. An engagement developed in the direction of the Borne de Cornouiller, involving the entire 158th Infantry Brigade and a large part of the 157th Infantry Brigade and requiring the supporting fire of the 106th Field Artillery. After repeated attacks on successive days the enemy, on November 7th, was forced to retire and the 79th Division, pivoting on its right, advanced its left to Solferino Ferme, connecting up with the 15th Colonial French Division, which had crossed the Meuse at Vilosnes, taken Haraumont Ridge, and reached the Ferme. The 79th Division, in this advance, broke through the strong Giselher Stellung and the formidable Kriemheld Stellung positions of the enemy line.

On November 8th the 79th Division pressed its advantage, advanced through the Bois de la Grande Montagne, Bois d'Etrayes, Bois de Wavrille, Belleu Bois, Bois des Chenes and Bois d'Ormont, and captured the towns of Reveille, Etraye, Wavrille and Crepion, the artillery advancing in close support. As a result of this action the enemy was driven from the heights of the Meuse across the Tinte Brook to the abrupt Hills 328, 319, Cote de Morimont, Cote du Chateau and Cote d'Orne.

On November 10th the division attacked again, the 157th Infantry Brigade advancing against Hills 328 and 319 under the supporting fire of the 104th Field Artillery, and the 158th Infantry Brigade attacking the Cote de Morimont supported by the 105th Field Artillery, the 106th Field Artillery supporting both attacks. The artillery brigade's P. C. was moved forward on this date with that of the division to Molleville Ferme.

The 157th Infantry Brigade captured Hills 328 and 319, but the 158th Infantry Brigade, because of the dominating position of the Cote d'Orne on its flank, was unable to reach its objective. The following day an attack, ordered the night before, was launched against the Cote d'Orne. After the attack had started, and while it was in progress, orders were received at 8:25 A. M. to cease hostilities at 11 o'clock. Orders were immediately sent to all units of the brigade and reached them in time to discontinue all firing at the designated hour, up to which time all the guns of the brigade were in action.


For the rest of the day the gun crews stood by their guns ready to respond to any calls for fire in case of any enemy reaction. Later the crews were reduced one-half and then relieved altogether.

All during the afternoon of November 11th, and for days thereafter, great numbers of French, Russian, Belgian and some American prisoners, released from the German lines, came into the division's sector and were sent to the rear. Over 5,000 were evacuated.

The 104th Field Artillery was commanded by Colonel Merritt H. Smith until he became ill, October 18th, after which it was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John T. Delaney, who was succeeded on November 6th by Colonel Charles C. Pulis. The following notes on operations of the regiment give an accurate and interesting account of its activities:



*Colonel Merritt H. Smith, 104th Field Artillery*



*Colonel John T. Delaney, 104th Field Artillery*



## PHASE I

On September 25, 1918, the batteries of the 104th Field Artillery were collected on the Le Claire-Esnes Road, about 500 meters west of Le Claire. The general direction of fire was north towards Bethincourt and Forges. Colonel M. H. Smith commanded the regiment with his post of command in the Bois Bourrus, about 300 meters southeast of Le Claire.

The lines at this time ran generally east and west along Forges Brook through Bethincourt and thence west. The lines crossed the Meuse River between Samogneux and Brabant. At this part of the front the lines were widely separated, from 500 to 1,000 meters—the Allied lines were well up on the southern slope of the Forges Ravine and the German lines were up on the northern slope towards Forges Wood. The Germans had outposts in Forges and Bethincourt and some bombing posts close to the brook.

The general character of the sector had been quiet. The lines had remained undisturbed for about fourteen months. The line was thinly held. The French, who occupied this sector before the Americans, had held their artillery fire down to a minimum, and the only Allied artillery fire of any magnitude that had taken place in this sector for months had been the demonstration conducted in connection with the Allied attack at St. Mihiel.

The 104th Field Artillery was supporting—as a part of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade—the 129th, 130th, 131st and 132d Infantry Regiments of the 33d American Division.

The demonstration in connection with the St. Mihiel attack had increased the enemy artillery activity of the section, but the sector was still quiet.

The batteries of the regiment at their position near Le Claire were firing at long range in order to reach the enemy's front line and required "D" shell in order to go much beyond it.

The country in this sector was rolling and hilly. There is a certain amount of woodland such as the Bois Bourrus. Woodland nearer the line, such as the Bois des Corbeaux, had been practically destroyed by shell fire. Forges Wood was still thick. The towns which had played a part in the great battle of Verdun—along the actual line—were destroyed completely. These were Chattancourt, Cumieres, Forges and Bethincourt. The roads were good, except where for months they had been a part of no man's land. This included that part of the Cumieres-Forges Road that lay in the Forges Ravine and that part of the Cumieres-Bethincourt Road where it ran over the Mort Homme into Bethincourt.

Observation of the enemy's line was easily obtainable from observation posts on the Mort Homme or in the vicinity of the Bois des Corbeaux. The enemy also had good observation from Forges Wood, from Montfaucon and from the right bank of the River Meuse.

So far as reported patrols of the Allies had not crossed Forges Brook on reconnaissance. Forges Wood was reported to be extensively organized for defense. The right bank of the Meuse River was reported to be held by Austro-Hungarian troops. The centers of resistance—Forges and Bethincourt—were reported to be held by the enemy, with second rate troops.

The major operation of September 26th was conducted with the right regiment of the 33d American Division as a pivot. The 104th Field Artillery was instructed to support the right battalion of the 132d Infantry. The 132d Infantry was to be the right element of this turning movement. The attack was to move straight forward and then turn to the right, coming to a stop along the River Meuse at the railroad track.

A very heavy artillery preparation was laid down by Army and Corps Artillery, late on the night of September 25th and through the early hours of September 26th. At 5:30 A. M. on September 26th, the 104th Field Artillery started a rolling barrage to precede the advance of its infantry battalion. The local plan of attack of the 132d Infantry was to avoid a frontal attack on Forges Wood and to take it by going around it.

Therefore, the narrow lane of barrage of the 104th Field Artillery first moved straight forward to the north and then turned to the right. Prisoners taken in this action said that they could not withstand the artillery preparation and barrage. The result was that the infantry advance in this sector was completely successful. The infantry crossed some of the marshy ground in the Forges Brook bottom by foot bridges constructed by the engineers. The rolling barrage rested for an appreciable time just north of the Forges-Bethincourt Road and the infantry after crossing the brook was re-formed for attack along that road.

Approaching the Forges Wood from the flank, the 132d Infantry took the wood with comparatively slight loss, and moved forward to a line along the railroad track, extending from the Forges Brook northwest to the cross roads at 22.6—79.5. After the attack the 104th Field Artillery laid on a protective barrage in front of its infantry and just on the other side of the River Meuse.

For this protective barrage the guns of the 104th Field Artillery were laid at extreme range and some of them could execute the mission only with "D" shell. The attack generally of the 33d American Division had been successful. General King's infantry brigade on the left had moved up to the ground overlooking the Meuse at Vilosnes. The gun positions at Le Claire had originally been planned by the French as defensive positions, and they were not well adapted for attack, especially when the attack had been successful. Therefore, it became necessary to move three batteries of the regiment forward.

Batteries "C," "D" and "E" were moved to the ravine immediately north of the Moulin de Raffecourt and the post of command of this battalion was placed in the Trench de Misery at the southwest corner of Forges Wood. During the hours involved in the move of this battalion, Major Austin's guns were extended to include the entire regimental protective barrage.


At this time, because of some difficulty encountered by elements on the left, the 105th Field Artillery—the other light regiment of the 52d Artillery Brigade—were turned to the left and the guns of this forward battalion of the 104th were required to be pointed north against the enemy in the Bois de Chatillon and the general vicinity of Vilosnes. For a time the 104th Field Artillery was spread over a very wide front, stretching from the vicinity of Brabant on the southeast to the Bois de Chatillon on the northwest. There had been no advance up to this time on the right bank of the Meuse. It is true that French patrols had made night reconnaissance into Brabant, but it had been found expedient to withdraw the advanced posts established there.

One of the biggest difficulties in connection with the position of the forward Battalion near Forges Wood was the difficulty of transport.


The engineers at once started to construct the road northwest out of Cumieres over a shoulder of the Mort Homme, to meet the Forges-Bethincourt Road near Bethincourt. The Cumieres-Forges Road was also repaired. There was a good deal of shell fire of the enemy against both these roads and the jam of traffic due to the advance of troops made the problem of transport a difficult one. The positions of the guns of the forward battalion were, of course, in the open with simple camouflage against overhead observation.

The infantry of General Wolf's brigade—that is, the right brigade—had dug in along the railroad track and were extended north of a point opposite Sivry sur Meuse. General King's brigade was facing north. General King's brigade was subjected to considerable artillery fire from the direction of Vilosnes. General King called for considerable special fire from the forward battalion, and it was reported that such fire was effective.

At this time, the enemy had complete terrestrial observation of the terrain north of Forges Wood. The observation was obtained from the high ground across the Meuse in the vicinity of Haraumont. The enemy also had direct observation of a good part of the Cumieres-Forges Road and the valley of Forges Brook. Hostile artillery fire was heavy on many of the roads, such as the road west out of Gercourt and west out of Danneveaux. The town of Danneveaux was heavily shelled with gas.



*2d Battalion, 106th Field Artillery, cleaning howitzers after a "shoot." Brabant Road*



*Camouflaged roads under enemy observation, near Forges*

The right elements—infantry elements—of the 33d American Division were subjected to some front line artillery fire of the enemy, but not as much as were the left elements, that is, General King's brigade. The battery positions of the 104th Artillery near Forges Wood were subjected to considerable artillery fire of the enemy, none of which did much damage.

## PHASE II

From Samogneux on the southeast to Briulles on the northwest, the ground on the right side of the Meuse rises very rapidly from the bottom land of the Meuse to the high points of what is called the heights of the Meuse. The heights of the Meuse lying on the right bank of the river are heavily wooded at the crest and have all the aspects of splendid defensive military positions. With the enemy still in possession of these heights, the American army was extended forward and echeloned from south to north with its right flank exposed to the observation and the fire of the enemy on the high ground on the heights of the Meuse.

It was reported that the Austro-Hungarian units on the right side of the river had been supplanted by first rate German troops.

On the 6th of October Batteries "A," "B" and "F" of the 104th Field Artillery were moved north into the immediate vicinity of the other batteries so that they might be within effective striking distance of the enemy's lines.

On the 8th of October an attack was set in motion that had for its object the taking of the high ground of the Meuse Heights. The burden of this attack was on the French troops on the right side of the river and the part of the 33d Division began only after the first attack had been successful. It was planned that the 132d Regiment of Infantry should move across the river by bridges at Samogneux and Brabant and at five hours after the H hour proceed along the open country near the river and north of the Consenvoye-Etraye Road to the ridge on which is the Bois de Chaume. The 104th Field Artillery laid down a rolling barrage to make this advance possible, and the advance was entirely successful. The rolling barrage moved along in a line parallel to the direction of the river north of Consenvoye, and the barrage was finished near the river, becoming more concentrated as the ground became more difficult as it ascended to the wooded heights. There was at first a report of the light artillery having fired short, but this was fortunately found to be untrue and it was found that an element of the infantry had mistaken the cross road on which it was to form.

The 33d Division was successful in its part of this operation, but considerable difficulty had been experienced by the Allied infantry to the right, which had run into the very difficult country of the woods on the high ground.

On the 10th of October Batteries "C," "D" and "E" crossed the river by the bridge at Consenvoye and took position just south of the village in the vicinity of the German trench system that runs east and west at this point.

The infantry position in the vicinity of the Bois de Chaume was a difficult one. It had been found necessary to withdraw the infantry outposts from the most distant points that they had attained, because of the very severe artillery fire of the enemy to which they were subjected. Their first position, directly observable from the high ground in the vicinity of Haraumont, was one that could not be sustained.

Colonel Davis, of the 132d Regiment of Infantry, which had made the original advance on the right side of the river, had been relieved by General King's brigade. The regimental and brigade command posts of infantry were very close to Major Austin's posts near Consenvoye and the result was splendid liaison between the artillery and the infantry. The fire called for by the infantry commander was delivered by Batteries "C," "D," and "E," of Major Austin's command, within a very few minutes after the time it was asked for, and the infantry was able to see quickly the effects of artillery fire.

The command post of the regiment was moved into the northwest corner of Forges Wood and contact between elements of the regiment was much more easily maintained. It was still found that Batteries "A," "B" and "F" were too far from the

enemy's lines to be of maximum value and they were therefore moved to the southwest edge of the Bois Jure. This was an exposed position, especially from observation on the right, and it was fortunate that these batteries in this position were not called upon to fire.

During this period there had not been much advance on the part of troops to the right into the high wooded ground of the Meuse Heights, and the general regimental sector was subjected to harassing fire both from the north and from the east. The rationing and supply of Major Austin's command near Consenvoye were made difficult by the almost constant bombardment of the Consenvoye bridge and the roads both north and south of Forges Wood were subjected to harassing fire. There were occasional bursts of fire at high speed, delivered by the enemy, but most of the hostile fire seemed to be with one or two guns and at more or less regulated intervals. Gas was used by the enemy against Forges Wood and against the infantry and artillery positions at the right side of the river.

While the regiment was in this position, Colonel Smith was taken seriously ill and was sent to the rear by order of the regimental surgeon. Lieutenant Colonel John T. Delaney took command of the regiment. In this position the division was relieved by French Colonial troops.

### PHASE III

From the vicinity of Brabant and Samogneux the country rises steadily to the high ground of the Meuse Heights, and the general locality of Haumont Woods, Brabant Woods, Molleville Woods and Etraye Woods is reached from southwest by two roads, one the Brabant-Etraye Road and one the Samogneux-Crepion Road. The first mounts almost immediately and stays on the high ground until it drops down into Etraye. The second stays on the low ground of a deep ravine until it reaches the foot of Hill 360, when it rises quickly over that hill and ascends more gently into Crepion.

On the 29th of October the regiment moved to take position in the general locality of Malbrouck Hill and to relieve the 322d Regiment of Artillery, of the 158th Field Artillery Brigade. The 322d Artillery was laid with a defensive barrage on the right sub-sector of the sector Grande-Montagne. It supported the centers of resistance Wavrille and Etraye.

The Volker-Stellung of the German defensive system runs east out of a point just south of Consenvoye over the high ground across the Brabant Wood, skirts the Ormont Wood and goes east at the south edge of Moirey Wood. At the point where this line crosses the Brabant-Etraye Road, Major Seymour's battalion went into position and farther up the road on the left side Major Austin's battalion went into position.

The infantry position for both Allies and Germans was a difficult one. Most of the country was wooded. Observation was very difficult. The first twenty-four hours that Major Austin's battalion was in position a protective barrage was called for, upon a nervous call through the liaison officer of infantry.

After it had been in position relatively but a few hours, the brigade sector was moved to the right and the 104th Artillery took over a sector bounded generally by the right edge of Ormont Wood and the left edge of Houpey Wood.

At this time Colonel Charles C. Pulis took command of the 104th Field Artillery.

The 104th Field Artillery supported the 313th and 314th Field Artillery. The 313th Infantry held a short line running through the center of the Ormont Wood with one battalion, with one battalion in support in Brabant Wood and one battalion in reserve south of Haumont. The lines of this regiment were short because this ground was difficult to hold. Three times the Americans had taken the entire Ormont Wood and three times they had been driven out of the eastern half by a very destructive enemy fire. The Ormont Wood is comparatively thick, is traversed by a good many paths and has in it several strong dugouts. At the time the 104th Field Artillery took over this sector the infantry was convinced that the eastern half of the wood was infested with machine guns, pill boxes, at close intervals.

The guns in both positions were without protection except for overhead camouflage. There were several strong dugouts for command posts and the like. It developed that the enemy had direct observation from the high ground of either side of Ormont Wood. The result was that during the first days of the regiment's occupation of this position, the entire sector from Haumont to the southern point of Consenvoye Wood was subjected to a very severe artillery fire. This fire was particularly severe along points of the Brabant-Etraye Road and in the Haumont Ravine and the ravines that meet the Haumont Ravine from the northeast. The enemy was accustomed to deliver bursts of fire consisting of anywhere from 60 to 120 shots, delivered without warning and with great rapidity against a single locality. These bursts of fire during the first five days of occupation of this position were very frequent, but were in descending scale towards the last. This enemy fire was delivered with great accuracy and did great damage along such points as the bottom of the Haumont Ravine, where ration trains were compelled to proceed. Enemy fire was severe against support positions such as the Brabant Wood and against ravines such as the Ravine de Coassinvaux, the Ravine de Bourvaux and the Fond de Valonsevaux.

During the stay of the regiment in this position no attack was made in its immediate front. But the infantry on the left was active in attack and the guns of this regiment were frequently called upon to assist in such activity. The assumption is the general locality of the Ormont Wood and the Belleu Wood had been found so difficult for attack that it had been decided to make a turning movement to the east and go around this difficult high wooded position formed by the Ormont Wood and the Belleu Wood.

All this time the artillery positions, the infantry support positions and even the infantry front line positions were subjected to a very severe harassing fire, and to relieve this pressure the 104th Field Artillery was called upon to deliver a good deal of concentration fire, retaliation fire and harassing fire. Some of this fire was delivered with great rapidity.

Fortunately the liaison between infantry and artillery at this time was very close. Excellent telephone communication was maintained. Liaison officers of artillery had been sent to brigade, regimental and battalion headquarters of infantry. The result was almost immediate response to the demands of the infantry, thus fulfilling the instructions of the commanding officer of the regiment that one of the primary functions of the light artillery was to fulfil quickly the demands of the infantry. At this time the regimental expenditure of ammunition in a day often amounted to 4,000 projectiles.

The infantry commanders were especially interested in retaliation fire that would relieve the pressure on certain portions of their area. It was found that concentrations of fire rapidly delivered against Crepion lessened the enemy's artillery fire in the upper end of the Haumont Ravine.


About the 5th of November the artillery fire in the general regimental sector seemed to decrease. There was still considerable fire by gun and by platoon, but the rapid concentrations delivered with bursts of fire seemed to lessen.

About this time gas was thrown over by one or two guns on certain areas, with concentrations of two or three hundred projectiles, but little harm was done unless it was in the very low ground.

The infantry attack had been successfully carried forward on the left and the plan was to squeeze out the enemy on the high ground in the vicinity of Hill 360.

On November 8th the commanding officer ordered Batteries "A," "B" and "C" forward, along the Brabant-Etraye Road, to a point almost in the woods, so that they could fire at the enemy's front line, at a range of about 2,500 meters.

About 3 o'clock on the afternoon of November 8th the enemy apparently became fearful of attack along the Ormont Wood, or was desirous of covering his retreat. At any rate a really tremendous artillery fire was delivered by him about the base of Hill 360 and extending slightly to the right and left. This fire continued with great severity until about 6 o'clock, when it decreased and spent itself in a gas attack on the Haumont-Batiue bottom and the Ravine Rechimpre.



*37 cm. howitzer captured by 33d Division men of 1st Battalion Headquarters,  
106th Field Artillery "investigating"*



*Near Gercourt. German guns abandoned, September 26, 1918.  
Objective of 52d Field Artillery Brigade*

## PHASE IV

After this demonstration on November 8th it was learned that the enemy had retired out of the Ormont Wood and there was from that time comparatively little artillery activity of the enemy in the area. On November 9th not a shot was fired up to 11 o'clock. Then there was one flanking gun that fired on the high ground towards Haumont Wood. On November 9th Batteries "A" and "E" went into position near Ormont Farm. The enemy had retired rapidly in front and first made a stand on Hill 328 and the high hills of the Cote d'Orne and the Cote de Chateau. When the two leading batteries moved forward it was impossible for them to go any farther because the road from the Ormont Farm into Crepion was not passable. Very severe artillery fire had been delivered against this road at the summit of Hill 360 and there were two hits directly on the road of projectiles larger in caliber than 300 millimeters.

While at this time the enemy was not firing heavily on this area he still had a direct observation from the high hills to the east on any point eastward of the 360 Hill.

The commanding officer of the regiment made every effort to see if guns could not be got in position in this vicinity of the Peine Wood by going around Molleville Farm. But the roads through rain and shell fire made such a thing impossible.

On November 9th the fire of this regiment played a very big part in making possible the successful attack of the infantry against the entrenched hill just north of the town of Chaumont and on the next day the same thing was true of the attack on Hill 319.

On November 10th Battery "D" moved to a position near Crepion, which was as near the line as even the infantry commander thought the light artillery should go.

On November 11th, at 10:15, this regiment fired its last shot with one battery in position in Crepion, three at Ormont Farm and two near Malbrouck Hill.

The experiences of the 105th Field Artillery were similar to those of the 104th, and are contained in some detail in the following notes on the operations of the regiment which were prepared by Colonel DeWitt C. Weld, the regimental commander.

## PHASE I

### OPERATIONS OF THE 105TH FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT FROM SEPTEMBER 26TH TO OCTOBER 3D

1. On September 23d Regimental Field Order No. 1 was issued, placing the batteries of the two battalions in position. This was based on warning orders issued by the 33d Division and 52d Field Artillery Brigade. On the afternoon of September 26th the Commanding General, 33d Division, called all artillery commanders to his P. C., announced "D" day and "H" hour, based on Field Order No. 23, 33d Division, A. E. F., and Field Order No. 4, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, and Regimental Field Order No. 2 was issued.

2. At the hour indicated (5:30, September 27th) all batteries of the regiment opened fire and continued without cessation to the end of the schedule. Observation of fire was impossible, due to the heavy fog and smoke. Liaison was established by detail of one lieutenant and six enlisted men with the attacking battalion of the 132d Infantry, which we were supporting, and one officer and four runners with the Regimental Headquarters, 132 Infantry, and one officer and two runners with the Commanding General, 66th Infantry Brigade. This never failed, and I was kept constantly in touch with the progress of the action.

3. Nothing to report.

4. (a) No advance made by the artillery.  
(b) No prisoners taken.  
(c) No materiel captured by the artillery.



(d) Casualties September 26th to October 3d, inclusive, were as follows:

Killed—One.

Wounded—Thirteen.

(e) Nothing to report.

(f) Nothing to report.

(g) Prisoners' statements indicate the accuracy and intensity of the artillery fire, and subsequent inspection of the terrain bore out these statements.

(h) Terrain hilly and heavily wooded in parts, necessitating a constant raising of angle of site during barrage.

(i) Conclusions. The attack was well planned and well executed, and the artillery support adequate and accurate. The difficulties of the terrain with a single road caused an unavoidable delay in the movement forward of the artillery.

5. 1/20,000 map showing sector limits, positions and advances each day is attached.

#### SEPTEMBER 28TH

The roads having been reported as prepared for the advance of artillery, the 1st Battalion was ordered forward to positions reconnoitered in the vicinity of the Mill de Raffecourt, based on Field Order No. 24, 33d Division, which was complied with, but upon arrival of the head of the column at the designated place at the hour set, the entire battalion was turned back to their positions by a colonel of the Military Police, who refused to allow them to proceed. The movement was repeated the following day and the positions were successfully occupied.

#### OCTOBER 2D

Regimental Field Order No. 4 was issued, directing the 1st Battalion to move forward from its positions near the Mill de Raffecourt to positions reconnoitered in the vicinity of the Bois de Sachet, by direction of the Commanding General, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

#### OCTOBER 3D

Addenda to Field Order No. 4 was issued, based on Field Order No. 26, 33d Division and Field Order No. 5, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, directing the 1st Battalion Commander to move his battalion into concealed positions along the northwest edge of the Bois de la Cote Lemont to neutralize hostile fire and break up counter-attacks between the Bois de Brioules, Bois de Foret and Brioules-sur-Meuse, two batteries in line and one in reserve, movement to be completed before 5:00 A. M., October 4th.

#### PHASE II

#### FROM OCTOBER 4TH TO OCTOBER 24TH, INCLUSIVE

#### OCTOBER 4TH

1. In compliance with Field Order No. 26, 33d Division, and Field Order No. 5, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, Batteries "A" and "C," 1st Battalion, succeeded in getting up into the Bois de la Cote Lemont on the edge of the thick underbrush at a high point, being heavily shelled and gassed during the operation. They were also subjected to heavy machine gun and rifle fire, being close to the infantry front lines. Battery "B" was in reserve.

2. The 1st Battalion remained in position during the entire day but were not called upon to fire, as there were no counter-attacks, and the infantry did not need or wish for neutralizing fire of any kind. The battalion was ordered back to its positions near the Bois de Sachet at dusk. Beginning at the "H" hour (5:25) in accordance with Field Order No. 5, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, the 2d Battalion, Bat-



*8-inch naval gun (French) used to supplement the fire of 52d Field Artillery Brigade*



*Men of 1st Battalion Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Sivry, Meuse.  
Meuse-Argonne, October 20, 1918*

teries "D," "E" and "F," executed several missions of harassing neutralization and interdiction fire on the east bank of the Meuse.

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary:

(a) No advance made by the artillery.

(b) No prisoners taken.

(c) No materiel captured by the artillery.

(d) Casualties from October 4th to 24th, inclusive, were as follows:

Killed—None.

Wounded—Ten.

(e) Nothing to report.

(f) Nothing to report.

(g) Artillery support as indicated above.

(h) Terrain heavily wooded in parts and under enemy's observation from higher ground, especially from east bank of the Meuse.

(i) The attack was not successful, and the employment of the 1st Battalion as indicated caused it to remain inactive for twenty-four hours.

5. 1/20,000 map showing sector limits, positions and advances each day is attached.

#### OCTOBER 6TH-7TH

1st Battalion ordered by Field Message 7, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, to take over mission of 1st Battalion, 104th Field Artillery, and execute harassing and neutralization fire as directed.

#### OCTOBER 8TH

1. Regimental Field Order No. 5, issued on the 7th, based on Field Order No. 6, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, attached the 2d Battalion of this regiment to a groupement under Colonel E. T. Smith in support of the infantry detachment of this division temporarily attached to the 17th French Corps operating on the east bank of the Meuse, in order to perform which mission the battalion was moved, beginning at dusk on October 7th, to new positions on the slopes of the Cote de l'Oie.

2. Action opened as directed at "H" hour (5:30 A. M.) and continued in accordance with schedule. Liaison officers reported objective gained at 11:55 A. M.

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary. Terrain open and rising ground over which the entire barrage could be observed. Infantry reported shots from friendly artillery. It was afterwards proved to their satisfaction that there were no shots from our artillery, but that it was German fire from the southeast, where the line dipped sharply to the south.

#### OCTOBER 9TH

Action resumed on east bank of the Meuse, second objective gained. Counter-attack by the enemy drove back the line of the 29th Division Infantry and caused the left held by the 33d Division to retire.

#### OCTOBER 10TH

Attack resumed at 6:00 A. M. with slight gains, the 2d Battalion again supporting.

#### OCTOBER 12TH

In accordance with Field Message 10, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, the 2d Battalion was ordered to move at dusk and to complete the movement before daylight to new positions reconnoitered on the southern edge of the Bois de Jure in the vicinity of Gercourt. At the same time the Regimental Commander reconnoitered new position for his P. C. east of the two battalions, slightly north of Consenvoye on the west bank of the Meuse.

#### OCTOBER 13TH

Regimental Field Order No. 6 issued, based on Field Order No. 8, 52d Field Artillery Brigade. Mission to assist by artillery preparation in the attack of the 29th Division in the sector east of the 34th meridian. Operation to commence at 5:30 A. M., October 14th. At 6:10 P. M. Field Message No. 11, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, ordered the postponement of the attack twenty-four hours and changed the mission of the 2d Battalion to the execution of fire on Sivry-sur-Meuse to cover the construction of emplacements of the 102d Trench Mortar Battery on the west bank of the Meuse opposite.

#### OCTOBER 14TH

The 2d Battalion ordered to execute neutralization fire on Villeneuve Farm from "H" minus thirty to "H" during the postponed attack, Battery "A," 1st Battalion, taking over the mission of covering the construction of trench mortar emplacements. Regimental Field Order No. 7, issued at 5:30 P. M., based on Field Order No. 9, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, to support the 29th Division in the continuation of the attack on the 15th.

#### OCTOBER 15TH

Action ordered on the 14th begun at 7:30 A. M.

#### OCTOBER 17TH-20TH

Harassing and neutralization fire executed in accordance with Operation Orders, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

#### OCTOBER 21ST

Regimental Field Order No. 8, based on Field Order No. 30, 33d Division, and Field Order No. 12, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, was issued, giving details of the withdrawal of the regiment from the sector upon relief by French units of the 15th Colonial Division, taking over the sector.

#### OCTOBER 22D

Regimental Field Order No. 9, issued in compliance with Field Order No. 30, 33d Division, for the second stage of the relief.

#### PHASE III

FROM OCTOBER 25TH TO NOVEMBER 8TH, INCLUSIVE

#### OCTOBER 25TH

52d Field Artillery Brigade transferred to 79th Division.

#### OCTOBER 27TH

Regimental Field Order No. 10, based on Field Order No. 28, 79th Division, was issued, giving details of the relief of the 29th Division; the 1st Battalion to reconnoiter positions to the north of those then held by the 2d Battalion, 323d Field Artillery, 158th Field Artillery Brigade, northeast of Brabant, and to occupy them on the night of the 28th-29th; the 2d Battalion to reconnoiter positions to the west of those occupied by the 1st Battalion of the same regiment and occupy them on the night of 29th-30th. Mission to take over this sector in support of the 158th Infantry Brigade, 79th Division, in defense.

#### OCTOBER 28TH-NOVEMBER 1ST

Taking over sector of 323d Field Artillery and performing sixty-five missions of concentration, area harassing and protective barrages.

#### NOVEMBER 2D

Regimental Field Order No. 11, based on Operation Order No. 5, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, calling for the support of a strong reconnaissance with the idea of

penetrating a limited distance into the enemy's territory and to hold, if possible, whatever ground gained within the limits of the advance.

#### NOVEMBER 3D

1. Attack was started at 5:30 A. M., the 316th Infantry moving forward against Hill 378, the 105th Field Artillery putting down a standing and rolling barrage lasting two hours.

2. Summary. The infantry reached and held ground up to the foot of Hill 378 and reported the artillery support adequate and accurate.

3. At 8:00 P. M. in accordance with Operation Order No. 8, 52d Field Artillery Brigade, the 105th Field Artillery was put at the disposal of the 158th Infantry Brigade, and in compliance with Field Order No. 12, Headquarters 158th Infantry Brigade, Regimental Field Order No. 12 for a further attack upon the sector in front of the positions held was issued, calling for harassing fire and barrage lasting three hours, to be begun on the morning of the 4th at 7:30 A. M. In order to obtain closer liaison, one officer and two runners were furnished to each of the two battalions of the 316th Infantry on the left in the forward lines, one officer and two runners to Regimental Headquarters, 316th Infantry, one officer and two runners to the battalion of the 315th Infantry in line, one officer and two runners to the Regimental Headquarters, 315th Infantry, and one officer and two runners to Headquarters, 158th Infantry Brigade. In addition, telephone and radio liaison was kept up.

#### NOVEMBER 4TH

1. The action began at the appointed hour, and at the request of the Infantry Brigade Commander during the attack one gun of Battery "D" was sent forward to take up a direct fire position to neutralize machine gun and trench mortar activity on the right flank, but due to the rainy weather, which had made the roads almost impassable with mud, and the very heavy grades over the hills, it was more than even eight horses could do in time to be of assistance, and it was ordered back to position.

2. Summary. The attack was partially successful and the infantry succeeded in taking and holding Hill 378, but was unable to advance beyond it to the second objective. Artillery support was pronounced effective and adequate.

#### NOVEMBER 5TH

1. At 1 A. M. Regimental Field Order No. 13, based on Field Order No. 13, Headquarters, 158th Infantry Brigade, was issued, covering a continuance of the attack and calling for intermittent harassing fire intermittently until "H" hour, followed by a standing and rolling barrage lasting three hours and fifteen minutes. The fire was opened at 5:00 A. M. as directed, and continued throughout the period. During the firing two guns of the 2d Battalion, each with two filled caissons, were ordered forward to take up advanced position to still further assist the infantry, but the engineers having reported that the German fire felled so many trees and cut up the roads so much that it would take eighteen hours to clear them, the Commanding Officer, 158th Infantry Brigade, ordered the guns back into their position.

2. Summary. The infantry, after advancing well forward, was subjected to a heavy counter-attack, which prevented them advancing but little beyond their original position.

#### NOVEMBER 6TH

1. At 1 A. M. Field Order No. 14, 158th Infantry Brigade, was received and Regimental Field Order No. 14 was issued calling for a continuance of the attack at 6 A. M. Intermittent harassing fire and barrage covering period from 6 A. M. to 11:40 A. M.

2. At noon the attack was ordered repeated, commencing at 2:15 P. M. Fire was opened as directed at 2:15 P. M., and carried through the same length period as the morning attack.

3. At 6 P. M., in accordance with Field Order No. 15, 158th Infantry Brigade, Regimental Field Order No. 16 for an attack on the morning of November 7th at 8:10 A. M. was issued.

#### NOVEMBER 7TH

Fire was opened without preliminary preparation with a standing barrage at 7:55 A. M. and lasted 15 minutes, followed by a rolling barrage and ending with a standing barrage lasting from 9:50 to 10:20. The change in method was successful and the attack proceeded to the final objective without check, the infantry reaching and organizing the strong positions in the Kriemheld Stellung.

#### NOVEMBER 8TH

In accordance with orders from the 158th Infantry Brigade Commander, Regimental Field Order No. 17 was issued, calling for the support of a further development of the attack toward the northeast in the direction of Etraye-Reville. The 2d Battalion was ordered to assist by concentrations and harassing fire and the 1st Battalion was ordered to immediately reconnoiter positions as far advanced as possible in the vicinity of Hill 378 or further forward if the attack progressed sufficiently. As a result of the reconnaissance, the battalion was moved forward the following night to positions east of the Villeneuve Farm and close up to the infantry lines.

#### SUMMARY

The terrain over which the attacks during this period were launched was of the most difficult character, deep valleys, high hills in most places, thickly wooded with dense undergrowth through which the infantry had to fight its way. Hill 378 and the Haraumont Ridge, which were the keys to the enemy's position, were difficult, as the infantry had to issue from the woods at the foot of these hills and advance up a bald slope without cover against strongly fortified positions flanked on the right by woods full of machine-gun nests. It was all the more, therefore, an achievement on their part to continue to return to the attack so many times until successful. The artillery support was strong and accurate and contributed materially to their success, according to the statements of prisoners and observers in the French lines, which were advanced somewhat on the left flank.

Casualties from October 25th to November 8th, inclusive, were as follows:

Killed—Four.

Wounded—Twenty-three.

1/20,000 map showing sector limits, positions and advances each day is attached.

#### PHASE IV

#### FROM NOVEMBER 9TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH, INCLUSIVE

#### NOVEMBER 9TH

On the morning of the 9th the 1st Battalion was ordered to reconnoiter positions still further forward, the infantry having advanced about three kilometers, and to make, if possible, positions as near the front lines as practicable, with direct observation from the hills from which the enemy had been driven, and to occupy these positions during the night, prepared to execute the missions covered by Regimental Field Order No. 18 based on Field Order issued by the 158th Infantry Brigade, which provided for an attack on the Cote de Chateau and Cote d'Orne, two hills rising from the plains beyond the town of Damvillers.

#### NOVEMBER 10TH


Attack began at 5:00 A. M. with heavy harassing fire on an indicated area, followed by a standing barrage commencing at 6 and lasting until a rolling barrage

Wald von Sivry.

Fort Bourrus.

Samogneuxmulde.

Champneuville.



*The above is a photographic copy of photogravure made by the Germans of the sector held by the 33d  
27th by the 33d Division and immediately turned over to the 33d Division.*

commenced at 6:30, the artillery support ending in a standing barrage lasting from 8:10 to 8:30 A. M. The attack was not pushed forward, however, on account of meeting unexpected opposition from machine-gun fire from the flanks on the slopes of the hill.


In the evening at 20 Hr., in compliance with orders from the Commanding General, 158th Infantry Brigade, Regimental Field Order No. 19 was issued, calling for a renewed attack on the morning of the 11th, the artillery fire commencing at 8 A. M. and lasting until 11:12 A. M. The 2d Battalion was ordered forward to positions reconnoitered by direction of the Regimental Commander and occupied near Etraye, with instructions to have the batteries in position before dawn of the 11th. All three batteries were in position before midnight. The 1st Battalion was in position at Reville, all within a range of less than 200 yards from the objective, one battery of each battalion being well forward, practically in open warfare positions in direct fire.

#### NOVEMBER 11TH

At 1 A. M. orders were received by telephone from the Commanding General, 158th Infantry Brigade, countermanding the previous orders, and directing me to place the regiment at the disposal of the Commanding Officer, 315th Infantry, who would make an attack supported by the 316th, which had previously been designated. After consultation with the Commanding Officer, 315th Infantry, Regimental Field Order No. 20 was issued, covering the attack to commence at 8 A. M., and I personally went forward to the P. C. of the Commanding Officer, 315th Infantry, and remained there during the attack.

A heavy fog rendered observation impossible, but fire was opened at 8 A. M.

At 9:12 A. M. Colonel Knowles, commanding the 315th Infantry, received the order transmitted by the Division Commander that hostilities would cease at 11 Hr., to continue the operations previously ordered with vigor until that time, and the necessary orders were issued to the batteries to secure compliance. The fire ceased promptly at 11 Hr. with the infantry in position but not attacking.



*American Division near le Mort Homme, September, 1918. The original was captured September 11th and turned over to General Wingate for the use of his brigade*

#### SUMMARY

The terrain was a broad open plain without cover, leading up to the foot of the two hills attacked, which rose from the plain to a considerable height quite precipitously. It was a difficult objective to gain, but a Prussian officer, questioned, stated that the artillery preparation had practically blown them from the hill and that the attack would surely have been successful if made. This position, once taken, would have left the enemy without a good defensive position upon which to make a stand until he had reached the other edge of the plain and the hills on the northeastern edge.

Casualties from November 9th to 11th, inclusive, were as follows:

Killed—None.

Wounded—Two.

1/20,000 map showing sector limits, positions and advances each day is attached.

#### CONCLUSIONS

I attribute the remarkably small number of casualties to the careful selection of positions, careful camouflage, severe concealment discipline and untiring efforts of all Commanding Officers to quickly improve positions after occupation.

The 106th Field Artillery was commanded by Colonel John D. Howland until August 6, 1918, when Lieutenant Colonel John T. Delaney was assigned to its command at Camp de Souge. Colonel Delaney commanded the regiment until September 1st, when command was taken over by Colonel Emery T. Smith. The following notes on operations of this regiment give in detail many interesting facts connected with its service:



PHASE I

SEPTEMBER 26 TO OCTOBER 3, 1918 (INCLUSIVE)

1. SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS.—Attached to 33d Division and occupying positions as follows:

Regimental P. C.....	20.1—72.6
1st Battalion P. C.....	19.5—72.2
1st Battalion O. P.....	18.9—73.2
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....	19.7—72.2
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....	19.6—72.2
2d Battalion P. C.....	20.0—71.9
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun.....	19.9—72.1
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun.....	19.9—72.0
3d Battalion P. C.....	19.4—72.1
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun.....	19.5—72.2
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun.....	19.4—72.1

Echelons at Bois la Ville, 23.5—61.5.  
Sector of Fire—Divisional Sector.

2. THE ATTACK.—September 26, 1918—H.5:30—2,550 rounds fired between H. and H.3:45 on objectives I-XIX, designated by Table I, Field Order No. 4, Headquarters, 52d Field Artillery Brigade. (See map attached.)

September 27th—326 rounds harassing fire delivered during day on roads north and east of Consenvoye, and on enemy batteries in Bois de Chaume.

September 28th—Sixty rounds harassing fire on Brabant—130 rounds fired harassing roads on east of Meuse.



*Battery D, 105th Field Artillery, near Etraye, a few minutes after the armistice, November 11, 1918*

September 29th—180 rounds harassing fire on batteries, Boise de Chaune and roads to northeast of Brabant and Consenvoye.

September 30th—Sixty rounds H. E., twenty rounds No. 5 gas harassing fire on sensitive points as prescribed in Operations Order No. 7, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

Third Battalion O. P. established at 21.5—74.3.

Second Battalion O. P. established at 20.0—71.9.

October 1st—Eighty rounds H. E. and fifteen rounds No. 5 gas harassing fire on sensitive points east of Meuse in accordance with Operations Order No. 8, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

October 2d—Batteries "A," "B" and "F" and Headquarters 1st Battalion moved at 20H.15 to new positions east of Bethincourt. Road blocked by disabled trucks at Cumieres. Carriages camouflaged alongside of road and horses returned to echelon.

October 3d—Headquarters, 1st Battalion, Batteries "A," "B" and "F" moved from Cumieres at 10H.30, reaching positions at 24H.00. Positions occupied in accordance with Field Order No. 5, Headquarters, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

Headquarters 1st Battalion P. C.....	18.5—74.9
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....	19.9—76.0
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....	18.6—75.9
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun.....	19.6—75.7

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary:

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) None.
- (c) 150 mm. enemy battery organized with gun squad.
- (d) One private slightly wounded.
- (e) Nothing to report.
- (f) Nothing to report.
- (g) Fire executed as ordered in support of infantry.
- (h) Favorable for artillery fighting.
- (i) Nothing to report.

## PHASE II

OCTOBER 4TH TO 24TH, 1918 (INCLUSIVE)

1. SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS.—Attached to 33d Division and occupying positions as follows:

Regimental P. C.....	20.1—72.6
1st Battalion P. C.....	18.5—74.9



Headquarters 52d Field Artillery Brigade, September 9-24, 1918, at Fromereville, France

Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....	19.9—76.0
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....	18.6—75.9
2d Battalion P. C.....	20.0—71.9
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun.....	19.9—72.1
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun.....	19.9—72.0
3d Battalion P. C.....	19.4—72.1
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun.....	19.5—72.2
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun.....	19.6—75.7

Echelons at Bois la Ville, 23.5—61.5. Forward echelons established at La Claire, 20.8—69.7.

Sector of Fire—Divisional Sector.


2. THE ATTACK.—October 4th—5H.25—1,200 rounds covering fire delivered on enemy batteries for neutralization in Bois de Chatillon, Bois de Sartelle and ravines east of Liny-Devent-Dun in connection with the attack of the 4th Division on our left per Field Order No. 5, Headquarters, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

October 5th—1H.00—neutralization fire on enemy batteries in Bois de Sartelles 7H.30—10H.00, harassing fire on Briuelles-Haraumont, and destructive fire on Trench du Teton 14.4—84.0. Total, 415 rounds.

October 6th—256 rounds destructive fire on Trench du Teton 13.9—82.8, twenty-four rounds registration fire, twenty rounds neutralization on enemy battery at 25.6—80.1.

October 7th—115 rounds for registration, forty-seven rounds harassing fire on 16.5—85.3, 21.9—81.5.

October 8th—Artillery groupment consisting of 104th Field Artillery, 1st Battalion 105th Field Artillery and 106th Field Artillery, commanded by Colonel E. T. Smith, 106th Field Artillery, placed at disposal of Colonel Davis, 132d Infantry. From 8H.25 to 15H., 1,573 rounds harassing fire for preparation east of Meuse at 22.7—81.8, 21.8—81.1. From 15H.50 to 17H.25 accompanying fire in conjunction with attack of Colonel Davis' detachment. 1,674 rounds on areas designated by Operations Order No. 11, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.



*Chateau le Haut Meral, Montsurs, France. Headquarters 52d Field Artillery Brigade, December, 1918, to February, 1919*

October 9th—Accompanying fire along the line 21.1—81.8 to 21.8—81.7 and 21.0—78.2 to 21.8—782. Total, 365 rounds.

October 10th—Attack resumed east of Meuse at 6H.05. 168 rounds accompanying fire on objectives in accordance with Operations Order No. 13, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

October 11th—106 rounds interdiction fire on Haraumont, seventy-five rounds harassing fire on 24.7—84.0 and 25.—84.0, 180 rounds harassing on area 20.8—83.1.

October 12th—Seventy-six rounds harassing fire on area 20.8—83.1, forty rounds on line from 24.7—82.4 to 25.0—84.0 to 24.7—84.0.

October 13th—408 rounds harassing fire on 20.8—83.1, 350 rounds on Sivry. Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 3d Battalion and Batteries "C," "D" and "E" moved to following positions at 23H.00, arriving at 6H.00 October 14th.

2d Battalion P. C.....	18.1—79.4
3d Battalion P. C.....	18.1—79.0
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun.....	18.0—79.5
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun.....	18.0—79.5
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun.....	17.7—79.3


October 14th—Eighty rounds adjustment fire 9H.30 to 14H.00, 1,090 rounds accompanying fire from 7H.20 to 8H.00 on 24.2—82.8, 24.6—82.9, 24.2—83.3, 24.4—83.8. Operations Order No. 15, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

October 15th—Headquarters 1st Battalion, Batteries "A," "B" and "F" moved at 19H.00 to new positions west of Gercourt, arriving at 23H.00. Positions occupied as follows:

1st Battalion P. C.....	17.2—78.3
1st Battalion O. P.....	18.5—74.9
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....	17.0—78.7
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....	16.6—79.1
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun.....	17.2—78.7

October 16th—No activity.

October 17th—Regimental P. C. closed at 20.1—72.6 at 13H.00, opened at same hour at 17.2—78.3. Total, fifty-one rounds fired during day for registration.



*105th Field Artillery post of command near Verdun, France,  
November 20-December 14, 1918*

October 18th—196 rounds harassing and registration fire on following points: 22.9—83.3, 21.7—83.0, 22.7—83.0.

October 19th—554 rounds harassing fire on 17.7—85.4, 23.4—83.5, to 24.0—83.8, 23.9—86.8, 19.3—84.7, 24.9—85.4, 24.2—85.3. Battery at 17.9—86.5.

October 20th—No firing. Relieved at 22H.30 by French Colonial Troops. Regiment left position at 23H.00 for Bois la Ville.

October 21st—Arrived at Bois la Ville 20H.30.

October 22d—Regimental Headquarters, 1st Battalion Headquarters, Batteries "A" and "B," Headquarters Company, Supply Company, left Bois la Ville at 19H.00 for billets at Camp Chene Gossin, 3 km. southeast of Dugny; arrived at 24H.00.

October 23d and 24th—In billets at Bois la Ville and Chene Gossin cleaning materiel, harness and conditioning animals.

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary:

(a) Nothing to report.

(b) None.

(c) None. Captured battery fired on Sivry.

(d) Wounded—Two.

(e) Nothing to report.

(f) Nothing to report.

(g) Fire executed as ordered in support of infantry.

(h) Terrain favorable for artillery fire.

(i) Nothing to report.

### PHASE III

#### OCTOBER 25 TO NOVEMBER 8, 1918 (INCLUSIVE)

1. SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS.—Attached to 79th Division and billeted as follows:

Regimental Headquarters.....	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
1st Battalion Headquarters....	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
Battery "A".....	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
Battery "B".....	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
Supply Company.....	Camp Chene Gossin, southeast of Dugny
Headquarters Company.....	Camp Maujouy
2d Battalion Headquarters.....	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
Battery "C".....	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
Battery "D".....	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
3d Battalion Headquarters.....	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
Battery "E".....	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5
Battery "F".....	Bois la Ville at 23.5—61.5

2. October 25th to October 27th, at billets, cleaning men, materiel, harness and conditioning horses.

October 28th—Headquarters, 2d and 3d Battalions. Batteries "C," "D," "E" and "F" left Bois de la Ville at 15H.30, arriving at positions south of Brabant, and relieved 2d and 3d Battalions, 324th Field Artillery, at 24H.30, in the following positions:

2d Battalion P. C.....	24.7—76.7
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun.....	24.7—76.7
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun.....	24.5—76.7
3d Battalion P. C.....	24.8—76.8
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun.....	24.9—76.4
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun.....	24.9—76.4

Regimental Headquarters, Headquarters 1st Battalion, Batteries "A" and "B," Headquarters Company, Supply Company, left Chene Gossin at 16H.00 for Bois de la Ville, arriving at 21H.30.



*General view of Vacherauville, Headquarters 52d Field Artillery Brigade,  
October 30, 1918*

October 29th—Regiment P. C. opened at 24.7—76.17 at 9H.30. Headquarters, 1st Battalion, Batteries "A" and "B" left Bois de la Ville 15H.00, arriving at positions south of Brabant at 24H.30, relieved 1st Battalion, 324th Field Artillery, in positions as follows:

1st Battalion P. C.....	24.1—76.9
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....	24.1—77.0
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....	23.9—77.0

Echelon—Supply Company at Cote Talou, 26.—72.3.

October 30th—670 rounds harassing and concentration fire on sensitive points in accordance with Operations Orders Nos. 19 and 20, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

October 31st—708 rounds harassing fire in accordance with Operations Order No. 23, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

November 1st—1,900 rounds H. E., seventy-five rounds gas demonstration fire on sensitive points and active battery in accordance with Operations Order No. 24, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery, from 3H.30 to 5H.30.

November 2d—722 rounds harassing and demonstration fire in accordance with Operations Order No. 25, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

November 3d—1,023 rounds fired for destruction of machine-gun nests, harassing and counter-battery and demonstration fire in accordance with Operations Order No. 27, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

November 4th—182 rounds No. 5 gas fired on 25.4—85.2, 992 rounds on Ville-neuve Farm, Sillon-Fontaine Farm and 24.8—85.2, 23.1—85.8, 26.8—83.1, 23.4—84.3, 25.4—85.2 in accordance with Operations Order No. 8, Headquarters, 52d Field Artillery Brigade. 1st Battalion O. P. established at 20.0—77.9.

November 5th—1,365 rounds accompanying fire in accordance with Operations Order No. 33, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery, from 8H.30 to 11H.15. Enemy battery observed in action at 24.22—86.64 at 9H.30, silenced by our fire at 10H.25.

November 6th—1,038 rounds H. E. and 160 rounds No. 5 gas preparation fire as per Operations Order No. 35, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Battery "C" moved right platoon to 25.8—78.2 at 2H.30.

November 7th—680 rounds accompanying fire from 7H.45 to 9H.05 as per Operations Order No. 36, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Left platoon Battery "C" moved to position at 25.8—78.2 at 4H.45.

November 8th—173 rounds H. E. fired on Buisson Chaumont, Cote de Romagne and Cote de Morimont trenches at 6H.00 and 11H.00 as per Operations Order No. 38, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Battery "D" moved to position at 25.8—80.4.

3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary:

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) Nothing to report.
- (c) Nothing to report.
- (d) Killed—Two. Wounded—Sixteen.
- (e) Nothing to report.
- (f) Nothing to report.
- (g) As ordered.
- (h) Observation poor before November 8th.
- (i) Nothing to report.



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*Artillery Brigade Commander and Staff. Left to right: Brigadier General George Albert Wingate, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac J. Lovell and Major Walter L. Schoellkopf*

PHASE IV

NOVEMBER 9TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH (INCLUSIVE)

1. SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF OPERATIONS:

Regimental P. C.....	24.7—76.7
1st Battalion P. C.....	24.1—76.9
1st Battalion O. P.....	20.0—77.9
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....	24.1—77.0
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....	23.9—77.0
2d Battalion P. C.....	26.0—78.1
Battery "C" No. 1 Gun.....	25.8—78.2
Battery "D" No. 1 Gun.....	25.8—78.2
3d Battalion P. C.....	24.8—76.8
Battery "E" No. 1 Gun.....	24.9—76.5
Battery "F" No. 1 Gun.....	24.9—76.4

Echelon—Cote Talou 26.1—72.3.

2. November 9th—100 rounds fired on Cote Morimont, Cote Romagne and Buisson Chaumont 5H.30 to 6H.15 per Operations Order No. 39, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery.

November 10th—1,590 rounds H. E. fired from 2H.00 to 7H.00 on Cote du Chateau trenches south edge of Hill 319, Cote d'Orne, Buisson Chaumont, per Operations Order No. 40, Headquarters, 106th Field Artillery. Headquarters, 1st Battalion, Batteries "A" and "B" moved to new positions, arriving at 2H.30.

1st Battalion P. C.....	26.55—80.1
1st Battalion O. P.....	28.6 —80.4
Battery "A" No. 1 Gun.....	26.7 —79.6
Battery "B" No. 1 Gun.....	26.6 —79.7

380 rounds harassing fire on 31.6—84.0, 34.8—82.94, 24.9—82.2. Battery "F" moved to 26.9—79.2.

November 11th—9H.00 180 rounds fired on west trenches on Cote Morimont. Armistice in effect at 11H.00—all firing ceased—no activity.


3. Nothing to report.

4. Summary:

- (a) Nothing to report.
- (b) None.
- (c) None.
- (d) One gassed.
- (e) Nothing to report.
- (f) Nothing to report.
- (g) As ordered.
- (h) Favorable for artillery—good observation.
- (i) Nothing to report.

The 102d Trench Mortar Battery, commanded by Captain Charles Pearson, Jr., operated with the 52d Field Artillery Brigade. Lieutenant Bell, of the battery, commanded two platoons in the Bois de Forges in the latter part of September. On the night of the 19th-20th of October, seventy-five rounds were fired by the battery into Vilosnes. This was the only time the battery got into action. The battery, however, rendered





*Headquarters 102d Ammunition Train at Faubourg Pave,  
Verdun*

fine service in supplying ammunition to the battery positions through practically the entire front line service of the brigade.

The 102d Ammunition Train, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Bell, rendered most effective service throughout the period of operations. Colonel Bell had served most efficiently as Motor Transport Officer of the 27th Division in the British area until early in November, when he took command of his train in the area in which the 52d Field Artillery Brigade was operating, in time to take part in its later operations. The activities

of the Ammunition Train are covered in the following report made by Colonel Bell:

#### PHASE I

SEPTEMBER 26 TO OCTOBER 3, 1918

##### 1. SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE OPERATION:

The 102d Ammunition Train, consisting of Headquarters Train, Headquarters Motor Battalion, Headquarters Horsed Battalion, Companies A, B, C, D, E, F and G, Ordnance and Sanitary detachments, were situated on September 26, 1918, as follows:

Horsed Battalion, consisting of Headquarters, Companies E, F and G, and a detachment of the Sanitary unit, after traveling via rail from Bordeaux, France, in two sections, were situated as follows:

Headquarters, Companies E and F in the woods at Bois de la Ville with thirty men of Company E on detached service at the Division Ammunition Dump at Germonville, and sixty-four men of Company E on detached service at the Brigade Dump at Bois de Sartelles.

Company G with detachment of Sanitary unit at Marre.

Headquarters Train, Headquarters Motor Battalion and Motor Battalion, consisting of Companies A, B, C and D, Ordnance detachment and Sanitary detachment, after traveling via motor trucks overland from Bordeaux, were situated on September 26, 1918, in the woods at Bois de la Ville.

Company F moved from Bois de la Ville to Chattancourt, September 29, 1918.

Company G at Marre from September 26 to October 3, 1918.

Balance of Company E, Headquarters Train, Headquarters Horsed Battalion, Headquarters Motor Battalion, Companies A, B, C and D, Ordnance and Medical detachments, from September 26 to October 3, 1918, at Bois de la Ville.

## 2. THE ATTACK:

From September 26 to October 3, 1918, the Motor Battalion furnished motor trucks and details, and continually hauled ammunition from different ammunition dumps and railheads to the battery positions of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, on orders of the Division Munitions Officer.

Company E with details at the Division Ammunition Dump and Brigade Dump; the balance of their men were used as details for loading and carrying ammunition.

Company F at Chattancourt were in charge of an ammunition dump.

Company G at Marre, with their combat wagons, were used in hauling small arms ammunition to and from ammunition dumps.

3. Statement of enemy units engaged, time and place. Shelling of roads, etc., by artillery.

## 4. SUMMARY:

- (a) Depth of advance—Battery positions of the 52d Artillery Brigade.
- (b) Prisoners taken—Nothing to report.
- (c) Materiel captured—Nothing to report.
- (d) Casualties—Three wagons containing hand grenades accidentally exploded, causing seven casualties and the loss of three mules.
- (e) Employment of infantry weapons (machine guns, 37 mm. guns, Stokes mortars, and rifle grenades—Nothing to report.
- (f) Employment of auxiliary weapons (tanks, gas troops, etc.)—Nothing to report.
- (g) Artillery support—Supported artillery in hauling ammunition from dumps and carrying it to their battery positions.
- (h) Terrain—Country very hilly, roads mostly in very poor shape, and at some points almost impassable.
- (i) The organization operated throughout the entire period with but one-third of its equipment in the Motor Battalion and in the Horsed Battalion, the two caisson companies having no equipment whatsoever, and the wagon company equipped with combat wagons used entirely for hauling small arms ammunition. This condition greatly interfered with the maximum efficiency of operations. The Motor Battalion in addition being handicapped with the lack of equipment for repairs, having no repair shop in the organization. It had been at all times very difficult to secure spare parts, which resulted in having from ten to fifteen trucks laid up every day. It therefore became necessary to run what trucks we had twenty-four hours of every day.

The two caisson companies, having had no equipment, were not able to perform their proper functions at any time. They were used to supervise the forward ammunition dumps as loading details for the trucks, and to salvage ammunition in positions left as the batteries of this brigade advanced.

## PHASE II

OCTOBER 4 TO OCTOBER 24, 1918

### 1. SITUATION:

Company E—Left Bois de la Ville October 14, 1918, and arrived at La Claire. Left La Claire October 22, 1918, and arrived at Faubourg Pave.

Company F—Left Chattancourt October 18, 1918, and arrived at Pump Dump near Forges. Left Forges October 20, 1918, and arrived at La Claire. Left la Claire October 22, 1918, and arrived at Foubourg Pave.

Company G—Left Marre October 21, 1918, and arrived at Foubourg Pave. Balance of organization left Bois de la Ville October 11 and 12, 1918, and arrived at La Claire. Left La Claire October 22, 1918, and arrived at Foubourg Pave.

## 2. THE ATTACK:

From October 4 to October 24, 1918, the Motor Battalion furnished motor trucks and details and continually hauled ammunition from different ammunition dumps and railheads to the battery positions of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade, on orders of the Division Munitions Officer.

The Horsed Battalion was used for details and hauling small arms ammunition.

Report on sub-headings 3 and 4 the same as under period from September 26 to October 3, 1918, with the exception of no casualties.

## PHASE III

OCTOBER 25 TO NOVEMBER 9, 1918

### 1. SITUATION:

Company E—Left Foubourg Pave November 3, 1918, and arrived at Brabant. Left Brabant November 5, 1918, and returned to Foubourg Pave.

Company F—Left Foubourg Pave November 4, 1918, and arrived north of Brabant.

Company G—Left Foubourg Pave October 30, 1918, and arrived at camp across river at Marre.

Balance of organization at Foubourg Pave.

Report on sub-headings 2, 3 and 4 the same as under period from October 4, 1918, to October 24, 1918.

## PHASE IV

NOVEMBER 9 TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918

### 1. SITUATION:

Entire organization with the exception of Companies F and G at Foubourg Pave.

Company F—North of Brabant.

Company G—Across river at Marre.

Report on sub-headings 2, 3 and 4 the same as under period from October 25, 1918, to November 9, 1918.

The following facts concerning the consumption of ammunition by the artillery brigade will prove interesting:

Organization	Number of Rounds Fired	Value of Ammunition Consumed	Weight of Rounds Fired, Pounds
104th Field Artillery	66,782	\$1,335,640	1,001,730
105th Field Artillery	81,096	1,621,920	1,216,440
106th Field Artillery	33,036	1,982,160	3,072,348
Totals	180,914	\$4,939,720	5,290,518

The Ammunition Train delivered 1,420 truck loads of ammunition at the battery positions.

Battery A, 105th Field Artillery, held the record for the greatest number of rounds fired: 15,166.

Battery F, 106th Field Artillery, led the heavies in firing with 7,429 rounds.

Gun No. 16,948 of Battery B, 105th Field Artillery, fired the greatest number of rounds in the light regiments: 4,049; while Gun No. 12,748 of Battery D, 104th Field Artillery, led in its regiment with 3,834 rounds.

Gun No. 3,010, 106th Field Artillery, led the heavy artillery by firing 2,100 rounds.

The service of the 52d Field Artillery Brigade was frequently commented upon in relation to the dependability of its fire, the discipline of its troops and the professional ability of its officers. Some of these commendations were in the form of formal communications sent to the Brigade Commander and from among them the following are culled and published:

HEADQUARTERS, 33D DIVISION  
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

October 28, 1918.

From: Major General Geo. Bell, Jr., Commanding.

To: Brigadier General George Albert Wingate, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

Subject: Service with 33d Division.

As the 52d Field Artillery Brigade is being relieved from duty with the 33d Division, I wish to take this occasion to express to you my appreciation for the invaluable service and assistance rendered by it.

Every request of ours you have met in a uniform, earnest and efficient manner, and your cooperation has contributed in a great measure to our success in the recent operations.

Please express to your officers and men my appreciation and sincere regret that the exigencies of the field service necessitate your separation from us at this time.

(Signed) GEO. BELL, JR.,  
Major General, U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS 158TH INFANTRY BRIGADE  
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

November 14, 1918.

From: Commanding General, 158th Infantry Brigade.

To: Commanding General, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.

Subject: Conduct of Artillery.

I desire to express to you, and through you to the officers of the 105th Regiment of Field Artillery, my appreciation of the services rendered by this regiment since the beginning of the operations November 2d last. At all times they have worked in the closest cooperation with my brigade, and have performed the duties assigned them most efficiently and effectively, assisting very largely in such measure of success as I may have gained.

I may add not only this regiment, but where called upon the heavy artillery worked, I found, also very effectively, and I desire to record my appreciation of the assistance rendered.

(Signed) EVAN M. JOHNSON,  
Brigadier General.

HEADQUARTERS 157TH INFANTRY BRIGADE  
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

November 15, 1918.

From: Commanding General, 157th Infantry Brigade.  
To: Commanding General, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.  
Subject: Artillery Support.

1. It is my pleasure to take this opportunity of communicating to you the opinions of all members of this Command regarding the support and cooperation of the 104th Field Artillery and that portion of the 106th Field Artillery assigned for the support of this brigade during the recent operations prior to the cessation of hostilities.



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*Colonel DeWitt C. Weld, commanding  
105th Field Artillery*

2. The service rendered by the above mentioned units from the start commanded the thorough confidence of all members of this Command and by the efficiency of their work and the effect of their fire supported all ranks and assisted materially in maintaining a high standard of morale.

3. From my own observation and from reports and statements made by officers of my Command, the units mentioned above proved themselves to be the best supporting artillery which has been associated with us. Their fire has been the most accurate, their action upon request the most prompt, their means of communication with us the most complete and continuous and their cooperation by moving forward with our infantry, the best that has been our fortune to encounter.

4. I trust that you will convey the thanks and appreciation of myself and of members of this Command to the officers and men of the 104th Field Artillery and the battalion of the 106th Field Artillery above indicated, for their splendid services.

(Signed) W. J. NICHOLSON,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS 79TH DIVISION  
AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

November 18, 1918.

From: Commanding General.  
To: Brigadier General George A. Wingate, 52d Field Artillery Brigade.  
Subject: Commendation.

I desire to record my appreciation of the manner in which you and your brigade have functioned in support of the 79th Division. During the recent operations north

of Verdun October 30th to November 11th, inclusive, your brigade was called upon many times for artillery support, and frequently the aid desired made it necessary for you to employ the full resources and capacity of your brigade. You, your officers and men have always responded to the call of the infantry with the utmost cheerfulness and enthusiasm and our artillery support has been all that could be desired.

I beg that you will extend to your officers and men the sincere thanks of myself and of the division as a whole for their hearty and whole-hearted cooperation.

(Signed) JOSEPH E. KUHN,  
Major General, U. S. A.

