



# 165<sup>th</sup> Infantry

HEADQUARTERS RCT 165  
A.P.O. 27

Record of Operation FORAGER

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HEADQUARTERS 165TH INFANTRY  
APO 27

5 October 1944.

SUBJECT: FORAGER Operational Report.

TO : The Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division, APO 27.

In compliance with instructions contained in letter, AG 319.1, Hq, 27th Infantry Division, 17 May 1944, the following report is submitted on the FORAGER operation.

1. Plans.

a. The landing force operation plans and annexes were considered adequate.

2. Operations and Training.

a. The practice landings and rehearsal exercises held on the island of Maui were satisfactory with the following exceptions.

(1) One of our BLT's after conducting all of its practice landings with one ship, was embarked for the actual operation on an entirely different ship and with boat crews with whom they had never worked.

(2) LVT's were not available during the practice landings.

b. It was found that bazookas and the 75mm and 105mm self-propelled guns were effective against fortified installations.

c. The number of hand carried flame-throwers supplied this organization were sufficient, however we were not equipped with any flame-thrower tanks. It is recommended that one tank in each platoon be equipped with a flame thrower.

3. Air.

a. Air liaison parties performed all their duties satisfactorily, however in many instances air support was not available when called for.

4. Naval Gun Fire.

a. The shore fire control parties were adequate and sufficient fires were delivered expeditiously.

b. Fires were adjusted quickly and properly.

c. Called fires in most instances had the desired effect.



f. The issue of wrist watches be increased to include all officers and non-commissioned officers down to and including squad leaders, and that

g. Men carrying the bazookas be armed with pistols in place of rifles in the event that it is found to be impossible to provide additional weapons-carriers, subsequently recommended here.

h. 50% of the personnel in wire sections be armed with pistols in place of rifles.

i. The operators of SCR 284 and SCR 300 radios be armed with pistols in place of rifles.

It is recommended that:

(1) In each heavy weapons company, three such weapons to replace

(2) In each battalion HQ company, four such weapons to replace M-1 rifles.

(3) In each rifle company, four such weapons to replace carbines.

It is recommended that the following:

a. Thompson sub-machine guns or machine pistols should be substituted for the following:

b. It is recommended that one additional BAR be added to each rifle platoon to replace one M-1 rifle.

c. It is recommended that a study be made with a view of equipping the ~~Regimental Artillery~~ ~~Company~~ ~~for~~ ~~transport~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~57mm~~ ~~gun~~. The ~~Artillery~~ ~~platoons~~ of the ~~Battalion~~ ~~Headquarters~~ ~~Companies~~ should retain the 57mm guns.

d. Because of the terrific wear and tear on the rubber tracks of the SPM's in operating over coral, it is recommended that all SPM's be equipped with steel tracks. A supply of rubber tracks could be palletized so that they would be available whenever their use was indicated.

e. A study should be made with the view of improving the armor protection of our self-propelled mounts, or the replacement of the self-propelled mounts by M-10 tank destroyers.

f. A unit of trucks equipped with rocket launchers should be organized within each RCT or within the Division, for assignment to BCT's as required.

5. Weapons.

a. Some delay was experienced in securing Naval gun fire on those occasions when but one ship was assigned to support two BCT's.

b. Naval gun fire was found to be particularly effective against Japanese fortified positions in caves facing the sea.

the faces of these watches be of the luminous type, and that a cover be provided for the faces of the watches;

k. The number of machine-gun platoons in heavy weapons companies be increased from two to three in order that one such platoon be available to support each rifle company when all three are committed.

l. A study be made of the advisability of forming a unit within the Division equipped with the 4.2 mortar.

m. The following changes be made in the types of ammunition indicated:

- (1) 81mm mortar---WP no change. HE heavy to be increased. HE light to be decreased.
- (2) 60mm mortar---80% HE and 20% WP.
- (3) Rifle Grenades---50% A-T and 50% fragmentation.

n. The Very pistol be replaced by a smaller projector of similar size to that used by the Navy.

#### 6. Transportation.

It is recommended that:

a. Shipping facilities be increased in order that the number of vehicles taken into combat may be increased to the following:

- (1) Two  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton weapons carriers with trailers for each rifle company.
- (2) Eight  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton weapons carriers with trailers for each heavy weapons company.
- (3) Two  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton weapons carriers with trailers for each battalion medical section.
- (4) All TBA  $2\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks and 1 ton trailers for each Service Company.

b. A study be made to provide a more varied ration than is now possible with the present K and C rations. The improved type C rations should be secured or sufficient 10 in 1 rations provided to insure a more balanced and palatable ration. This study should include the feasibility of providing a variety of canned fruit juices and soups.

c. The number of squad cooks be increased from one to two per squad.

d. While in actual contact with the enemy, rations be issued in the ratio of two C rations to one K ration.



a. On too many occasions subordinate commanders were not allowed sufficient time for a proper reconnaissance. In many instances orders were issued during the night for attacks at daylight. While it is appreciated that this condition is controlled to a great degree by changes in the tact-

10. General Comments.

1. More adequate guarding facilities be provided for our supplies and equipment as they reach the beaches. In each of the two operations in which this regiment has participated, pillorage was the rule rather than the exception. The practice of listing the contents of each case or crate and placing that list in an envelope on the outside of the case greatly assisted the thievery and should be discontinued.

h. A considerable increase be made in insecticide bombs.

g. Additional screening be provided to permit the screening of all kitchens and latrines during the rehabilitation period immediately following combat. It is recommended that a fabric screening similar to that used by the Japanese be provided.

f. 120 pre-fabricated berbed-wire concertinas be provided to each Infantry regiment. A re-supply of these concertinas should also be available.

e. Four 250 gallon water trailers be issued to each Infantry regiment.

d. The pouch provided for carrying rifle grenades be redesigned along the lines of the 60mm ammunition pouch.

c. While in actual contact with the enemy, new socks be issued to each man at least once a week. We believe that the cushion sock is superior to any other type issued.

b. A lighter grade HBT, similar to that used by the Marines, be issued.

a. A lighter poncho, similar to that used by the Marines, be issued.

It is recommended that:

9. Equipment.

a. It is recommended that the number of SCR 536's be increased from 6 to 8 in each lettered company.

8. Rations.

e. During the period of rehabilitation immediately following combat permit the serving of wheat cakes, rolls, or bread at each meal. The issue of sugar should also be increased.

ical situation, nevertheless adequate reconnaissance by Battalion commanders, company commanders, and platoon leaders is essential to the success of any combat operation. This defect occurred much more often when this Regiment was a part of Marine Divisions.

b. Sufficient shipping should be provided to permit all of our units to go into combat at full TO strength. All of our units landed under strength and as casualties developed from day to day this imposed a severe strain on units required to cover extended frontages. A sufficient number of additional troops should be brought on each operation to provide combat replacements.

c. In assigning frontages consideration should be given to the terrain involved as well as the strength of the unit at the time.

d. Coordination between adjacent larger units must be more closely controlled. On several occasions it was found that the jump-off time given to this regiment differed as much as two or three hours from the time given to adjacent units. This caused considerable confusion because of preparatory fires falling in front of units that were attempting to comply with the jump-off time given to them. This defect occurred much more often when this regiment was a part of Marine Divisions.

e. Information as to the location of adjacent friendly troops should be more carefully checked before being passed down the line. On too many occasions it was found that units were not where they reported themselves to be. On many other occasions when this organization was sent in to relieve other organizations we found it necessary to fight our way to lines of departure that were supposedly already in the hands of friendly troops. This defect occurred much more often when this regiment was a part of Marine Divisions.


f. Sufficient additional ammunition should be provided to permit all men to fire a more extensive course with the bazooka and rifle grenade.

g. A great deal more Infantry-tank training is indicated. The problem of communication between the Infantry and the tanks is far from solved. Complete additional study should be given to this problem.

h. It very definitely must be SOP that the tank unit with which we train is the one that we go into combat with. This was not true in the recent operation.

i. The practice of recalling the tanks to the tank park each day for re-servicing before dark must be discontinued. We serviced our SPM's in the front lines and there is no reason at all why the same practice should not be followed by the tanks.

j. Each RCT should be assigned a 4.2 Chemical Mortar Company as a permanent part of the combat team.



JOSEPH T. HART,  
Lt Col, 165th Inf,  
Commanding.



S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 165TH INFANTRY  
A.P.O. #27

S-1 REPORT OF OPERATION FORAGER

Casualty Reports

Throughout the operation there appeared to be a need for greater coordination between the agencies concerned with casualty information so that the various types of reports would more accurately complement each other. It was found frequently that the casualty figures submitted by battalions and companies, when checked against Medical Forms CR-5, were incomplete. The difference was almost always accounted for by those cases of wounds, injuries and illness so slight that the individuals returned to duty immediately after treatment in the field or at aid stations. In the rush and confusion of battle their cases were either unknown to company headquarters or were unrecorded because of the vagueness of the information. Of course, this would not affect the unit's present effective strength figures, but it would seem that since these cases are a matter of medical record and are reported to Personnel Section by Medical Detachment, it would be appropriate for the companies concerned to have an immediate accounting.

It is recalled that during the Saipan battle there were several instances where officers were WIA and remained on duty without those facts being reported by the companies. The news of these casualties was obtained by this Headquarters from the CR-5 form. This was also true concerning a large number of enlisted men. This situation became apparent at the outset of the action, and thereafter S-1, this Headquarters, in order to have as complete a story of the casualties as possible endeavored to compile its consolidated report not only from figures submitted by battalions and companies but also from the CR-5 forms, which were forwarded through Regimental Headquarters to Personnel Section. Since the direct reports to S-1 are statistical whereas the CR-5 deals with names, it is difficult to correlate the two reports. About all that can be done under the present procedure is to note the discrepancies between the figures on the one report and the number of names on the other and use this as a basis for checking with the battalions and companies. This involves considerable work and inconvenience, and, even though its object is to pick up information unaccounted for by the companies, does not wholly eliminate the danger of duplication of information.

In view of the above it is recommended that some system be devised whereby all casualties, including those returned to duty without ever having been dropped from the Present Effective Strength column, are reported on a tag that goes directly from the aid station or the aid man in the lines to the casualties' respective companies. This not only would account for all casualties but would also insure agreement between the company and medical reports in classifying the casualty. For example, it would preclude a man's being listed on one record as WIA and on another as IIA.

Also recommended is a procedure for maintaining a closer check on men evacuated to the rear after treatment at aid stations in other battalions within the regiment, or at aid stations in some other regiment. In this connection,



there should be speedier transmission to the units at the front of information concerning personnel carried by them as well as those who died or were wounded or during evacuation to clearing station, field hospitals, ships or hospitals on other islands.

While it is true that all the problems arising from discrepancies in reports are eventually resolved and that the figures finally straighten themselves out, it is believed that casualty reports should always be complete and current and should be reflected accurately at all times in the combat picture.

Morale

With reference to morale of our troops, the following comments and recommendations are submitted:

Morale of our troops throughout the Japan operation was superior. This was manifested by the high degree of confidence, aggressiveness, and determination to close with and destroy the enemy on the part of all ranks of the command. This is considered to constitute true morale, as differentiated from outward enthusiasm over movies, entertainments, band concerts and other forms of recreational activity. It is believed that this high state of morale is due to thorough and complete training, outstanding leadership and integrity on the part of all leaders, commissioned and non-commissioned, which instilled in the troops a feeling of loyalty and complete reliance toward these leaders.

As to the special service phase in the furtherance of morale among troops, it was possible to immediately present to the men moving pictures, band concerts, radio programs, and other entertainment, as well as furnishing athletic equipment and reading material. All these things were possible due to the smooth functioning and untiring effort of special service personnel. I can think of no improvement on this service, within the limitations imposed by combat conditions.

On the negative side of the morale question, it is the unanimous opinion of all ranks that the present practice of requiring our troops to bury enemy dead cannot but have a harmful effect on morale. In past operations, our men have engaged in close combat with the Jap. They have learned first hand of the barbaric treatment accorded to our wounded and dead by this enemy, and have seen their comrades killed and wounded. Following this experience our troops, in the interests of sanitation, and urgent necessity for clearing the battle field, were required to bury the enemy dead. I wish to emphasize that this order, like any order received by this regiment was promptly and completely obeyed. There was no question as to the wisdom or necessity of the practice described, but it is strongly recommended that in future operations, some agency other than combat troops be employed. Where possible, prisoner labor should be employed exclusively, and this labor made easily available to front line units. It is suggested that labor, materials and transportation be handled from a central control point, from which all phases of handling of enemy dead would be controlled. Not only would this provide an efficient solution of a difficult problem but would furnish valuable information of an intelligence nature.

EDWARD S. McCABE,  
Capt, 165th Inf.,  
Adjutant.

*Edward S. McCabe*

ROSTER OF REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION STAFFS  
AND COMPANY COMMANDERS

SAIPAN OPERATION

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS

<u>DUTY</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
CO	Colonel	Gerard W Kelley	WIA on 28 June.
CO	Lt Col	Joseph T Hart	Assumed comd 28 June.
Exec O	Lt Col	Joseph T Hart	Until assumption of comd 28 June.
Exec O	Major	William F McCahill	Asgd in addition to other duties on 28 June.
S-1	Capt	Edward S McCabe	
S-2	Major	William F McCahill	
S-3	Capt	Charles E Coates, Jr	Until asgd as 2nd Bn S-3 17 July.
S-3	Capt	Maurice M Scheibner	Asgd 17 July.
S-4	Capt	Herman M Lutz	Ab sk 21-23 July.
S-4	Capt	Michael E Kenny	Asgd fr 21-23 July in addition to other duties.
Asst S-3	Capt	Maurice M Scheibner	Until asgd as S-3 17 July.
Asst S-3	Capt	John G Firsching	Asgd 17 July.
Asst S-1	WOJG	Joseph A Conway	
Surg	Major	Francis H Reynolds	
Mtr O	Capt	William J Smith	Until asgd CO of Co F 30 June.
Mtr O	CWO	James J Wynne	Asgd 30 June.
Munitions O	1st Lt	Francis H Tuohy	
TQM	Capt	John J Molloy	Until asgd as CO of Co E 30 June; resumed TQM dy 17 July.
Commo O	1st Lt	Edward J Condon	
I&R Plat O	1st Lt	James M O'Brien	
Burial O	1st Lt	Thomas P Fleming	
Ln O	1st Lt	Peter Donaghy	
Ln O	1st Lt	Alfred J Carsola	
Ln O	1st Lt	William R Orefice	



Exec 0	Exec 0	Exec 0	Exec 0
CO	CO	CO	CO
Major	Major	Major	Major
Dennis D Claire	Martin H Foery	Martin H Foery	William Martin
Until asgd 27 June to comd 2nd Bn.	Asgd 27 June.	Asgd 27 June.	Asgd 27 June.

THIRD BATTALION

Exec 0	Exec 0	Exec 0	Exec 0
CO	CO	CO	CO
Major	Major	Major	Major
Gregory Brousseau	Gregory Brousseau	Gregory Brousseau	Gregory Brousseau
Until assumed comd 25 June.	Until assumed comd 25 June.	Until assumed comd 25 June.	Until assumed comd 25 June.
Exec 0	Exec 0	Exec 0	Exec 0
CO	CO	CO	CO
Major	Major	Major	Major
John F McDonough	James A Dooly	James A Dooly	James A Dooly
WIA on 25 June.	Asgd on 25 June.	Asgd on 25 June.	Asgd on 25 June.
CO	CO	CO	CO
Lt Col	Lt Col	Lt Col	Lt Col
John F McDonough	James A Dooly	James A Dooly	James A Dooly
WIA on 25 June.	Assumed temp comd on 27 June.	Assumed temp comd on 27 June.	Assumed temp comd on 27 June.
CO	CO	CO	CO
Major	Major	Major	Major
Gregory Brousseau	James A Dooly	James A Dooly	James A Dooly
Fr 25 June until WIA on 27 June.	Asgd fr 3rd Bn to 2nd Bn 27 June.	Asgd fr 3rd Bn to 2nd Bn 27 June.	Asgd fr 3rd Bn to 2nd Bn 27 June.

SECOND BATTALION

CO	CO	CO	CO
Major	Major	Major	Major
James H Mahoney	Edward J Strong	Eugene D Cronin	Myron L Brewer
Until asgd as CO of Co B 29 June.	Asgd 29 June in addition to other duties.	Asgd 29 June in addition to other duties.	Asgd 29 June in addition to other duties.
Exec 0	Exec 0	Exec 0	Exec 0
CO	CO	CO	CO
Major	Major	Major	Major
James H Mahoney	Edward J Strong	Eugene D Cronin	Myron L Brewer
Until asgd as CO of Co B 29 June.	Asgd 29 June in addition to other duties.	Asgd 29 June in addition to other duties.	Asgd 29 June in addition to other duties.

FIRST BATTALION

AGL 0	AGL 0	AGL 0	AGL 0
Lt (jg)	Lt (jg)	Lt (jg)	Lt (jg)
John B Sackley, USN.	Robert L Hire, 295 JASCO	Robert L Hire, 295 JASCO	Robert L Hire, 295 JASCO

THIRD BATTALION Cont'd.

S-1	Capt	James P Cuffe
S-2	1st Lt	John T Farley
S-3	Capt	Martin E Nolan
S-4	1st Lt	Richard Funk

COMPANY COMMANDERS

Regtl Hq Co	Capt	Joseph D Gattie	
Sv Co	Capt	Michael E Kenny	
Cn Co	Capt	Robert B Marshall	
A-T Co	1st Lt	Maurice P Prout	
Med Det	Major	Francis H Reynolds	
Hq Co 1st Bn	1st Lt	Eugene D Cronin	
Co A	Capt	Lawrence J O'Brien	
Co B	1st Lt	Jose H Gil	IIA on 20 June, resumed comd 23 June; WIA 26 June, resumed comd 16 July.
Co B	1st Lt	Audie G Barnett	Fr 20-23 June and fr 26-29 June.
Co B	1st Lt	Myron L Brewer	Asgd 29 June, trfd 16 July to Co C.
Co C	Capt	Paul E Ryan	KIA 18 June.
Co C	1st Lt	Edward L Cloyd, Jr	Fr 18 June to 5 July.
Co C	Capt	Joseph J Kennedy	Fr 5 July to 16 July.
Co C	1st Lt	Myron L Brewer	Asgd 16 July.
Co D	Capt	Joseph J Kennedy	Asgd to Co C 5 July; reasgd to Co D 16 July.
Co D	1st Lt	Edward Gill	Fr 5 July to 16 July.
Hq Co 2nd Bn	Capt	Andrew M Mursko	
Co E	Capt	Bernard Ryan	WIA 23 June; ret to comd 17 July.
Co E	1st Lt	John J Raleigh	Fr 23 June to 30 June.
Co E	Capt	John J Molloy	Asgd 30 June, reld 17 July.
Co F	Capt	Francis P Leonard	WIA 25 June.
Co F	2nd Lt	Ralph L Laney	Assumed temp comd 25 June.



COMPANY COMMANDERS cont'd

Co F	1st Lt	Joseph L Tremmel	Fr 25 June to 29 June when WIA.
Co F	2nd Lt	John M Flesche, Jr	Assumed temp comd 29 June.
Co F	1st Lt	Charles L Yarbrough	Assumed temp comd 30 June.
Co F	Capt	William J Smith	Asgd 30 June.
Co G	Capt	Paul J Chasmar	
Co H	1st Lt	Joseph W Kiley	WIA 25 June, ret to dy 30 June, ab sk, 17 July, ret to dy 22 July.
Co H	1st Lt	Charles L Yarbrough	Fr 25 June to 30 June and fr 17 July to 22 July.
Hq Co 3rd Bn	Capt	James P Currie	
Co I	Capt	John J Peter	I/A on 11 July.
Co I	1st Lt	Robert A Elliot	Asgd on 11 July.
Co K	Capt	Howard E Betts, Jr	
Co L	Capt	Joseph P Stampher	WIA 28 June.
Co L	1st Lt	George R J Weigand	Asgd 28 June.
Co M	Capt	William Martin	Until asgd as Bn Exec O on 27 June.
Co M	1st Lt	Joseph M Logan	Asgd 27 June.

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS 165th INFANTRY  
APO # 27

S-2 INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL

From the Intelligence standpoint, a wealth of information and material was obtained during the Saipan Campaign. Enemy tactics, equipment and the Japanese soldier were brought to light during the various phases of the operation. Saipan was our initial operation on island warfare, previously meeting the enemy on Makin Atoll. The lesson learned during the Makin operation were applied to this campaign and resulted in complete intelligence coverage. The following report covers the period 1 April 1944 to 6 August 1944.

PREPARATION AND PLANNING PHASE

The first information received concerning the operation Forager was obtained about the first part of April 1944. The regimental commander informed the Battalions and selected members of his staff of the general plan for the forthcoming operation. All members present at this meeting were sworn to secrecy and no information was to be divulged until released by the Regimental Commander.

Upon our return from amphibious training various secret documents were made available to the selected officers for study. Regiment and each Battalion prepared plans and operation rooms which were kept under constant surveillance and appropriate security measures taken. After the actual operation plans were received a few key enlisted personnel were informed of the operation. This personnel assisted in the preparation of administration details. Aerial photos, Maps and other intelligence data received from Division were prepared for distribution to the units that comprised the Regimental Combat Teams. Distribution of the packages were not effected until embarkation day.

About the 15th May 1944, all unit commanders were informed of the operation and thoroughly oriented on the various plans formulated by Division.

The entire Regimental Combat Team embarked on the 31 May 1944.

TRAINING

When information was received that our Regiment was to be part of a Task Force intensive training was instituted. A weekly training schedule was submitted to include the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoons and each Battalion Intelligence sections. Two full days each week were set aside for training of combined Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoons and Battalion S-2 section. In addition two enlisted men from each company headquarters were included in the two days training period.



The following subject were included in the Intelligence Training Program.

- Map and Aerial Photo Reading
- Use of the Compass
- Combat Intelligence
- Scouting and Patrolling
- Communications
- Japanese conventional signs and symbols
- Captured Documents
- The Japanese Soldier
- Counterintelligence
- Interrogation of POW's
- Motor Maintenance

Training aides including films, captured jap tanks and captured documents and Maps, made part of the weekly training program.

MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

Maps: the supply of maps for this operation was furnished in sufficient quantity. The following types of maps were furnished to this organization:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>
1:20,000 Topographic	Island: Saipan, Tinian Guam	Down to include squads
1:62,500 Topographic	Island: Saipan & Tinian	Down to Companies
1:20,000 Litho-Mosaic	Island: Saipan & Tinian	Down to Companies
1:10,000 Topographic	Island: Guam	Down to Battalion
1:20,000 G-2 Situation	Island: Saipan & Tinian	Down to Companies

During the course of the operation additional maps were issued this Headquarters by Division. One of the maps issued was a reproduction of a captured Japanese map which showed all the terrain features not accounted for on the original map issued.

The new type target square map, scale 1:20,000, proved to be of great assistance in target designation and plotting and marking of front lines. Points and areas were quickly located without the use of scales and grid coordinates. The scale 1:62,500 map was used primarily as an orientation map. The scale 1:20,000 litho-mosaics were not satisfactory due to the numerous cloud covered areas, thereby detracting from its value for study. G-2 Situation maps were very good and were kept current by the daily issuance of additional intelligence data from Division and Corps.

One relief map of the island of Saipan was acquired from Division. Regiment and Battalion S-2 sections prepared individual relief maps of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. These models proved very valuable for orientation of all personnel aboard ship.



## SECRET

### AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

Aerial photographs of the island of Saipan, Tinian and Guam were issued to each Regiment. The vertical photographs, as issued, were not satisfactory as they contained a great many clouded areas. Oblique photographs of the various landing beaches were very good. Sufficient copies were issued for distribution down to Battalions. During the course of the operation, aerial photographs of different sections of the island were issued to this organization. The oblique photos of the island of Tinian were most satisfactory.

It is recommended that initial distribution of aerial photographs for future operations be made to include Battalions. One set of vertical photographs of all three islands was issued to Regiment and was not sufficient for complete study by each Battalion.

### ENEMY TACTICS

In all phases of the operation in our zone of action the enemy tactics followed a similar pattern. Initially the enemy had good observation and was able to lay accurate artillery and mortar fire on our lines. When it became apparent to the Jap that he could no longer hold his position, the result of superior firepower, he would retire to a new defensive position and would leave a small delaying force to harass our advance. These small delaying forces were never organized and remained in their positions until annihilated. Throughout the operation our forces received sniper fire. All main installations, such as airfields, radio stations and AA guns were protected chiefly by concrete and log emplacements. A natural feature used extensively by the Japanese was the caves in the cliffs and mountainous areas of the island. In addition, the shoreline of the island contained thick jungle growth and large natural caves. Access to these shoreline caves could only be made from the ocean side. With a machine gun and a few snipers the enemy was able to hold out for a considerable time in these caves. Often in order to dislodge the enemy from these caves, our forces had to traverse rugged terrain and many times it was necessary to scale these cliffs. In addition to infantry fire, demolitions, flame throwers and tanks were used to overcome this resistance. Each cave required separate treatment. A great many of the caves were connected up with one another and formed an underground dwelling. Many of the caves were sealed up before a computation of the number of enemy killed could be obtained.

Infiltration tactics were used at night and the early morning. The enemy would attack the perimeter in various strength. Some reported groups of four or five would attempt infiltration and others reported groups of seventy five to one hundred. The formation of a well coordinated perimeter enabled our forces to quickly expell any attempt at infiltration. A system of booby traps along the outer edge of the perimeter was used successfully.

In our zone of action enemy tanks attempted to penetrate our perimeter, but were knocked out by anti-tank and bazooka fire. At one point the Japs used a buried tank which was impregnable to small arms fire and required artillery and tank fire to knock it out.



A copy of the propaganda leaflet, together with the translation, was distributed to each Battalion and separate unit aboard ship. The propaganda leaflets were discussed during the orientation lectures and all notified when these leaflets would be dropped on the island of Saipan. In our zone of action no Japanese surrendered by the means of this leaflet. The consensus of opinion was that the wording was too long and it was felt that a short to-the-point leaflet would have more success.

### PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS

In future operations it is recommended that sufficient personnel and transportation be made available to Bomb Disposal Officer, who, upon receipt of the location of these dumps, would immediately take steps to dispose of this ammunition.

It possible the ammunition was spread around a large area. Disposal Officer was notified and action taken to remove any booby traps and the ammunition dumps. When ammunition dumps were located, the Division Bomb from an ammunition dump being blown up. The enemy booby trapped a few of it blow up. During the operation an adjoining unit suffered many casualties close to or around an ammo dump and they were in constant danger of having tactical situation was such that units had to set up their perimeter defense ammunition and were a constant hazard to our fighting troops. At times the ammunition dumps. Most of the dumps contained an enormous amount of Considerable difficulty was experienced in the handling of captured

turned over to the Division Ordnance Officer thru Regimental S-4. ing of captured documents and material in the field. Captured weapons were turned to the finder. A censor stamp was provided by Division for the stamp- documents were obtained. Documents which had little or no value were re-cooperated wholeheartedly in this request and a great amount of material and Different types of enemy documents and maps were discussed. All troops informed of the necessity of turning in all captured documents and material. During the orientation lectures aboard ship, all members were again

### CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL

This headquarters received a report that the enemy was using gas. An immediate check revealed that the report was false. On one occasion, the enemy did use smoke to either conceal his position or to cover his withdrawal. At various Japanese supply points, a quantity of protective clothing and gas masks were found. Many of the enemy killed carried gas masks.

### SMOKE GAS OR CHEMICALS

In the first few phases of the operation identification of enemy dead was unsuccessful. The dead Japs that were searched had no identification on them. Estimation of the number of Japs killed for the day was not accomplished due to the fact the enemy removed their dead and hid them in caves.

The Japanese placed booby traps on many of their ammunition dumps. All personnel were warned to stay clear of all souvenirs as they may be booby trapped.



SECRET

This headquarters was notified when and where these leaflets would be dropped during the period of the operation. A few POW interrogated on whether they had read the leaflet stated they did read them but believe they would not be honored. Others stated they did not see the leaflet.

INTERPRETERS

For this operation, Division assigned two interpreters to each Regimental Combat Team. One interpreter was assigned to each assault BLT and upon the establishment of the Regimental Command Post, they reverted to Regimental control. The services of these two enlisted men was most satisfactory. Without their assistance the interrogation and evaluation of both civilian and military personnel would have presented a difficult problem. Their interrogation of the Prisoners of War and translation of material and documents was systematic and much valuable information was obtained. In order to establish uniformity in the questioning of POWs a mimeographed form of about fifteen questions was compiled by Corps Headquarters and issued to each interpreter. Each completed form was forwarded with the captured POW. Additional information was added in warranted cases. The interpreters were schooled in the method of handling POWs and the results were reflected in the information they obtained. The two interpreters were on call to the front line Battalions whenever their services were required. Prior to the operation, Division G-2 conducted a language school for personnel in Regiments who had a knowledge of the Japanese and Chinese languages. Each Battalion sent four men and Regimental two men to this school. Although the extent of their teaching was basic Japanese, nevertheless it proved its worth in the field for quick evaluation of captured documents.

There were several cases when civilians had hid in caves and interpreters would attempt to have them surrender. Disregarding their own personal safety, they had climbed into the caves and succeeded in having the civilians surrender. At all times a suitable guard was furnished each interpreter.

The public address system was used several times to extricate POWs from the caves and cliffs. The success attained was pretty well divided. On one occasion one hundred and fifty civilians surrendered. The PA system was mounted on a  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicle and often the terrain would not permit the passage of the vehicle and no success resulted. Later, a smaller, portable PA system was provided which could be carried and placed in convenient locations. The dialogue used by the interpreters was too long and it is felt by the undersigned that a short to-the-point dialogue be used.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FROM HIGHER ECHELON

Prior to embarkation all available G-2 information was sent to Regiment, including a complete G-2 Study of the Marianas Islands, latest information on estimated enemy strength, composition of various units believed to be on the islands and other intelligence data. All information received by Regiment was passed on to Battalions. During the operation daily intelligence information was forwarded by Division and Corps. Sometimes these reports were received late and could not be sent to Battalions in time to be of any value.



A copy of each POW Interrogation was forwarded daily to this headquarters by Division. These copies were received very favorably by all units. Upon completion of the operation, mimeograph copies of POW interrogations were distributed to each company of the Regiment for their personal discussion during training periods.

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MEASURES

During the orientation aboard ship all members of this organization were again impressed with the importance of counter intelligence measures. A thorough police of Unit C.P.'s was made before displacement. Extracts of S.O.I.'s were made so that only essential information required would be taken. During this operation the counter sign system worked very well. Having the counter sign for a period of five or six days was easier to remember and gave little chance of confusion.

JAPANESE CIVILIANS

In our zone of action no trouble was experienced with the handling of Japanese civilians. In most cases Japanese civilians were prevented from surrendering by the Japanese Soldiers. Both civilians and soldiers lived in the caves that were flushed out by our forces. Questioning of civilians disclosed that soldiers threatened to shoot civilians if they attempted to surrender. The civilians captured were all laborers and workers on sugar plantations. The majority had come from Korea and some from the Southern part of Japan. The majority of civilians captured had walked into our lines and surrendered willingly. It is believed that full circulation of news stories compiled about the treatment civilians received by US forces might have some value for future operations.

HANDLING OF POWS AND CIVILIANS

As this was the initial campaign on a Japanese mandated island, consequently handling of civilians was to be quite a problem. A discussion was held by Division G-1, G-2 and G-4 together with the Regimental S-1 and S-2's as to the best methods to be employed in the handling of all types of POWs. The final decision was to segregate the POWs into three classes, i.e. all females and children would be kept in one group, all Korean and Japanese laborers of military age in another group and all known military personnel in a third group. Initially during the operation the number of POWs captured was very small. As the campaign progressed this number increased considerably. In the evacuation of both civilian and military POWs, transportation was the chief difficulty. The only means at our disposal for evacuation was to halt a vehicle that was going to the rear and load as many as possible on each vehicle. A two man guard was sent with each group of prisoners sent to the rear. On one occasion 200 civilians were brought to the Regimental POW area about mid-afternoon. Rather than have these civilians kept overnight an emergency call was sent to higher echelon for transportation. The request was granted and four large vehicles dispatched. As transportation was very limited every use was made of vehicles returning to the rear.

We had numerous cases of wounded POWs. On many occasions this would drain both Battalion and Regimental Aid Stations of vehicles and left none to take care of our own wounded.



S E C R E T

Close cooperation between the Bn and Regtl Aid Stations made possible the smooth functioning in the evacuation of wounded POWs.

Recommendations: In future operations one  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton medical truck be assigned to each Bn medical section and one  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicle be assigned to Regtl Medical section for sole purpose of evacuating wounded Japanese.

INTELLIGENCE AND RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON

The intelligence and reconnaissance Platoon was assigned reconnaissance missions for various Saipan operating plans. Aboard ship they were oriented and prepared to reconnoiter areas as called for on each particular plan. Upon landing the reconnaissance mission assigned could not be effected due to a change in the tactical plan.

In addition to small reconnaissance missions within our zone of action, the I & R Platoon was assigned to man Observation Posts and act as guides for the Battalions. Small groups were sent out to explore the natural caves used by the enemy for the purpose of collecting intelligence material. In the event the Regiment was called for the Tinian operation, two or three men were to follow up each assault battalion for the purpose of securing enemy unit identification.

HANDLING OF NEWS RELEASES

Prior to the Saipan operation a public relations office had been set up under the supervision of the Regimental S-2. Personnel consisted of one enlisted man who had previous experience in newspaper work. The chief function of this section was the publication of a weekly newspaper, human interest stories, and stories on awards and decorations of individuals for home town newspapers. During the operation this enlisted man worked with the correspondents in compiling stories of individual's deeds.

One news correspondent, a staff sergeant, and one still photographer, a technical sergeant, was assigned to this Regiment to cover the operation. During the voyage numerous still pictures and stories were compiled. Upon landing the news correspondent and still photographer attached themselves to the assault Battalion and were able to acquire first hand news stories and pictures. Before the completion of the operation both men were recalled by higher headquarters. They formed part of a pool of newspaper correspondents and photographers under the supervision of the Division Public Relations Officer.

At least two photographers and two correspondents, civilian or military, should be attached to the RCT for the entire operation. In this way complete news coverage can be obtained. Each Regiment is desirous of having a complete record of each campaign for its historical records. This can only be accomplished by having at least two photographers assigned to the RCT. From the standpoint of news releases, a great deal of copy was forwarded to higher headquarters and the amount actually released is not known. It is felt by the undersigned that better news coverage for the Army should have been obtained.



Regimental S-2  
Major, 165th Infantry  
WILLIAM F. McCAHILL

*William F. McCahill*

All intelligence personnel were instructed in the use of the 300 Radio. Throughout the entire campaign no difficulty with the operation of the 300 radio was experienced. Sufficient supply of batteries was made available at all times.

In this operation a G-2 Intelligence net was formed. Each Regiment S-2 had a B10 radio which was in direct contact with Division G-2. In this way information was quickly disseminated to higher echelon and eliminated the usual delay in getting information back in time to be of value. Continued use of this G-2 net is recommended for future operations.

COMMUNICATIONS



## FORAGER OPERATION

### S-3 OPERATIONAL REPORT

1. This regiment was first given a warning about the 1st of April that it would soon be taking part in an amphibious operation. At the time very little information was available as to the exact nature of this operation.

2. Following receipt of this warning order, all training was intensified so as to properly prepare the organization for what lay ahead of it. The following routine subjects were covered:

- a. Qualification and familiarization firing of all weapons.
- b. Swimming: An attempt was made to teach every member of the organization to swim at least fifty (50) yards carrying full field equipment. Better than ninety (90) percent of the organization were able to do this before leaving for this operation.
- c. Physical Conditioning: All men were trained with the object in view of preparing them to withstand the rigors of a prolonged campaign over difficult terrain.
- d. Scouting and patrolling and small unit tactics.
- e. Hygiene, sanitation and first aid.
- f. Map and aerial photograph reading.

3. Specialized training was instituted in subjects that were believed required for the type of operation expected. Some of the subjects covered were:

- a. Movement through burned cane fields.
- b. Attack of a fortified position.
- c. Combined Tank-Infantry operations.
- d. Communications: Emphasis was placed on the special types of communications peculiar to amphibious operations and island warfare.
- e. Perimeter defense.
- f. Combined Infantry-Artillery operations.

4. The specialized training period was followed by a period of advanced training in amphibious operations. During this period the RCT was taken out on ships for two periods of four and seven days each and made practice landings on the Island of MAUI. The final practice landing was one involving the entire 27th Infantry Division.

5. Shortly prior to embarking for the operation, this regiment received twenty-one (21) plans from the Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division. These plans covered possible landings on the different beaches on the Islands of SAIPAN, TINIAN and GUAM. This regiment in turn, based on the missions assigned it in the Division plans, wrote twenty-one (21) sets of plans covering its possible employment on any or all three islands. Prior to embarkation for the operation, these plans were disseminated as far as battalion commanders, certain members of their staffs and company commanders. The battalion commanders in turn prepared plans appropriate to their BLTs.

6. a. Embarkation: The RCT embarked aboard transports in PEARL HARBOR on the afternoon of May 31st. All ships weighed anchor and sailed out of the harbor at 0555 on the 1st of June. The convoy arrived at KWAJALEIN on the afternoon of June 9th. It left there at 1650 on the 11th of June.



throughout the night individual boats wandered into and landed on the Blue beaches. The Regimental Executive Officer accompanied by the forward echelon of the CP group landed at 0030. While looking for Colonel Smith he contacted a lieutenant in charge of a Marine shore party. This lieutenant informed him that he had received instructions that the 10th Infantry was to take over the occupation of the town of ~~CHIRAN-KANNA~~ from the Marines. While at the shore party of a telephone message was received from the 4th Marine Division to the effect that the original orders had been cancelled. We were instructed to send a guide to the CP of the 4th Marine Division to pick up a Major Rock who would

17 June 1944:

hours before finding their way ashore. could not read a compass. Most of the boats were in the water for four or more hours before finding their way ashore. Beaches. The boat waves became disorganized in the dark. In most cases the dusk had set in. Extreme difficulties were experienced in finding the Blue Marine Division. By the time the troops were debarked in the landing craft on beaches Blue 1 and 2 and report to a Colonel Smith from Headquarters 4th radio orders aboard the Harris from the Regimental Commander to land the RCT Harris to await orders. At 1604 the Regimental Executive Officer received the USS Harris at 1710. The three BLT commanders were assembled aboard the instructions. The Regimental Commander, accompanied by the S-2 and S-3 left the USS Regiment on arrival in the transport area for further mending Officer of this Regiment was directed to report to the Division Com- pare to land on the beaches in the vicinity of ~~CHIRAN-KANNA~~ today. The Com- at 1701 a message was received from the CG, 27th Infantry Division to pro-

16 June 1944:

FIRST PHASE

- a. FIRST PHASE: Landing from transports, assault on ASLITO AIRFIELD and NARUWAN PENINSULA.
  - b. SECOND PHASE: Attack to the north ending at MAKUSMA Village.
  - c. THIRD PHASE: Period of rehabilitation and reserve for TINIAN Operation.
  - d. FOURTH PHASE: Final mopping up of SAIPAN.
7. Operations: (See Fos, Overlays, Unit Journals and Unit Reports).
- a. The convoy arrived off SAIPAN ISLAND at 0530 on the 16th of June.
- b. Starting on the morning of "D" day a constant radio watch was kept by RCT Headquarters of the progress of the attack on SAIPAN by the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions. All members of the RCT were kept informed of this progress by dispatches broadcast over the ship's public address systems.
- c. Starting on the morning of "D" day a constant radio watch was kept by RCT Headquarters of the progress of the attack on SAIPAN by the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions. All members of the RCT were kept informed of this progress by dispatches broadcast over the ship's public address systems.
- d. Prior to embarkation, all BLTs had prepared relief maps and en- largements of the maps of SAIPAN, TINIAN and GUAM. During the trip these maps were used extensively to orient all personnel on the terrain on all three islands. The twenty-one (21) plans were gone into in detail and explained to all members of the RCT. During the voyage the plans were further enlarged upon to the extent that every unit knew what the role would be in the event that anyone of the plans were ordered executed.

The following is a digest of events of the attack on the island of SAIPAN by this regiment. It is broken down into four (4) phases as follows:



guide us into position for a dawn attack. When Major Rock arrived at the shore party CP the regiment (less BLT 165-3 which had not been landed up to this time) was assembled and marched south along the shore towards Yellow Beach. Because of wreckage along the shore line the men were often required to walk in the water. The Regimental Commander met the Regiment as it passed through the 4th Marine Division CP in the vicinity of Beach Yellow One. He had received orders for this regiment to relieve the 24th Marine Regiment of its sector and capture O-2 line within its zone of action. This sector included ASLITO AIRFIELD. The troops marched all night and started the relief at just about daybreak. While going into position they were shelled by Jap artillery. The 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment on the right of the regimental sector and the 2nd Battalion relieved the right battalion of the 25th Marine Regiment. It was requested of the 4th Marine Division that the 3rd Battalion of the 24th Marine Regiment be left with us as a reserve until our own 3rd Battalion arrived. \* This request was granted. In the 1st Battalion, Company A crossed the LD at 0900 and Company B crossed at 0740. They had to fight for the LD against bypassed enemy groups. The 2nd Battalion crossed the LD at 0750. Both battalions moved forward slowly. The 1st Battalion ran into concrete emplacements on its right flank and was slowed down considerably. The leading elements of the 3rd Battalion came ashore at 0805. The remainder of the battalion had all landed by 0945. It was placed in Regimental reserve. By the middle of the afternoon the 2nd Battalion had advanced to within two hundred (200) yards of ASLITO AIRFIELD. The 1st Battalion was experiencing difficulty getting on the ridge running south from the airfield. At 1140, Company I was released to the 1st Battalion. At 1600 the 1st Battalion succeeded in capturing the top of the ridge. At 1715, Company K was re-released to the 2nd Battalion. At 1730, the enemy launched a counter-attack against the 1st Battalion and drove them back. Orders were issued to the 3rd Battalion at 1815 to move to the vicinity of the 1st Battalion and to be prepared to attack with them the following morning. They arrived at 2145 and extended the left of the 1st Battalion line for the night.

18 June 1944:

At 0600, Companies I and K reverted to control of the 3rd Battalion. King Hour was set at 0730. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were ordered to capture the ridge to their front. This was the same ridge from which the 1st Battalion had been driven during the Jap counter-attack the previous night. The formation for the attack was 3rd Battalion on the right, 1st Battalion in the center, and the 2nd Battalion on the left. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to hold its line until the 1st and 3rd Battalions came abreast of them. At 0800, the 2nd Battalion was ordered to proceed across ASLITO AIRFIELD. At 0900, Company K was again attached to the 2nd Battalion. By 1000, the 1st and 3rd Battalions had captured their objectives. The 2nd Battalion secured the airfield by 1015. At 0900, the CG, 27th Infantry Division issued a new order revising boundaries. The new formation placed the 105th Infantry on our right. The Division objective was the coast line on the east side of the island. This Regiment continued the attack to the east with the 1st and 2nd Battalions in the line, the 1st Battalion on the left. The 3rd Battalion was in Division reserve. At 1730, a counter-attack developed against the Marine units on our left. To guard against a possible break-through on our left the 1st Battalion moved to the left and the 3rd Battalion filled the gap between the 1st and 2nd Battalions. By nightfall our lines were approximately one thousand (1,000) yards short of the objective. Early in the evening several enemy aircraft engaged in a dogfight with some friendly planes directly over the airfield. One enemy plane was shot down in flames over the NAFUTAN PENINSULA and another landed in flames on the airfield, ran off the runway and crashed in the canofields beyond. The pilot was captured by the 2nd Battalion.

\* See end of report, Page 11.



19 June 1944:

The attack was continued to the east. The 1st and 2nd Battalions jumped off at 0730. Both battalions reached the shore line by 1400. At 1500 the 3rd Battalion was ordered to relieve the 1st Battalion of its sector. The 1st Battalion was ordered into Division reserve. While this relief was being executed word was received that a gap existed between the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 105th Infantry. This gap was located south of ASLITO AIRFIELD. DIV ordered the 1st Battalion of this regiment to fill the gap and hold that section of the line for the night.

20 June 1944:

At 0700 the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry was attached to this regiment. The Commanding General, 27th Infantry Division visited the regimental CP and issued orders for a new attack. The direction of attack was changed to the south in the direction of NAVALAN POINT. The 1st Battalion, 165th Infantry was relieved of the mission given it the previous night and ordered to take over the front of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and to maintain contact with the 4th Marine Division to the north. The formation for the attack to the south was 2nd Battalion on the left, 3rd Battalion in the center, and the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry on the right. When the battalion commanders made their reconnaissance it was found that the LD given in the Division Field Order could not be reached without fighting for it. By mutual agreement they decided on a new LD approximately five hundred (500) yards behind the one given in the order. The time of attack had originally been set at 1000. This time was changed to 1115 and then to 1200 in order to allow the 3rd Battalion to get into position for the jump-off after being relieved by the 1st Battalion. After an artillery preparation all units jumped off at 1200. Initially very little resistance was met. After advancing about five hundred (500) yards, Company I on the right met heavy rifle, mortar and machine gun fire. The left of the 2nd Battalion ran into heavy enemy resistance along the shoreline. They left one company to contain and eliminate this resistance. The reserve company was committed to take over the front of the company left behind. By nightfall the entire line had advanced about one thousand (1000) yards. During the day the zone of advance and the rear installations of the battalions were subjected to heavy enemy artillery fire from across NAIGIEMME BAY. These enemy guns were eventually knocked out by naval gunfire and air strikes. Late in the evening the first American plane landed on ASLITO AIRFIELD. Enemy artillery pieces firing from the vicinity of LT. NAVALAN were hitting in the vicinity of the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The muzzle blasts of the guns could be observed from the regimental CP on ASLITO AIRFIELD. The artillery liaison officer directed observed counter-battery fire against these positions.

21 June 1944:

At 0630 the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry was relieved of attachment to this regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 105th Infantry was attached to us. The 2nd Battalion, 105th Infantry was ordered to relieve our 2nd Battalion of its sector and mission. The plan of attack for this day was for the 3rd Battalion to be squeezed out of the line when the 105th Infantry and this regiment reached the 0-1 line, the division objective. At 0700 the order relieving the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry of attachment to this regiment was revoked, thus placing the entire attack under the control of this regiment. At 0800 orders were received that this regiment would be relieved of its sector at 0630 on the 22nd of June by the 105th Infantry. The orders further stated that the regiment as part of the division was to go into an assembly area in NTLF reserve. The attack this day proceeded slowly because of the numerous enemy positions located in caves. The Asst Div Artillery Officer moved a battery of 105mm Howitzers



into a position from which they could support the attack with direct fire into these caves. By nightfall the attack had advanced to within five hundred (500) yards of the O-1 line.

22 June 1944:

The relief of this regiment by the 105th Infantry was started at 0925. It was completed at about 1130. The last elements of this regiment closed in the assembly area at 1510. Late in the evening orders were received from the CG, 27th Infantry Division for this regiment to relieve elements of the 4th Marine Division the following morning and continue the attack to the north.

23 June 1944:

SECOND PILLSE

At 0530 the regiment began the movement to pass through elements of the 4th Marine Division. Relief was effected at 1000. The formation for the attack was 1st Battalion on the right, 2nd Battalion on the left and 3rd Battalion in reserve. The objective was the O-5 line. The 1st Battalion, in contact with the 23rd Marine Regiment on their right, made good progress against light enemy resistance. The 2nd Battalion ran into heavy enemy mortar, rifle and machine gun fire coming from strongly fortified positions to their front in Death Valley and the high ground to their left. The 106th Infantry on their left were unable to capture this high ground at that time. The enemy fire coming from that direction held up the advance of the 2nd Battalion and caused heavy casualties, it advanced about four hundred (400) yards before nightfall. Throughout the day the regimental command post was under sniper fire. At about 1830 enemy tanks attacked the left flank of the 2nd Battalion. Between our 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, five of these tanks were knocked out of action by bazooka and 37mm AT guns. One tank got away but it is believed it was the same one that our 1st Battalion reported knocking out a short time later. At 1940 a Jap ammo dump exploded in the vicinity of the 2nd Battalion CP causing several casualties.

24 June 1944:

At 0800, following a ten minute artillery preparation, our 1st and 2nd Battalions, with the 106th Infantry on their left, attacked toward the O-5 line. By 0915 they had advanced about two hundred (200) yards against enemy rifle, machine gun and mortar fire. The terrain was becoming rugged. The Japs held strong points in the sides of cliffs with perfect concealment and excellent fields of fire. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were hit all along the front with heavy enemy small arms and mortar fire. The left of the 2nd Battalion was hit the hardest. At 1000 the 1st Battalion executed a flanking movement with Company B holding, Company A moving around their left through the 2nd Battalions zone of action and Company C moving around Company B's right. At 1030 the 3rd Battalion was ordered to attack through Company C and make contact with the 2nd Battalion at 187 K. During this day we lost one medium tank and knocked out four enemy tanks. We made very little gain during the day. The enemy were offering heavy resistance. At this point the terrain was in their favor. At about 0800 the 2nd Battalion CP was hit by heavy mortar and sniper fire. At 1500 the 1st Battalion CP was hit by enemy mortar fire and suffered heavy casualties.

25 June 1944:

At 0630 the 3rd Battalion was ordered to by-pass the enemy in the vicinity of TA 186 T and move up in position on the right of the 2nd Battalion. Preceded by a fifteen minute artillery preparation the 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacked toward the O-5 line. The 1st Battalion followed up behind, mopping up in the regimental zone of action. The activity throughout the day consisted



of several separate actions along the entire front, in the reduction of enemy strong points organized on the high ground and in the side of cliffs. The progress was slow. One enemy light tank was destroyed by the 3rd Battalion. During this days action the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion was severely wounded. It was necessary to call upon Company C, 88th Anti Mortar Battalion in order to evacuate him. The 3rd Battalion was held up by the 106th Infantry Regiment passing through them but reached the 0-5 line by the end of the day. The remaining elements of the Cannon Company came ashore and were brought up to the vicinity of the regimental CP.

26 June 1944:

The regiment was ordered to commence hopping up operations at daylight so as to secure and reorganize on the 0-5 line, and then to be prepared to attack from this line on Division order to secure the 0-6 line. The 2nd Battalion was to remain in their present area hopping up in rear of the 0-5 line. The 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry was attached to the regiment for the attack. The formation for the attack was 3rd Battalion on the right, 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry on the left, our 1st Battalion following in rear of 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry. At 0730, the 2nd Battalion started hopping up operations on the high ground in the vicinity of TA 186 AX and 187 AV. At 0800, the remainder of the RCT moved off and began their advance. Initially the advance was rapid but then slowed down. Resistance in general ranged from very heavy on the left of the sector to almost none on the right. At 2200, RCT 165, less the 2nd Battalion and plus the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry, now attached to the 4th Marine Division. The 2nd Battalion was attached to the 106th Infantry.

27 June to 1 July 1944:

King hour was originally set for 0630 June 27th but owing to the delay of the Marine forward observers in reaching the regimental CP, the artillery preparation could not be delivered causing the attack to be delayed until 0730. At that time, following a ten minute artillery preparation, the regiment moved out with the 1st Battalion, 166th Infantry on the left, the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry in the center and our 3rd Battalion on the right. The 3rd Battalion advanced very rapidly within its zone of action but the two battalions on the left were forced to move much more slowly because of strong enemy resistance coming from caves in the steep cliffs in that part of the regimental sector. On 28 June 1944, the advance continued with the 1st Battalion 166th Infantry moving out at 0550 to secure the high ground from which they could support by fire the attack of the rest of the RCT. This attack began at 0730 and by 0830 the 3rd Battalion had reached the 0-6 line and then moved westward to capture Hill 700. Our 1st Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry attacked west towards the Division boundary. The 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry encountered heavy resistance near rd 547. Fire from an enemy mortar shell landed in the regimental CP, severely wounding the regimental Commander, Colonel Gerard W. Kelley. Colonel Kelley was evacuated and Lt. Colonel Joseph T. Hart, the regimental executive Officer assumed command of the regiment. On 29 June 1944, the regiment was ordered to hold its present positions, hopping up and patrolling to the front. At daylight, in order to improve our positions, the 3rd Battalion was ordered to attack and secure CHANAN DAMSIII and Hill 765. This mission was completed by noon. Patrols maintained between the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry and our 3rd Battalion encountered heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire all day. The 1st Battalion, 166th Infantry patrolled the left of the regimental sector. On 30 June 1944, the regiment continued its patrolling activities and harassed the enemy with long range machine gun and artillery fire. At 1740 orders were issued to the



effect that the 1st Battalion would be relieved of its flank protection mission by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines the following morning. The 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry was ordered relieved of attachment to this regiment and ordered back to 27th Division control. The relief of our 1st Battalion by the Marines was completed by 0710 on July 1st. They in turn relieved the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry of their sector by 0800. During the afternoon, they attacked the pass at RJ 547. They captured it by nightfall. The 3rd Battalion continued patrolling and the delivering of long range machine gun, mortar and artillery fire against the enemy withdrawing to our front. The 2nd Battalion who had been relieved of attachment to the 106th Infantry and attached to the 105th Infantry were now placed in Corps reserve in the vicinity of TA 187 A. At 2200 the 165th Infantry received the 27th Division attack order for the next day relieving them of attachment with the 4th Marine Div and returning them to 27th Infantry Div control. The 2nd Battalion was ordered to remain in their present area as Corps Reserve.

### 2 July 1944:

The regiment attacked at 0830 on July 2nd in column of battalions, 3rd Battalion leading, 1st Battalion (less Company C) following. Company C was left in the vicinity of RJ 547 mopping up. Our advance was very rapid, so much so that contact between our left flank and the right of the 105th Infantry became extremely difficult. In view of this the CG, 27th Inf Div ordered us to halt our advance at 1445 until further orders. Our advance had been aided by a 30 minute concentration laid on the area of our exposed flank by the attached Chemical Mortar Platoon during the morning. During the day two SPMs were lost, one from enemy action and one from an accident. The latter one was later repaired and put back into action. By nightfall contact with the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry on our left was reestablished.

### 3 July 1944:

King Hour had been set at 0800. The 3rd Battalion was in position and ready to jump off at that time but because of an air strike on the front of the Marines on our right, and repeated onfilade automatic fire from their sector, we could not advance. The attack finally jumped off at 1100 with the Marines and our 3rd Battalion moving off together. The Division phase line was reached at 1735 after an advance through enemy mortar and machine gun fire which was especially heavy on our left flank. At 1515 the 1st Battalion moved to a point four hundred (400) yards behind the 3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion was still in Corps Reserve.

### 4 July 1944:

Early in the morning a large group of enemy attempted to infiltrate north through the regimental command post. Twenty-seven of them were killed including a number of officers and warrant officers, one of whom proved to be Colonel Ogawa, Commanding Officer of the 136th Japanese Infantry Regiment. At 0730 the 1st Battalion passed through the 3rd Battalion and attacked in the regimental zone of action. Originally King Hour was set for 0700 but was delayed until 0730 on Division order. Progress was steady against light opposition until 1030 when the 1st Battalion reached the high ground overlooking FLORES POINT. Here the advance was held up because of the delay in moving up of the 105th Infantry on our left flank, but was resumed at 1115. During the early afternoon the advance was rapid against weak enemy opposition. Later in the afternoon it slowed up because of heavy enemy automatic weapon fire. At 1530 the CG, 27th Inf Div ordered the Regiment to relieve and take over the sector and zone of advance of two battalions of the 4th Marine Division on our right.



At this time the 2nd Battalion was released from WTA&F Reserve. At 1700 relief was begun by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of this regiment and although the 2nd Battalion, 105th Infantry was ordered to fill the gap between our 1st and 3rd Battalions, it was too late to prevent some enemy infiltration. Approximately one hundred enemy delivered sporadic attacks against the 3rd Battalion that night. These were all unsuccessful and the enemy retired leaving many dead.

5 July 1944:

The morning of July 5th, the regiment attacked toward the LD from which they were to advance to the 0-8 line, starting at 1200. Later King Hour was changed to 1300 by the CG, 27th Inf Div. At that time the regiment attacked with the 2nd Battalion on the right and the 3rd Battalion on the left. The 2nd Battalion made swift progress against light opposition and maintained contact with the Marines on their right. The 3rd Battalion was able to advance only one hundred (100) yards before they were halted by heavy mortar and machine gun fire. The 105th Infantry on their left was also held up by the same fire. The 1st Battalion had been relieved at 1035 by a battalion of the 105th Infantry and was in regimental reserve near RI 560.

6 July 1944:

The attack to the north was scheduled to begin at 0700. The objective was to bring the 105th Infantry and our left battalion on line with our right battalion. The 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion at 0615. At 1000 the direction of attack and boundaries were changed. The objective was now the shoreline in the vicinity of the town of MAKUNSHA. The regiment jumped-off in a northerly direction at 1200 with the 2nd Battalion on the right and the 1st Battalion on the left. The 2nd Battalion had left company G on the old regimental boundary to maintain contact with the Marines on our right. They were relieved of this mission by the Marines in mid-afternoon. During this period company I was attached to the 2nd Battalion. During the afternoon the 1st Battalion was able to advance but three hundred (300) yards against heavy resistance. They were subjected to heavy cross fires coming from the caves in Hill 767 and the draw on their left in front of the 105th Infantry. At 1500 the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry was attached to this Regiment with orders to attack between our 1st and 2nd Battalions in an effort to get troops down in MAKUNSHA plains. Because of the approaching darkness and their inability to reach their LD before darkness, they were ordered to dig in for the night in PL 219 I and 250 K. Our 1st and 2nd Battalions made contact with each other thus closing the existing gap between them. The 105th Infantry on our left had not been able to keep abreast of our 1st Battalion. It was necessary for the 1st Battalion to bend back its left flank in order to make contact and tie in for the night.

7 July 1944:

Word was received of a heavy enemy counter-attack during the early hours of the morning against the 105th Infantry. At least part of an enemy force estimated variously between 3500 to 5000 Japs penetrated 1500 yards through the American lines, over-running two battalions of the 105th Infantry and a battery of Marine artillery. A Jap counter-attack was unsuccessfully launched against the 3rd Battalion, 165th Infantry through the Valley of Holl at day-break. One hundred of the enemy were killed during this action. Another unsuccessful counter-attack was launched against the left flank of the 1st Battalion at the same time. Those attacks were apparently coordinated with the attack against the 105th Infantry. The 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry was ordered to extend the left flank of our 1st Battalion. The regiment was to



continue the attack toward MAKUNSHA. At 0855 the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry, attacked within their zone of advance. They were followed by Companies E and G, 165th Infantry. These two companies were commanded by the executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, 165th Infantry. At 0900 our 1st Battalion jumped off on the right of the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry. The advance proceeded slowly due to steep terrain and fierce resistance from the enemy entrenched in caves, spider holes and pill boxes. All forward movement ceased at 1450 on Division order. During the day the remainder of the 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion supported the attack with long range machine gun and mortar fire from the high ground on the right of our zone of action. The remainder of the 2nd Battalion was in position between the 1st and 3rd Battalions. Word was received that a Marine battalion would relieve the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry the following morning. Meanwhile RCT 165 plus the 3rd Battalion, 106th Infantry were attached to the 2nd Marine Division. Upon relief of the 3rd Battalion 106th Infantry the next morning, that battalion was to revert to 27th Division control.

#### 8 July 1944:

The attack was scheduled originally for 0630 from the Marine line and 0800 from our line but owing to the delay of the Marines to come up on time, it did not begin until 1130. At that time the Regiment moved off toward the 09-A line, with the 1st Battalion on the left, the 2nd Battalion on the right and the 3rd Battalion, in regimental reserve, following the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion met strong resistance very early, but were able to contain the caves from which it came with a platoon from each company and it continued to move ahead slowly. The 2nd Battalion meeting light resistance, reached their objective by 1445. The 3rd Battalion assisted the 1st Battalion in cleaning the enemy out of the caves. During the afternoon Company I forced their way through the Valley of Hell meeting stiff resistance from the caves in the sides of the valley. Enemy attacks and attempts to infiltrate through our lines were unsuccessful and cost him seventy-five killed with no casualties to our troops.

#### 9 July 1944:

The 1st Battalion moved off at daybreak toward their objective. At 1245 assisted by Company L they reached the shore. Company K again went through the Valley of Hell cleaning out all caves as they went along. All other units carried on mopping up operations. At 1615 it was reported by NT&LF that the Island of SAIPAN was considered secured. The regiment was directed to organize the high ground facing the sea within its sector, protect the right flank of the 2nd Marine Division and prevent infiltration from the north. During the night the enemy again attempted to infiltrate through our lines unsuccessfully, leaving one hundred and fifty dead in front of our positions.

#### 10 July 1944:

All battalions were engaged in mopping up operations and patrolling activities. One hundred enemy were killed during daylight hours and another eighty died trying to infiltrate through our lines during the night.

#### 11 July 1944:

Mopping up activities continued resulting in the killing of seventy-five Japs during daylight hours. The regiment was officially returned to the 27th Infantry Division control, relief to take place next day by the 6th Marine Regiment of the 2nd Marine Division. That night another one hundred and ten Japs were killed.



A report came from the MAGICIENNE BAY area that enemy landing craft were reported in that vicinity but an investigation by a friendly destroyer yielded negative information on this report. The regiment jumped off at 0800 with the 106th Infantry and proceeded toward the end of the island. The formation was the same as the previous day except that the 27th Division Reconnaissance Troop and Company B remained in rear of the 2nd Battalion to mop up pockets of resistance. The end of the island was reached at 1230. Seventy-four military and sixteen civilian Japs were killed during the action. Three

5 August 1944:

Using the same formation as the previous day, the regiment jumped off at 0800 and proceeded toward the 0-8 line. This objective was reached by 1330. During this period forty two Japs were killed and forty eight were captured. All but two of those killed were military personnel, but only four of those captured were soldiers. At 1600 the 27th Division Reconnaissance Troop was ordered attached to the 2nd Battalion with instructions to report at 0800 the following morning. By dusk all battalions were dug in on the 0-8 line.

4 August 1944:

Upon orders received the previous day from the CG, 27th Infantry Division, the regiment moved by foot and motor shuttle to the area immediately north of MAKUNSHA. Here they relieved the 105th Infantry of the left zone of action of the 27th Infantry Division. The mission was eliminating the remaining enemy resistance on the north end of the island. Relief was completed by noon. The 1st and 2nd Battalions were ordered to hold up until the 3rd Battalion, which was maintaining contact with the 106th Infantry on the right, came abreast of them. At 1410 the 106th Infantry came abreast of the forward elements of the 165th Infantry. At that time the regiment took up the following attack formation: 2nd Battalion on the left, 3rd Battalion in the center and 1st Battalion on the right. The Division Reconnaissance Troop maintained contact with the 106th Infantry on the right. At 1600 the Regiment moved off in that formation. They reached the 0-7 line by nightfall except on the right flank where it bent back to contact the 106th Infantry. Three enemy were killed during the operations that took place during the day.

3 August 1944:

FOURTH PHASE

During this period the regiment was in bivouac in the MAGICIENNE BAY area. Activities were confined to anti-subpatrols in the surrounding areas. During the period of the PINNAC operation the regiment was in reserve and alerted to be prepared to move thereto if required to assist the Marines. It was released from this reserve status on the morning of August 3rd.

13 July to 2nd August 1944:

THIRD PHASE

The regiment less a provisional battalion was released and began its movement to MAGICIENNE BAY at 0945. The provisional battalion remained behind to hold the regimental sector until relieved by the 6th Marine Regiment. They were released by the Commanding General, 2nd Marine Division at 1630 and closed in the MAGICIENNE BAY area at 1800.

12 July 1944:



civilians were captured. Several casualties were sustained by the Reconnaissance Troop during the days activities. At 1430 all battalions were ordered to withdraw to the base of MT. MARPI to dig in for the night.

6 August 1944:

At 0600 the Regiment began to shuttle back to MAGICIENNE BAY area by motor. Two provisional companies were left back in TA 286 and another in the vicinity of the 27th Infantry Division forward CP at TA 238 Y, to complete mopping up operations. These operations were concluded by 1630 and all units returned to MAGICIENNE BAY area. Twelve enemy soldiers and one civilian were killed and one civilian was captured. During the Fourth Phase of the SAIPAN Operation the regiment killed one hundred and fifty-seven enemy, mostly military personnel and captured sixty-two, mostly civilians.

*M. M. Scheibner*  
M. M. SCHEIBNER  
Capt, 165th Inf  
S-3

\*Note---The time of crossing the LD on 17 June for Companies A and B shown in this report differs from that shown in the organization's Unit Journal. This discrepancy was discovered during a combat critique held on the same ground after the cessation of hostilities. An effort was made to ascertain the origin of the time shown in the Unit Journal, but the records are incomplete because of the fact that during the period of this action the CP personnel and communication equipment had not been completely landed.



S E C R E T

105mm How, Shell, HE, M1 w/f M48	250
105mm How, Shell, HE, M1 w/f M54	254
105mm How, Shell, HE, A.T., M67	70
105mm How, Shell, WP, w/f M57	20
105mm How, Shell, Cannister	75
Ground Signals, Ass't M17-M22	250
Ground Signals, ass't M17A1-M22A1	75
Grenade, Hand, Frag, MkII	4,000
Grenade, Hand, Off., MkIII	400
Grenade, Rifle, HE, A.T., M9A1	300
Grenade, Rifle, Frag, M17T2	800
Rocket, HE, A.T., 2.36", M6A1	100
Smoke, red	450
Smoke, violet	400
Smoke, yellow	400
Smoke, WP	200

The majority of enemy weapons were turned over direct to Division Ordnance Contact parties by front line units. The following quantities of enemy weapons were salvaged thru RCT S-4:

<u>Type and Caliber</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Rifle, Cal. .30	43
Light machine gun, Cal. .30	10
Rifle, automatic	4
Heavy machine gun, Cal. .30	7
AA Gun, 20mm	2
Knee mortars	17
Pistols	8
Rifle, Cal. .25	6

During this operation the following weapons were lost or damaged beyond repair:

<u>Type and Caliber</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
Shotgun, 12 gauge	1
Rifle, US, Cal. .30, M1	40
Rifle, Browning Automatic, Cal. .30, M1918A2	8
Carbine, Cal. .30, M1	28
Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal. .30, M1919A4	3
Pistol, automatic, M1911 and M1911A1	23
Launcher, rocket, A.T., 2.36", M1	11
Mortar, 60mm, M2	2

Enemy ammunition dumps were reported by units to Regimental Ammunition Officer by target areas. This information was immediately transmitted to Division Ordnance Officer who made arrangements for proper disposition. The only enemy ammunition salvaged directly by this organization was 81mm Mortar, Shell HE and Fuzes for Shell HE, 81mm. The latter was employed in our own 81mm Mortars when ammunition supply for that weapon became critical.



The following malfunctions of ammunition and weapons were observed:

All lots of Blumhortar, Shell, HE, M56 fired, proved to be approximately 30% duds.

Grenade, rifle, Eng., M172, do not go off on impact.

Cartridges, rifle grenade, Cal. .30, M7 was defective in numerous cases, causing grenades to fall short and resulting in casualties among our troops.

Carbines failed to function whenever exposed to dust or dirt.

7mm sight, telescope, no swears inside when it gets damp and cannot be used.

Recommendations for new types of weapons are as follows:

Some of the Battalions suggested that the .50 cal. machine guns on the vehicles be replaced with .30 cal. light machine guns resulting in a double purpose: (1) vehicular protection (2) and defense of the perimeter during the night.

Anti-Tank Company and the Anti-Tank Platoon of Battalion Headquarters Company, request one .30 cal. light machine gun or one rifle, Browning auto-matic per squad; also one pistol, automatic, cal. .45 per three men.

Recommendations for new proportions of ammunition types are as follows:

One heavy weapons unit suggests the following on the Blumhortar ammunition: 50% HE, M56; 25% HE, M43A1; 25% WP, M53.

Tracer ammunition should be eliminated except for Squad Leader carrying one clip.

Suggest an increase on Blumhortar Illumination Shell from 10% per unit of fire to 30%.

Supply of Blumhortar Illuminating and Blumhortar Shell, HE, M56 during remainder of operation. Supply of Grenade, Rifle, M7A1; cartridge, Cal. .50, AP, I & T in link bolts; and tracer cal. .30 packed in cartons, were found to be excessive. Other types of ammunition were more than adequate.

HERMAN M. LUTZ,  
Capt, 165th Inf,  
S-4.



SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 165TH INFANTRY  
A.P.O. 27

S-4 REPORT OF OPERATION FORAGER

Supply and Transportation

Elements of the supply group landed on Blue Beach 2 in the following order:

D plus 2 (17 June 1944) at 0020: RCT S-4, Regimental Motor Officer, Ass't Regimental Supply Sergeant, two clerks.

D plus 2 at 0900: CWO Maintenance Officer, detail of 34 EM from Service Company.

D plus 2 at 1400: Ass't Munitions Officer, Regimental Supply Sergeant, detail of 12 EM from Service Company.

The remainder of the Supply group were assigned the following duties as S-4 Representatives:

Service Company Commander: On transport.

Regimental Munitions Officer: On control vessel.

Ass't Regimental S-4: On LST.

Last elements of this group landed on D plus 7.

Battalion Supply Officers and their enlisted assistants landed on D plus 1 and D plus 2.

The RCT S-4, at daybreak, immediately made a reconnaissance of beaches, and contacted Engineer Shore Party Commander to ascertain status of supplies. A small quantity of supplies were landed on D plus 2 and approximately twenty (20) 1/4 ton vehicles. Although two (2) canteens of water were carried by each individual, it was necessary to provide an immediate supply for emergency use. The 1/4 ton vehicles were required by front line units to carry weapons and ammunition, leaving the S-4's without transportation and necessitating borrowing vehicles from other organizations. This resulted in delaying the movement of supplies and the establishing of dumps. Inasmuch as the Service Company 2 1/2 ton trucks (four cargo trucks and one maintenance truck) were not landed until D plus 7 and D plus 8, it was necessary to function with only the available 1/4 ton trucks; two trucks borrowed from the Seabees for three days; two LVTs borrowed from the Marines. The LVTs were available for only approximately six hours and recalled by the Marines. Supplies were not available from the 27th TransDiv until D plus 4. During this period supplies were procured from Marine Dumps, from the beaches, and from any other available source. The shortage of supplies was the result of supply ships leaving during an air raid and not returning for three days (about 1200 D plus 4). Regular dumps were not established until D plus 6 and then only limited supplies were available in the quantities and type required.

Palletized supplies proved satisfactory. The only serious damage to palletized supplies was clothing and individual equipment. It is suggested that cases of clothing and equipment be waterproofed where practicable.



About D plus 10 combat fatigue cases were returned from hospital to Regimental supply dump. This treatment group numbered from twenty to ninety men. These men were reequipped and rehabilitated in from two to seven days. Regimental Surgeon made inspections about three times a week and selected men to be returned to their units. It was necessary to request the services of a clerk from the S-1 section to maintain the administrative details and check the daily progress of each man.

By D plus 8, a fair quantity of supplies were on hand in the RCT dump. When transportation was available, a detail was sent out under the supervision of the 1st Battalion TQM (assigned to S-4 upon completion of TQM duties) to locate and pick up organizational property. It was necessary to procure two DUKWS from Division G-4 for this purpose.

Combat packs were carried by each individual consisting of the following: one change of underwear plus additional pair of socks; toilet articles and hand towel; poncho; 1 "K" and 1 "G" ration (some units carried 1-1/3 "K" rations and 2/3 "assault rations"; spoon, patches and oil for cleaning weapons; trenching tool. It was found that the rations carried were too heavy and it is recommended that initially each man carry 1 "K" ration and 1 "D" ration. In many instances packs were dropped by the men. It is suggested that combat packs be left in Battalion Dumps when desired and be made available to units on their request.

Practically no requests for clothing were made for the first week. However, it was necessary to replace essential items of individual equipment, such as canteens, cartridge belts and weapons, from the second day of fighting. Salvage parties were organized by RCT S-4 for the purpose of collecting abandoned equipment from the battle field. This salvage equipment was picked up in sufficient quantities to replace items required by units during the first week of combat. Thereafter, the quantities were not great enough to replace items lost or worn out. Sufficient quantities of clothing were not available after the first week of combat. During combat, barrack bags are not available to remove clothing for men in the front lines. Shoes presented a particular problem. Resoled shoes, in apparent good condition, do not hold up. Men should not be sent into combat with resoled shoes. At least 50% of shoes requiring replacement were resoled shoes. The RCT S-4 was unsuccessful in an effort to have these shoes replaced prior to embarkation. Shoes were requested in such large quantities that the Quartermaster was unable to supply all the required shoes in the correct sizes.

It was the experience of this organization that "G" and "K" rations were not available in sufficient quantities to offer variety to front line troops, i.e., only "G" rations were available in instances where front line units requested "K" rations and vice versa. Ten-in-One rations proved to be excellent for feeding units in reserve or for short rest periods. However, these were not available in adequate quantities.

On D plus 2 and D plus 3, RCT S-4 had approximately two to four DUKWS assigned to move supplies from LSTS. DUKWS negotiated reefs satisfactorily and proved to be excellent vehicles in moving supplies from ship to shore. However, it was found that DUKWS were cumbersome in moving supplies on land, particularly in loading and unloading. It is felt that openings on each side of vehicle, similar to a truck tailgate, would reduce the amount of labor required in loading and unloading.





**MAP of SAIPAN**  
SCALE: 1:40,000  
HEADQUARTERS 165 INFANTRY REGIMENT  
OPERATIONS 17 JUNE TO 9 JULY 1944



S E C R E T

The quantity of "B" rations put ashore were sufficient. The bread component issue in the "B" ration was not found adequate. It is suggested that the first ten day issue of "B" rations, immediately following combat, be increased approximately 20%; thereafter the present issue will suffice. It is further suggested that appropriate changes be made in Tropical Menu so that a greater variety be made available. The post exchange components were furnished with the "B" ration and were adequate. However, when "C" and "K" rations were issued, cigarettes were not available in sufficient quantity. It is recommended that additional cigarettes be issued with "C" and "K" rations.

Vehicles:

This organization embarked with two 1 ton trailers, forty-eight 1/4 ton trailers, ninety-one 1/4 ton trucks, five 2 1/2 ton trucks, four 1 1/2 ton trucks, three 3/4 ton trucks. All organic vehicles were not available until D plus 11. It is suggested that an additional 1/4 ton truck and 1/4 ton trailer be issued to each Rifle Company. The present 1/4 ton truck and trailer is inadequate.

During this operation five 2 1/2 ton trucks were available as follows: One maintenance truck, one 2 1/2 ton truck to each Battalion S-4, and one 2 1/2 ton truck for RCT S-4.

To overcome transportation difficulties encountered on this operation, sixteen 2 1/2 ton trucks are required. Those would be employed as follows: one maintenance truck, two 2 1/2 ton trucks to each Battalion S-4 (total 6), and nine 2 1/2 ton trucks to be used by RCT S-4. It is also advisable to assign six Dukws to RCT to deliver initial supplies to Battalion dumps. These Dukws to revert to G-4 control after dumps are established.

Communications:

The RCT S-4 was assigned six SCR 510 radios for the G-4 - S-4 Supply Net. In addition, the Service Company Commander was assigned one SCR 284 radio. It was found that the SCR 510 radios were impractical. Difficulty was encountered in contacting the Control Vessel and LST carrying the cross-section of supplies. Although the 510's were originally planned for only ship-to-shore communications, it was found essential to have communications between Battalion and Regimental dumps. Telephone communications were not available and were impractical. SCR 284 radios were procured to replace the 510's and proved very satisfactory between Battalion and Regimental S-4s.

SCR 284 radios should be provided for future operations. During the fifteen days of the operation the SCR 284 radio was employed, the minimum of maintenance and repair was required. At no time were communications seriously affected. It is felt by the RCT S-4 that without the aid of the 284 radio, difficulty may have been experienced at times in moving essential supplies to the front lines.

It is highly recommended that an SCR 284 radio be installed in the Regimental S-4 vehicle. In many instances the Regimental S-4 was in a position to transmit vital supply information to Regimental Dump but was unable to do so because means of communications were not immediately available. The importance of a complete communications system as an aid in moving supplies forward to assault units with a minimum loss of time cannot be stressed to greatly. Similarly, SCR 284's should be furnished the supply of higher echelon to insure that urgent supply matters are immediately transmitted to or from RCT S-4.



41,000	30 Cal. Carbino, M1, cartons
23,000	30 Cal. Carb. Ball, clip (5)
188,000	30 Cal. Carb. Ball, clip (8)
4,000	30 Cal. Carb. Tracer, cartons
437,000	30 Cal. Carb. AP & T, bolted
7,500	45 Cal. Carb. Ball, cartons
1,000	50 Cal. Carb. AP-I-F, bolted
2,000	37mm. Shell, HE, M63
800	37mm. Shot, AP w/t, M51
500	37mm. Carminator, M2
13,000	60mm Mortar, Shell, HE, M19A2
4,500	60mm Mortar, Shell, Illum., M83
2,500	75mm How. Shell HE, w/f M18
500	75mm How. Shell HE, w/f M51
300	75mm How. Shell HE, w/f M62
350	75mm How. Shell HE, w/f M57
4,500	81mm Mortar, Shell, HE, M13A1
7,000	81mm Mortar, Shell, HE, M56
2,000	81mm Mortar, Shell, Smoke, M57

Type of Ammunition

Quantity

The total number of rounds of ammunition expended or lost for each of the above weapons are as follows:

653	848	Carbines, Cal. .30, M1
7	27	Rifles, US, Cal. .30, M903A1
1108	1854	Rifles, US, Cal. .30, M1
84	81	Rifles, Browning Automatic, Cal. .30, M1918A2
47	27	Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal. .30, M1919A1
24	24	Gun, Machine, Browning, Cal. .30, M1917A1
4	5	Shotgun, 12 gauge
228	382	Pistol, automatic, M1911 and M1911A1
74	72	Gun, sub-machine, Thompson, Cal. .45, M1928A1
41	43	Gun, machine, Browning, Cal. .50, M2, HB, Flex, 2/sight tel.
24	24	Gun, 37mm, M3 w/carrriage, M4 and gun, 37mm, M3A1 w/carrriage M3A1
25	27	Mortar, 60mm, M2
18	18	Mortar, 81mm, M1
85	112	Launcher, rocket, A.T., 2.36", M1
6	6	Carrriage, motor, 75mm How, M8
1	2	Carrriage, motor, 105mm How, M7

Type of Weapon

Entered

Completed

The number of weapons employed in this operation are as follows:

The Munitions Officer and his assistant functioned directly under Regimental S-4.

Ordinance



S E C R E T

MEDICAL DETACHMENT  
165th Infantry  
APO 27

REGIMENTAL SURGEON'S REPORT OF OPERATION FORAGER

The following comments are on the functioning of the entire Regimental Medical Detachment during the operations on Saipan Island. It is a summation of the comments of the Battalion Surgeons plus the comments of the Regimental Surgeon.

Sanitary Conditions on Shipboard

Sanitary conditions on shipboard were generally adequate. The following could be improved:

Ventilation in the living quarters on the transport was inadequate.

Diet on several of the ships lacked fresh vegetables, salads, etc., and dairy products. In view of the diet which combat soldiers will be forced to eat after landing, these items should be abundant.

As the landing of the Regiment was on an established beach head no comment can be made regarding debarkation of medical troops. The plan contemplated was to land aid men with companies, litter squad or an agent for litter squad with assault companies, and the aid station divided into 2 or 3 sections, in the 4th and 5th wave.

Location and Protection of Aid Stations

In this theater, experience has dictated that the Battalion Aid Stations be established in the immediate vicinity of the Battalion Command Post, and that it be within the perimeter of the Battalion Command Post at night. This is done for the protection of the aid station and is necessary especially at night. It provides adequate protection without the need of delegating extra personnel for aid station personnel for their own protection. In addition, riflemen were assigned either regularly or on call to the aid station for protection of litter bearers or  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton ambulances when these were proceeding through sniper infested territory. If the aid station was isolated, riflemen were provided.

This procedure of keeping the aid station with the CP has definite disadvantages in that the site of a CP does not necessarily have the qualities desirable for an aid station. Therefore sometimes the aid station had to move too frequently, and be established in exposed areas, too far forward, and even under machine gun fire. However, as the Battalion Commanders were cognizant of this situation, they usually established the CP in a location where an adequately defiladed and covered aid station could be established. When the CP was moving too far forward, the aid station was able to remain back with a rear echelon of the CP or with assigned guards.

An aid station far forward--that is, 50 to 100 yards from the front lines--has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages are that it provides aid station treatment early and makes the litter hauls short. These are both life-



The 1/2-ton, with litter racks, again proved its exceptional value. They were able to proceed with patients regardless of roads. Without them evacuation would have been impossible. It is strongly felt that trailers should

Vehicles

There was an insufficient supply of ten battle dressing. Aid men state definitely that the white dressings draw too much attention to the injured. There was an inadequate supply of wire ladder splints and no resupply. These are the most useful and easily carried front-line splint and a much larger supply could be used. The traction arm splint is not a useful front-line splint and could well be omitted from splint cases. A 300 radio would be a helpful addition to the aid station in that it would enable the surgeon to quickly obtain exact information as to the location and nature of casualties so that he could quickly send the pro-

per help.

Doctors would prove helpful:

The type of supplies were generally suitable; however, the following sug-

gestions would prove helpful: One day's battle supplies and equipment--mostly battle dressings, plasma, and sulfa powder--are packed in "inserts" which are carried in the packs of the aid station personnel, making them independent of any vehicle. Litters with a few splints are also carried. On the 1/2-ton ambulances are loaded additional supplies--enough for 2 or 3 days--and aid station equipment, splints, blankets, etc. This arrangement proved satisfactory and during the first several days of this operation when resupplies were not abundant this Regiment had no difficulties.

This Regiment handles its medical equipment and supplies as follows:

Medical equipment and supplies

The Regiment did not utilize any blackout equipment. Night treatments were performed under blankets, pouches, etc. It is believed in view of the number of night treatments given that a blackout tent would be advantageous. This tent could not be carried by the more mobile Battalion Aid Stations, but it could be carried and utilized by the Regimental Aid Station or Collecting Company. One Battalion was unable for several days to establish near a road. Due to the terrain evacuation was by litter squads back to a roadside collecting point and thence by vehicle. Elsewhere the terrain and road network was such as to enable vehicles to be used not only from the aid station back to the second echelon units, but also frequently from collecting points back to the aid station. Cover and concealment was necessary against artillery and mortar observers only, as our forces had complete control of the air. This was done in the usual manner and was adequate. It was, however, found that it is dangerous to establish stations in houses, etc., as the enemy regularly knew the location of these places and tried on them. The disadvantages are that because of the proximity of combat and the fact that the aid station is sometimes under fire, the treatment will sometimes not be as complete as would be desirable. That is, wounds might not be as completely cleaned, dressed and splinted, or as much plasma given as would be done under quieter conditions. This disadvantage was easily overcome by having a rear echelon aid station and by using the Collecting Company Station or the Regimental Aid Station to complete such treatment.



be landed with these vehicles. This was done by the 3rd Battalion with one vehicle. By loading all the supplies on the trailers, the vehicle is at all times available for use as an ambulance. As it was, the  $\frac{1}{2}$ -tons were at times tied up transporting the aid station when urgently needed for the evacuation of patients.

#### Adequacy, Training and Functioning of the Aid Station Personnel

The functioning of the medical personnel of this Regiment was excellent. Throughout the operation they displayed courage, initiative and ability. The method in which dressings were done, plasma given, and the patient handled showed excellent training and natural ability. Aid men were able to give plasma while under fire and even at night under a shelter half. It appears a proven fact that with medical personnel, selected for their intelligence and stamina and well trained, many lives are saved and suffering prevented.

Numerically the supply of trained medical personnel was border-line. Had combat been continued much longer the supply would have been inadequate. All Battalion Surgeons feel that the T/O allotment of litter bearers is inadequate. On this operation we were able to supplement the number of litter bearers as follows: Company B, 102nd Medical Battalion, Collecting Company for this Regiment, regularly supplied two litter bearer teams for each battalion in action. They were able to do so because in this operation litter bearers were not needed in their chain of evacuation. Company B, 102nd Medical Battalion deserves the praise and gratitude of this Regiment for supplying these litter bearers and for the excellent manner in which these litter bearers performed.

When a Battalion Section encountered a large number of casualties additional litter bearers and vehicles were dispatched by the Regimental Surgeon to remain only so long as the emergency existed. In emergencies the Battalion Commanders were able to delegate line personnel to assist in the evacuation of patients. By these means evacuation was never long delayed and as many as 30 or 40 casualties were processed in 45 minutes. However, if the evacuation chain had been such that the Collecting Company was not able to supply litter bearers, the problem would have been critical.

Replacements of medical personnel is necessary. The loss of a company aid man must be immediately replaced. The loss of one litter bearer knocks out a litter squad. Replacements for medical personnel in the battalion sections was furnished by the Regimental medical section from available personnel, to such an extent that by the end of combat there was no personnel available for further replacements. To supplement the Regimental medical section personnel, 8 bandsmen were furnished for two days and then 6 bandsmen for about 10 days until the end of the operation. These bandsmen did excellent work as litter bearers. In future operations, it would be advantageous for higher echelons to have trained medical personnel ready for immediate replacement.

#### Casualties Among Medical Personnel

The Medical Detachment of this Regiment sustained a total of 31 casualties including 2 repeat cases. These cases may be grouped as follows: Killed in action, 3; died of wounds, 1; wounded in action, 19 (Of these, 9 were able to return immediately to duty, and 3 were back to duty in a few days); injured in action, 2 (both of these returned to duty after several days hospitalization); sick, 6 (all soon returned to duty). Of the 25 battle casualties, 21 were acting as company aid men at the time wounds were received, 3 were litter bearers



and 1 was in the aid station. Diagnostics of the sick cases was: Battle exhaustion; 3 war neurosis, 1 dengue, 1 diarrhea, 1. In addition 3 potential war neurosis cases were transferred to rear echelon installations. All 3 of the exhaustion cases were aidmen.

Evacuation

Evacuation in this operation was adequate and ordinarily rapid. The terrain ordinarily favored the use of vehicles. As stated above, adequate personnel was made available. The Collecting Company kept excellent contact throughout with the aid stations and evacuated patients as promptly as they were ready for evacuation. Patients were evacuated at night on several occasions. These were made necessary by the type of injury encountered. Regimental Headquarters supplied guards to accompany the movements. Evacuation could be expedited if line troops calling for medical help would learn to give as exact information as possible as to where the casualties are, how many, and of what nature. In this, as in other operations, cases occurred where several litter squads were sent to evacuate one patient, and where the guides left the litter squad before finding the patient. Evacuation of line officers and men to the importance of exact information will undoubtedly lessen this.

Medical Resupply

Medical resupply was effected in the usual manner, that is, through Collecting Company by informal request. In addition, resupply and emergency requests were accelerated by having the Regimental Medical Section immediately send out the requested supplies to the Battalion Aid Stations from their own reserve and then resupply themselves through the Collecting Company. This saved several hours on resupply. Exchange of litters and blankets was at first satisfactory but later in the operation became incomplete. By the end of the operation there was a critical shortage of litters and blankets in all aid stations.

Sanitation

In combat, sanitation is of necessity an individual problem. In this Regiment, experience and continual education has made the command sanitation conscientious so that sanitation was generally satisfactory. The diarrhea encountered was probably partially due to inadequate sanitation. It was apparently due more to the prolonged use of a diet ("C" Ration with beans) that favored intestinal fermentation.

The jungle kits proved definitely helpful in maintaining personal sanitation. Only two individuals were evacuated for athlete's foot. The mosquito lotion enabled all to sleep. Salt tablets kept the incidents of heat exhaustion down. Vitamin concentrates plus a more varied C or K Ration would have helped the general nutrition of the troops.

Lack of bathing and change of clothing for so long a period resulted in many cases of skin infections. A weekly issue of clean clothing or at least clean shorts, undershirts and socks would have done much to prevent this and to improve morale.

The Disposal of Our Own and Enemy Dead

The disposal of our dead was carried out in this Regiment as follows:



S E C R E T

Location of our dead was reported to Battalion S-4. When practicable they were moved near roads. In so far as possible they were tagged by aid men. Each day the Regimental Burial Officer, with truck and enlisted assistants, picked up all dead located as above and all other dead he could locate, and removed them to the Army Cemetery. In general this was satisfactory. The removal of our dead who were inaccessible because of enemy fire was of course delayed sometimes for several days. Disposal of enemy dead was made the responsibility of the Commander in whose area they were. They were buried in the immediate vicinity where found by burial details of combat troops, by bulldozer and on occasion by prisoner detail.

Evacuation by Higher Echelons

Collecting Company - The work of Company B, 102nd Medical Battalion, merits the highest praise. This company performed normal duties, the normal function of evacuation from the aid station in a most satisfactory manner. At all times they maintained contact with Battalion Aid Stations. They evacuated promptly both day and night. At times their vehicles travelled under sniper fire. They were always alert as to the best routes of evacuation. In addition, the company gave immeasurable help to this Regiment by furnishing litter bearers to the Battalion Aid Stations. This was a voluntary function on their part. These litter bearers evacuated patients from the front line regularly under fire. They did this in a most meritorious manner. Without their help, evacuation would have been much more difficult. The Clearing Company of the 102nd Medical Battalion functioned through much of the operation merely as a relay post. Even critical chest cases going through the Clearing Company at these times received only Tetanus and occasionally one unit of plasma. Five critically wounded cases reaching the Clearing Station late one night were immediately transferred to another  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton ambulance, and sent on to the Field Hospital some distance away.

In general, hospital facilities were not adequate, as a result it was necessary for many exhaustion cases and slightly wounded cases to be evacuated from the Island. Thus the Regiment was deprived of considerable personnel that could have soon been returned to duty.

*Francis H. Reynolds*  
FRANCIS H. REYNOLDS,  
Major, Medical Corps,  
Regimental Surgeon.



HEADQUARTERS 165TH INFANTRY  
APO #27

TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT

The following Transport Quartermaster report is submitted on the FORAGER Operation. This report is the consolidated statements of the six Transport Quartermasters from this organization who were part of the Regimental Combat Team:

Planning (Initial) of Embarkation of Supplies

The plan of loading was constantly being upset, due to changes being promulgated in the assignment of unit personnel to the different ships being replaced, changes were made in the types and amounts of the various vehicles and supplies, and in one instance, alterations were accomplished on one AP up to loading time.

Although the encounter of some difficulties of the above mentioned are to be anticipated in the initial planning stages, it is the belief that they can be minimized considerably by proper foresight and by the application of a "Freezing Date" on the switching of units, TBA and TE equipment and supplies.

The planning phase in itself would not be difficult, were it not necessary to include so many items in the loading plan. These excessive items are not only included, but are repeated over and over again to emphasize their unimportance. An example of this is the loading summary which lists each item by weight, square and cube. It is my opinion that no one had time enough to digest this summary even if it contained important information. By reducing the excessive material in the plan itself, a concise understandable manuscript would be the result. At the same time the TQM could use his time to improve upon the necessary items.

The value of obtaining correct information as to load is beyond estimation. A great deal more importance should be attached to this point. It is not an easy task to incorporate last minute changes into a loading plan. Furthermore the time will come when changes are so great in number that the TQM will make a mistake in his calculations as a direct result. This could be very serious, and in no way improbable.

At a meeting, the TQMs were notified that we were to prepare loading plans for combat loading of BLT and attached units. We were assigned the characteristics of a sister ship as characteristics of the Herald of Morning were not available. Although the general outlines were similar, the dimensions of holds, the number of holds available, the capacity of booms, and the troop capacity were so different as to render negligible any advantage gained by a study of a sister ship characteristics. Upon the arrival of the ship in port, I reported aboard to the ship's First Lieutenant who was also the ship's Cargo Officer. The ship had been commissioned less than a month before her arrival at the port of embarkation. It had been ordered out of the conversion yard three weeks before it was scheduled to be completed. The First Lieutenant had been ordered aboard the day it was to sail and reported two (2) hours before it did sail. The ship had been loaded and hatches battened, so he had no opportunity to become acquainted with the ship on the way across.



The plan for loading the pier was excellently carried out and all cargo arrived in plenty time to commence loading at the proper time. All short-ages of the consist were properly reported by the pier boss and acted upon by the Control Officer. A sufficient number of finger lifts were provided to work on the pier but a few more could have been assigned to work in the holds, as long as pallet loading is used, it is necessary that finger lifts be provided for use in the holds. Palletization should be followed out 100% if possible. All chocking, blocking and centering was promptly carried for by the Engineering detail provided for that purpose. All vehicles were checked several times on the way down to ensure that they would be in running condition on arrival. There was very little dock space available and what was available was used for the loading of vehicles and equipment.

It is to be noted here that the Regulating Point (Under the direction of Captain Robert Fairman of the Engineers) performed excellently. It's cooperation with the Regimental TQ1 Branch left nothing to be desired.

Generally the stocking of piers worked out well with one noticeable exception - "The Element of Timing". TRANS DIV 7 and TRANS DIV 32 were assigned the same loading areas. TRANS DIV 7 was to load first. In some instances the loading of this TRANS DIV 7 was not completed in the period allotted. Consequently the stocking of the piers by TRANS DIV 32 was slowed down and as a direct result the cargo was not completely stocked and checked in time appointed for loading.

Stocking of Piers

The advantages of a staging area to the Commanding Officer and his staff, as well as the TQ1, appear obvious. The many changes in the troop composition, in combat replacements and in equipment, vehicles, etc. caused a great deal of confusion and extra work. It was found necessary to merely keep track of changes and additions during the daytime and to work on the plans during the night. Evidently the "Freezing Date" about which so much discussion took place before the operation, was not found practicable. Almost all the data on combat replacements, furnished by higher headquarters, proved to be either incorrect or incomplete. The time allotted for stocking the pier and loading were not sufficient. Pier control and liaison with Port and Service Command were very unsatisfactory. Ship's characteristics originally supplied were not good. Even those brought by plane from Los Angeles by the ship's TQ1 proved to be incomplete and inaccurate. The fact that the ship was loaded properly, and unloaded in record time, in spite of the circumstances described, may be said to be due to the almost super-human efforts of the Ship's Party and the TQ1's Officer assistants. The current method for embarking troops appears to be satisfactory. It is believed, that including last minute additions, the total cargo of AF-2, in this operation was close to 1200 long tons.

There were no previous characteristics of the ship prepared. The first Lieutenant and I had to measure all holds. The Chief Engineer was now to the ship and had great difficulty in locating the valves so they could be pumped out. It was also necessary to count and diagram the location of troops quarters. The greatest cooperation was received from all members of the ship's crew. The crew was green and unfamiliar with the ship. The hatch and winch crews were not sufficiently trained to take part in an amphibious operation. At that time an LK was scheduled to return to the mainland for repairs, and experienced boatswain mates were transferred to the ship to operate winches.



## Loading

Initially the difficulties encountered in the loading of the ships were more or less in the following order:

a. Lack of hi-lifts: There were available, at the start of the loading, only three (3) hi-lifts per ship. This number is inadequate. The happy medium would be six (6) hi-lifts per ship. These hi-lifts should be divided between the pier, and the holds of the ship. As the loading advances through it's various stages, some of these hi-lifts could be dispensed with at the direction of the TQM. For example: After the TBA equipment and the majority of the sleds had been loaded, the remaining cargo consisted mainly of rolling stock.

b. The Army pier detail of the Harris, Fremont and Custer were not well organized at the commencement of the loading of the ships. However, this difficulty was eventually straightened out and all went well, with the exception of the Fremont, where constant interference by the ship's TQM, a Lt. Egan, USMC, whose lack of experience and constant getting underfoot, caused the Army TQM no end of trouble. The Navy officers aboard the ship possessed little or no knowledge of "Combat Loading" a vessel, and evidently relied greatly on the advise and recommendation of Lt. Egan. In addition, Lt. Egan, who was supposed to serve in an advisory capacity to the Army's TQM, took upon himself on a number of occasions authority that he did not possess. This consisted of continual harassing and agitating of the men. As he was part of the ship's staff and responsible only to the ship, his only concern was to keep the good will of the Navy, with no regard for the Army. His knowledge of combat loading was not of such a nature that he was any help to the Army TQM, but a definite detriment.

During the embarkation of troops there was no difficulty encountered. The ship's berthing officer, Lt. Schmidt, employed Navy enlisted men as guides who took various units to their berthing spaces. The only suggestion the TQM can make, in the present method of embarkation, is that the men leave their barrack bags on the pier until they have been shown their berths and disposed of their equipment.

The number of tons of troops cargo loaded on the USS Fremont was seven hundred and fifty tons. This consisted of three hundred and ten pallets and seventy nine vehicles. The personnel on board consisted of sixty five officers and six hundred and forty five enlisted men.

During the initial drafting of the loading plan changes occurred quite frequently but as these changes were brought to the attention of the TQM in sufficient time to alter the loading plan. No difficulty was encountered in this respect.

The Navy encountered a bit of difficulty in bringing the ship to an even keel, as there was a decided list to port. The addition of ballast to number three hold to correct the list changed the loading plan of this particular hold. As the TQM was notified in sufficient time, this change was made in the loading plan of this hold without difficulty, but the second time the hold was altered, the ship's TQM, Lt. Egan, failed to notify the Army TQM until the morning of the day loading was to begin, though he had knowledge of this change at least 24 hours before. This necessitated a last minute change in the loading plan.



Supplies were to begin coming ashore as soon as the Shore Party groups reported in as being organized for the receipt of cargo on the beach. The LCI's and LCVP's, after being loaded and dispatched from the mother ship, were to check in to the Regimental TQM at the Control Vessel before proceeding to the beach. This plan did not work out due to an air raid threat on the eve of D plus two which caused all transports to "up anchor" and disperse towards the open sea. The transports did not return for a period of several days, some not for seven or eight days and when they did proceed to unload, we had no control over the landing of our supplies. The final outcome was the scattering of our supplies over Red, Green, Blue and Yellow Beaches, with the ensuing loss of time and equipment in locating and collecting it.

Combat troops aboard TRAMS DIV 32 began unloading D plus one on 16 June 1944 at approximately 1700 and completed unloading sometime on D plus two on 17 June 1944.

Unloading

The loading of the ship is not difficult and I would have encountered no delay were it not for the obtaining the use of finger lifts aboard the ships. However, in my particular case, the pier detail was from five different units as was the ship's party. It would be far better to have the pier detail from one unit and the ship's party from one unit and have officers from those respective units in charge. The assistant TQM should be from the same regiment as the TQM. The time allowed for loading was feasible.

Loading: Pier stacking time should be 46 hours, if port situation will permit.

The procedure of embarking troops, by hold compartments, in effect in BLT 165-2, has proven to be very efficient. The BLT has consistently embarked in 45 minutes or less. The Gustor (LBA 40) had aboard 1125 tons of troop cargo.

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a. Some Divisional units were especially lax in submitting their UPAT Tables on time. In a few instances, information on the tables was incorrect as to the characteristics of vehicles. A vehicle is loaded in a certain hold due to the height of the vehicle in respect to the height of the hold.

b. A unit sent supplies that were to be kept readily accessible to be loaded with their organizational equipment which being of a low priority was unloaded last. Inquiry was made for those supplies before they were available as they were needed ashore.

c. One unit made changes in their loading plan without bringing those changes to the attention of the TQM. This consisted of detaching guns and trailers from certain vehicles and attaching them to others. This caused considerable confusion on the day of loading to the extent that the TQM had to visit the staging area to straighten the matter out when his presence was required at the ship.

Units that embarked on the USS Fremont did not cooperate with the TQM to the extent that they could have with a bit more attention to the requests of the TQM. I will mention a few specific examples:



The idea of attempting to load the supplies of a number of BLT's across the same beach, at the same time, or even within a couple of days of each other, is not feasible due to the following:

- a. Generally the beaches are too limited in both depth and width, and cannot accommodate the shore parties nor the vast quantity of supplies.
- b. Approaches for boats to these beaches are very limited.

Both the above results in the bottle necking of boats and supplies, confusion and loss of time. Supplies cannot be cleared from the beach to advance dumps rapidly enough to condone this type of unloading.

If it is contemplated that more than one BLT is to be landed on the same beach, I believe a command decision should be made as to: (1) Whether or not each BLT is to be completely unloaded prior to unloading the succeeding BLT or; (2) To the limit of the amount of supplies that each BLT will be permitted to unload initially.

In arriving at the decision in reference to the above, due consideration must be given to the supplying of the troops who have already landed across the beach in question. If troops of two BLT's have landed and supplies of one of these BLTs are to be completely unloaded before the supplies of the second BLT, then the troops of the second BLT would necessarily have to be supplied by the first BLT landing its cargo.

On 16 June 1944, when the Division was ordered to make the landing on Saipan, I was given orders by the Commander of Troops, that RCT 165 was not going to land, and that all that was needed was FA units and their ammunition. The FA vehicles were top priority, so on the night of the 16th, we discharged all of them. On the 17th we used LCIMs and LCVPs to take FA ammunition to the beachhead. I had no further orders as to landing RCT 165. On that day I could have disembarked and put ashore the entire Cannon Company of this regiment since it was second in priority, however since I had orders on FA ammunition and none on RCT 165, this was not done. As a result, what were to have been assault troops were taken back to sea and not landed for another seven days. When we returned to the transport area there were still no orders. Communication should be established between higher echelon and the TOM. Naval communication is inadequate since they fail with regularity, to appreciate the situation ashore.

Barges proved to be slower in taking on cargo than any other type of craft. The men who manned them refused to handle cargo, so I was forced to use Ship's Party which was totally inadequate to do both jobs.

There was altogether too much delay on the part of the Navy. It was a general practice for a boat to come alongside, the crew announce that they hadn't eaten, and then they would be taken aboard and fed. During this time (No less than two hours) their boat would be tied up aft. Since an order had been given by the Navy to do this, and since the boat crews knew it, there was no remedy. K Rations should be issued to the boat crews in the morning.

For discharging cargo, I had no Ship's Party Officer, consequently I assumed that duty as well as my own.

The time required to debark troops would, in the TOM's estimation, have been in the neighborhood of thirty five minutes, providing that debarking would have been in a continuous manner at all nets of the ship.

Unloading required eighteen hours into LVTs and LCIMs with twenty two hours required for unloading into an LST and thirty six hours required to drag pallets ashore from LST by use of the LVTs.



The unloading of the ship did not progress in accordance with loading plan, but as to the tactical need of certain units ashore. As the personnel consisted in a large part of the headquarters group of certain units this is easily explainable. The Navy objected to the loading plan not being followed. At the conclusion of unloading pellets, the Executive Officer of the ship refused to permit a high lift that the Army had placed on the ship to facilitate the unloading of pellets to be unloaded until told that the matter would be taken up with a higher Naval authority.

On 16 June 1974 at 1522, off Saipan Island, condition One-Able was set for troops of BLT 165-2 on board the USS Gustor (APA 710). First boat teams were called at 1745 and first boat departed from ship for rendezvous area at 1755.

On 17 June 1974, due to orders which dispatched USS Gustor boats to other ships, unloading did not start until 0954. On this day a total of 24 boats were loaded before we were ordered to up anchor and proceed to sea, with the last boat leaving the Gustor's side at 1712. The returned to the transport area off Saipan Island on 20 June 1974 and commenced unloading with first boat departing at 0730. Again our boats were ordered off to assist in the unloading of another ship, however, our unloading continued.

The unloading was steady from 1730, 20 June, to 1801, 21 June, when last boat left the USS Gustor's side, after she had been ordered to leave transport area and proceed to sea. The USS Gustor returned to transport area off Saipan Island, and unloading was started at 1732, 25 June. Unloading continued throughout the day and at 1700, with only three boatloads of barrack bags remaining of the cargo, I, with the Ship's Party, less one officer, embarked from the Gustor and went ashore.

The barrack bags and officer reach shore from USS Gustor at 0830, 26 June 1974, completing the unloading. The hatches on the USS Gustor were opened in twenty minutes. At no time did this cause delay in unloading cargo. It was necessary to re-rig to start unloading cargo. When heavy lifts were disposed of, a change was made to yard and stay rigging, to take advantage of its greater speed. Both types of rigging were used at each hold, and only at hold #2 was it necessary to re-rig both types twice. Due to the fact that the USS Gustor boats were assigned to other ships for unloading, it is impossible to make or strike an average for the operation on time required to make a trip to the beach and return. On 17 June, two boats which made two trips, both used just under three hours for their first trip. Another used seven hours and three minutes for its first trip. No other boats returned to the ship that day.

The last combat vehicles and troops, other than Ship's Party, were embarked on 20 June, approximately 96 hours after the first troops. From the time the first troops were embarked until ship was unloaded a total of 215 hours and 15 minutes elapsed. Cargo unloading time was 54 hours, 50 minutes. Time lost was through stopping work at night, and time spent at sea.

Upon the arrival of the Transport Group in the Transport Area, we were ordered to embark following the landing of the first and second BLT, at approximately 2130 thirteen LCVPs were made available and an officer of the Navy having reported as a guide to the LD, the Battalion Commander ordered the troops over the side. No other landing craft became available until daylight.



at which time the balance of the BLT, under the direction of the Battalion Executive Officer, debarked and set out for the beach. Up to this time no equipment other than hand carried equipment had been unloaded. As soon as LCIs became available, the Tank Platoon and several tractors were sent to the beach. Very few boats reported to the ship this day despite repeated efforts to the flagship that our unloading was delayed due to the lack of boats. The troops commenced unloading cargo at about 2130, 16 June 1944. At 1800, 17 June 1944, 8% of the cargo had been unloaded. That night as the Transport Group left the transport area they were subject to an enemy air attack.

The group returned to the transport area on the 25th of June and commenced unloading at 0900. Conditions this day were similar to that of the 17th in that very few boats reported to the ship to assist in the unloading. Again frequent requests were made to the flagship for more boats. Unloading ceased at 1700 with the percentage of 26% unloaded. The ship returned to the transport area the following morning and I accompanied the ship's Captain to a meeting on the flagship at 1700. The purpose of this meeting was to find means of assisting us to speed up the unloading. We requested a LST and a large supply of LCIs and LCVPs. Unloading commenced at 0700 and the ship was reported 100% unloaded at 1740, 26 June. The LST was tied alongside the starboard side of the ship. #2 hold aft was unloaded through the elevator hatch - the boom could not be topped down to plumb the hold due to the life raft tubs alongside the A Frame. A detail of men with a line and block pulled the pallets over the hatch opening to be lowered. The LST was equipped with two finger lifts - one was left on the tank deck to move and stack pallets. It was also equipped with a cherry picker on the upper deck and placed alongside the aft hatch opening. The other finger lift moved the pallets to the side of the hatch, where the cherry picker was able to lower them into the tank deck. At the same time a number of men were recruited from the ship's personnel, and augmented by 30 men from other ships. They were put to work carrying barrack bags above deck, and over the side to the LST deck, where they stacked them on the upper deck. The LST commenced unloading the following morning by LVT along the reef to the beach. I observed the LVT crews attempting to drag pallets in tandem, however the "S" hook provided on the pallets would not work and 75% of the time it was necessary to stop the LVT at the bottom of the ramp and adjust the tow. 75% of the pallets were towed ashore singly. I stayed aboard the LST until all barrack bags and organization property had been unloaded. Upon my arrival on the beach I found that the beach party had made no attempt to set up the dumps for organization property but moved it off the beach and dumped everything off at the discretion of the Amphtrack operator. It was necessary for unit representatives to search beaches to locate their property. It was observed that the Amphtrack crew segregated the equipment as it was being loaded, top loading such items as might be of use to themselves. One item in particular being a crate containing portable chairs and table for a CP. These items have never been recovered.

There were no serious casualties among the army and Navy personnel on board the ship during the unloading. One or two men suffered bruises and sprains. During the unloading of the LST an accident occurred aboard the LST. The elevator while raising a heavy chain to the upper deck, through some undetermined cause fell out of control, killing one Navy man and injuring several Army and Navy men. On the morning of June 17th, an LCVP approaching the beach, loaded with a quarter ton truck and trailer and ten men was hit by what appeared to be a Japanese mortar shell when about 75 yards from the beach. One man was killed, three wounded, one of whom died later after hospital treatment. Seven returned to ship, one suffering from a severe psychoneurosis. The others were returned to duty after treatment for shock.



For the unloading phase, the placing or the tying down of the Regimental TOM on a control boat is not feasible. The answer to this, I believe, is the establishing of the Regimental TOM in a DUKW, at the control boat. The TOM is then capable of checking the flow of supplies at the mother ships, the control vessel and the beach, leaving an assistant on the control vessel to check the boats and collect tags.

It is the contention of the undersigned that too much cargo other than that necessary for the first ten (10) days or two weeks of combat, is loaded. The loading of such cargo interferes in a good many instances with the combat loading of the ship. Why, for instance, cannot "B" rations and Class II supplies be brought in at a later date by other shipping? True, we'll probably run into the old story as to the lack of shipping. However, the importance of an operation certainly warrants extra steps being taken to remedy the "shortage of shipping" situation. The amputation of the "alibi" and the initiation of definite action more than often results in unforeseen accomplishments.

Full utilization of the various pier details with their work. Prior details must be thoroughly briefed by their respective Army TOMs, and a dry run or rehearsal should be gone through prior to loading time. Concerning interference by inexperienced ship's personnel, diplomacy and determination on the part of the Army TOM involved will tend to lessen the embarrassment and loss of valuable time, caused by lack of knowledge. This, however, is not the cure all solution. There should be experienced officers appointed (either Army or Navy), whose decisions and arbitrations will be honored by both Army and Navy.

Loss last minute changing and the establishment of a freezing limit for alterations.

Recommendations and Suggestions

Control boats should notify the ships when a beach is overworked, thereby saving a great deal of time. A separate beach or portion of the beach for each BLT should be provided. If a separate beach is not available to each BLT, it is necessary to land BLTs in a column. No ship carrying a BLT should be sent out to sea while still carrying tactical vehicles and priority supplies, while other ships are unloading non-priority supplies.

During the unloading phase, boats from other ships were used. From conditions on the beach as observed after unloading, it appears as if no two boats were unloaded at the same place. Under these conditions no check on boat trips which might have been made, could be of any value. Hatches were generally opened during the time in which boats were being lowered, or between trips to the beach, and no time was lost in the connection therewith. Dock hatches were removed in fifteen minutes or less, others in eight to ten minutes. No check was kept on the rigging, as the ship was equipped with a large number of booms of various capacity, and no time was lost in making the changes. The assault troops were debarked in ninety minutes. Unloading started at 1700, 16 June and continued until interrupted by an air raid around 1900. The ship cruised around all day June 17. Unloading was resumed at 0800, 18 June, and continued without stopping until completed at 0500, 19 June.



Last, but not least, the selection of the respective TQMs play an important role in the amphibious type of operation. At the risk of repetition, I write that while a thorough knowledge of the basic principals of combat loading is essential, the officer chosen for this type of work, aside from being conscientious, must possess the ability for excorising diplomacy and tact. He must be courteous yet forceful, and have the capability of making a quick decision in respect to changes in the loading of his ship.

The Commander of Troops on all RCT ships should be a member of the RCT and this should be true even if there is an officer of greater rank aboard. If this is deemed unnecessary then it should follow that it is unnecessary for Infantry units to furnish all the TQMs. I draw this conclusion after handling cargo that belonged, to a great extent, to the FA and after having a FA officer for Commander of Troops. It would have been better for him to have had one of his own officers for a TQM. The compromise was, like most compromises, ineffective.

Re-rigging the booms was a bottleneck in most cases. To switch the yard and stay from port to starboard required 30 minutes. To switch from Jumbo to yard and stay or vice-versa took one hour.

It took eleven days to complete the unloading. Reasons for delay can be traced to the Navy. We spent seven days at sea after unloading 8% of the cargo. Upon return we unloaded for twelve hours and then ran out to sea for another twelve hours. Lack of boats returning from the beach was another factor causing delay. Finally, we had so many GG's that delay on this account mounted to another six to ten hours.

It is my personal opinion that someone other than combat officers should load and unload these ships. Infantry units have the greatest need for officers on these operations and can thus least afford to leave some of their officers to do a job that requires far less skill than the one they are trained for.

The Troop Commander designated certain units and officers that would serve as pier detail, ship's party, pier bosses and ship's party commander. As these details were drawn from a number of units, control at first was difficult, due to the fact that some of the men seemed a bit reluctant to accept orders from strange NCOs and officers. I would suggest that in the future these details be drawn from only one unit with the officers from the same unit accompanying the detail.

The shoring details should be made to be known to the TQM in sufficient time so that they can be oriented as to how the shoring is to be done. The detail used on the USS Fremont had very little knowledge of how the work was to be done and didn't have sufficient tools to accomplish the work without the loading of tools from one group to another in the various holds.

The TQM suggests that one third of the boats carried by a transport be of the LCM type. There was considerable delay occasioned by the lack of this type of boat. In one instance one SPM-8 was unloaded while the other remained on the ship for a considerable length of time due to the lack of an LCM type boat. Usually one third of the vehicles carried for an operation are of the type that they have to be unloaded into an LCM type boat. The number of this type boat should be increased.



The time required to open hatches on the transport was fifteen minutes with an additional twenty minutes required to launch the boats that were atop the hatches. This time remained the same for removal of decks and platforms as work progressed into the lower sections. Time to re-rig to initiate unloading was twenty five minutes. The type of rig used at each hold was similar with few exceptions. Number one, two and three holds had a ten ton electric hoist with number one and number two using a snatch block and number three using a high lift to place the pallets above the hold. Number five hold was equipped with a thirty ton electric hoist. A roller type conveyor was used to move the pallets about the hold.

As there is a high casualty rate among Infantry officers in an operation of this kind just completed, and units had need of all their officers. In some cases, the TOII would suggest that transport quartermasters be drawn from some other source. Fortunately during the recent operation the TOIIs were able to rejoin their units in time to gain valuable combat experience and to observe how their unit functioned in combat.

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