

**Charles Edward Greene, Jr.
Veteran**

**Interviewer – Joseph Anastasio
Greater Capital Region Teacher Center
Albany, New York
August 21, 1989**

Q: As part of the Capital District Teaching Center Grant entitled “It’s Time Has Come- Supplementary Materials for Teaching About the Vietnam War”, we have the pleasure and honor this afternoon of sitting down and talking to a very amazing man. He has had an amazing life, that I think you will say after you watch this video. Mr. Charlie Greene. Charlie, thank you very much for doing this, I know you have a lot of things going on so thanks for taking a couple of minutes to do this.

Charlie, please start by telling us a little personal background so when the genealogists come along in twenty years and look at this they’ll know about you.

CG: I was born in 1935 in Somerville, Massachusetts, and I was brought up mostly in the town of Needham, Massachusetts. We moved there when we were young. I have a brother that’s two years older and a brother that is seven years younger than me. No sisters at all. My Dad was a very, very patriotic man. He did not serve in the military, he served in the National Guard. He was too young for World War I and too old for World War II. I think it may be a reason why, as children, we were brought up with a sense of a career in the military, or whatever. My older brother did spend a career in the Navy, he retired as a Captain. And I spent twenty-one years in the Air Force. My younger brother did serve in the Navy. So we came from a family that flew the American flag every day.

We also were involved in World War II as younger kids collecting scrap metal as kids did back in the 40’s. In fact, we received what was the Eisenhower Medal for the contribution in World War II. Both my brothers and I were Boy Scouts. All three of us made it to Eagle Scouts level. So I had a background that you would say was probably from a fairly conservative, working class family. My father was a working man, he worked for the Boston Globe for forty eight years. We were a very patriotic family and brought up in the outdoors with access to fishing and hunting and the Boy Scouts.

Q: Were you in the service when Vietnam took place?

CG: Yes I was. I had gone to college for two years, left college and joined the Air Force in a program called the Aviation Cadet Program. You did not need a college degree to go through flying training. You received your flying and your officer training at the same time. That was in 1956. I joined the Air Force in July 1956 and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant and received my pilot wings in December of 1957.

Q: How did you get to Vietnam?

CG: Well, let’s take a short trip through my military service first. (laughs) I got out of pilot training December of ‘57 and went into advanced training which was all-weather fighter interceptor as a pilot. My first assignment was in Rome, New York at Griffiss Air Force Base. I flew F-102s (Convair F-102 Delta Dagger). I came in 1957 and left in the fall of 1959 and went to Loring Air Force Base in Limestone, Maine. The squad at that time converted from F-102s to F-106s, which at that time held the world’s speed record so we were flying the top-rated, first-line fighter planes. I stayed up there until 1961.

Let me check my dates here, I left the service to go back to school in Boston. But I had joined the National Guard and was called back up during the Berlin Crisis. So I was out of the service, then right back in again. I went over to France and flew an F-86 (Boeing F-86 Sabre Jet) with the National Guard on active duty. I stayed there for eight months and upon my return, I made the choice to stay in the military. I was then assigned to tactical fighters, the F-105s (Republic F-105 Thunderchief) at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in Goldsboro, North Carolina. I stayed there for two and a half years flying the F-105s.

Then I was assigned to Germany to fly the F-105s. About one third of the way through my tour in Germany, the squadron was slated to get new airplanes – the F-104s (Lockheed F-104 Starfighter) instead of the F-105s. So we had the choice of saying “I don’t want to stay with the wing or the squadron and convert to the F-104s, I will stay with the F-105s.” Knowing full well that if you stayed with the F-105s you were going to go to Vietnam. A lot of us chose to do that, so in essence we volunteered to go to Vietnam.

I was assigned from Germany to Thailand, which was where the F-105s were flying out of into Vietnam. So, again, in essence we volunteered to go remembering that I am professional military at the time. I’m not being drafted to go to Vietnam. I was pretty much aware of what I’m getting into, and I had talked to other pilots who had flown over there. I think I probably could somewhat understand the political and economic nature of the war and the other reasons why we were involved with South Vietnam at the time.

Q: So you had a pretty good idea of what was going on there before arrived?

CG: Yes, as far as the major objectives of the United States, and a lot of the reasons why we were in there and the nature of how the war was being fought. I heard from other professional military people, who knew, mostly officers

Q: Did you form any opinions about this?

CG: Not really. I kind of understood and accepted being a professional military member. I accepted that the President has the right to use the military as an arm of his foreign policy. I still feel and accept that today. I think that, if we want to get into how I envisioned the war after being over there, and the experiences I went through in the Vietnam War, I could probably give you a different opinion of some of the things that went wrong.

Q: Could you put a date on your entrance?

CG: In December of 1966, I arrived in Thailand. You figure at that time the air war against North Vietnam had been going on for over three years, but pretty heavily for two and a half years at least.

Q: What was your first impression of the country?

CG: I came through Vietnam and only stopped briefly, so I didn’t get to see Vietnam. When we arrived in Thailand, we were in a remote area. There wasn’t much going on, we were mostly only dealing with the people on the base. We saw very few Thai people, they were friendly, there were no problem with the Thai. At that time, the government was not admitting that we were flying out of Thailand against North Vietnam. That was at the request of the Thai government. There was no press, no media coverage allowed on the base at that time.

Q: That certainly must have made a difference.

CG: I don’t think anybody missed it. The television people were right outside on the other side of the base taking pictures. So everybody knew it. Officially, we weren’t flying out of

Thailand at the request of the Thai government.

Q: What was the name of the base?

CG: Takhli (Royal Thai Air Force Base)

Q: Basically, what was your responsibilities while you were there?

CG: I was assigned to the 333rd Tactical Fighter Squadron, which was in the 355 Tactical Fighter Wing, so I was a fighter pilot. You also picked up additional administrative duties besides that. I worked with the administrative officer, handling awards, decorations and citations for things that were going on. Other than that, we had to do our own preparation. We had a kind of routine. If you weren't flying, you made the maps up for the people who were flying.

Let me tell you about a typical day. You would probably go to bed pretty early at night because you were going to get up at one or two o'clock in the morning to start your preparation for the mission the next day. You would probably go to bed around seven or eight o'clock at night. We slept in air conditioned barracks with no windows which made it plenty dark so you could sleep. If you were assigned to fly that day, then you would get up at one or two in the morning and start with a major briefing. You were told what your target was then, all this information was kept secret until then.

At the same time those pilots who were not assigned to fly would be down in a map-making area. They would start making the maps and documents you needed to go on the mission. So you got your briefings, your maps, your flight briefings and documents for the mission.

Sometimes they would have forty, forty four, and forty eight airplanes in a raid. Yeah. Our raids were really limited to Laos and North Vietnam. We didn't do any missions in Cambodia or in South Vietnam. So with all that preparation, generally you would take off around five or five thirty in the morning if your target was to be reached at seven thirty. It could be dark. You flew in groups of four. And those groups of four would get together to make whatever total we needed like forty or forty four planes in a raid. You would have specific tasks assigned to you. It might be a flight of four airplanes to do flak suppression. It might be a flight of four airplanes to cover (not me) for air superiority, or take out MiGs (Soviet military fighter aircraft) or whatever would come and shoot you down. Or you might actually be in a bombing group. You might also be sent off in groups of two or four just to go on a separate target.

We generally refueled on the way out. Remember that the airplanes were pretty heavily loaded when you took because they would have the bomb load or whatever ordinance you were carrying. We would meet the tankers over Laos and we would refuel with the tankers going into the missions. We would go in and complete our missions, and refuel coming back out. So a flight that would last four and a half hours, roughly an average flight, it was a long time to spend in a fighter plane. We were strapped down, not able to get up and walk around.

Q: So in a fighter plane, you are flying alone?

CG: Yes. These are single-seat, single-engine fighters. Some had two people in them. The F-4 had a crew of two. The F-105 did have a two seat version which was what they called a "Wild Weasel". Those would go after any enemy radar sites and had missiles that would lock on and others that would shoot down the radar.

Q: Were you surprised that the American planes were met by MiGs?

CG: We would not know what kind of a day it was going to be. Even in North Vietnam, it could be a day when they sent the MiGs up after you. Or they might be shooting missiles at

you plus anti-aircraft fire. They had extensive amounts of anti-aircraft fire. They had a SAM (Surface-to-Air) missile system which was built by the Russians and they had the Russian MiG-21 and MiG-17 were the two MIGs they had..

Q: @11:45 Question and answer unclear regarding the Cubans and Chinese as flying the MiG planes. Charles said he never did go back to find out who was flying those planes.

Q: What was the strategy of the chosen targets?

CG: Well, most of our targets were transportation targets, or military targets. There were some very heavy restrictions put on the fighting of the war. We were bombing railroad bridges and river crossing bridges for cars or trucks. Also passes, like on the side of a mountain where you could take the road out. Some attacks were against oil storage facilities, rail yards and steel mills.

But some interesting restrictions were put on. We weren't allowed to bomb in Hai Phong, which was the harbor. This is one of the areas where I think the war was fought wrong. We allowed certain things to take place that hampered the military in carrying out the military operation. For instance, Hai Phong Harbor was a free harbor for whatever ships wanted to come in and supply the war on the North Vietnamese side. Those ships were French, British and West Germany as well as, you know, Communist countries like East Germany or North Korea. Our friends were over there making money on the war too, and that kind of gets to you after a while when you see the amount of ammunition they were shooting at you. Instead you could mine that harbor and take out that supply of ammunition.

So we were asking out people to go in and fight a war basically with one hand tied behind your back. In essence there were certain areas we were not allowed to bomb around Hanoi, unless the specific target was in there. We could watch them assembling with our reconnaissance planes. We could see the anti-aircraft missiles get shipped into Hai Phong and the crates getting unloaded on the docks. We would photograph the trucks carrying things to the site, watch them build a missile site putting the whole thing together. Then as soon as it shot down an American airplane, that's when we could go in and strike that site. But until then, we could not touch it. Which was what I think was President Johnson's way of running the war with escalation.

Q: Why do you think they did it that way?

CG: I think it was Johnson, he was playing this tit-for-tat type of war. He would escalate the war when they escalated. If he'd tell them, "Back off or I'm else I'm going to do something." Then they would do something, so he'd do something. That was his strategy of fighting the war. When you get right down to it, if the military had been sent in there right away with the mandate to win the war, and the resources to do it, the war would have been over in two years or less.

But we played this game. We let them get ready. As I was to find out later, most of the oil storage wasn't in big oil tanks. It was in fifty-five gallon drums under this tree and under that tree and all over the country. So again, it was his method of fighting the war. When we get into my mission where I get shot down, we find out we were bombing the steel mill. That was the second day the steel mill was bombed and the air war had been going on for two and a half years. It was just then getting bombed. Which seems to me if you are going to strike with power, you would bomb that on the second day of the war.

Q: Is that what accounts for the supposedly tremendous amount of bombs and things dropped over Vietnam? And yet it had very little effect according to some historians.

CG: I think yeah, there were days when we went up and you could not bring the bombs home, you had to drop them on something. So you dropped them on the roads. There were a great amount of bombs just dropped on roads because you could not get into a specific bridge visually. A lot of the bombing was visual. We did bomb a lot on the railroads too.

Q: Why couldn't you bring the bombs home?

CG: They were too heavy to land with, plus they were fused. They don't want to fool with them because they might be a time-delayed bomb, or a radar-fused bomb, or something like that. They didn't want to touch them. They didn't want you to bring them home. (laughs) They want you to get rid of them.

Q: You used a word before - "flex"?

CG: Flak. That means anti-aircraft fire which goes up and then the shell explodes. They used a heavy amount of anti-aircraft fire. In fact, we had pilots who flew in World War II, and if you are familiar with the Clone Bomb Area in the Ruhr Valley in Germany, that was very heavily defended area. These pilots said that the Hanoi and Hai Phong areas were more heavily defended than the Ruhr Valley.

And add to that, not only the anti-aircraft fire now you are adding missiles. If you flew real high to get away from the anti-aircraft fire, you were a prime target for the missiles. If you flew real low to get away from the missiles, you were a prime target for the anti-aircraft fire. So you had to pick a compromise.

Q: I know it is awfully difficult to generalize things like this, but the feelings you had about the government you know, forcing you to work with one hand tied behind your back, was that the general feeling?

CG: I think so, yeah. I found some pilots that were fairly bitter who put their time in because they were professional military people and said "If this is the way we are going to fight wars, I don't want any part of it. I'll go do something else." I mean, I was trained to come in here and fight the war. And I am not saying to fight the war dirty, but do the things that are tactically and strategically smart to do.

I think you could get down to the whole problem that I have with the Vietnam War is asking our guys and gals who went over there to do something we were not committed to. The country was not committed, nor was the government meaning the President nor the Congress, etc. was not committed to go over there and do what we needed to do.

That is a lesson we have got to learn from the Vietnam War. Not that we should not go in there, don't get me wrong. The fear I have with the way the Vietnam War turned out is that there will come a time in the future when we ought to do something and we won't because we are going to say "Oh, it's another Vietnam! Don't get involved." I'm afraid we are going to say that when we probably should get involved. I'm not one of these people who say we should never get involved. I think there ARE times if we don't show we are willing to get involved at certain times with the power that we have in this country and the protection that we give a lot of people in the free world; I think we HAVE to get involved. But I'm afraid we're going to say it's another Vietnam...

Q: Which we do a lot.

CG: Well yeah, the first thing something comes up in Nicaragua they say "Don't get involved because it's another Vietnam." That is going to hurt us eventually. I feel sorry for all those people that were killed or injured in Vietnam because I don't think we got the commitment we

should have gotten from the government. That feeling finally spilled over into the people and they didn't give us their commitment.

It is really the reason we lost the war. We didn't lose the war militarily. We won every single battle we fought in that war. That is the fear I have of the Vietnam War, we are gonna just sit back and always have that fear. "This is another Vietnam."

My other answer is don't send us over there. Don't send my kid or anybody else's kid unless we are ready to back them up fully and we know what we are doing. So I say --Yes, don't get involved with another Vietnam the way we did. But there are going to be times when we are going to have to go somewhere to do some things.

Q: So you're describing being gun-shy in a sense because of Vietnam?

CG: Certainly, we are gun-shy.

Q: We are afraid right now of making a commitment because of Vietnam. That is a great point, and we could spend hours just talking about that. Because, how do you determine that? I mean, I'm convinced after the reading I have done, and after talking with people like yourself I think that the motives of going in were good. I don't think there was any conspiracy, I think Johnson's motives were good.

CG: The trouble is the government said we were in there to bring freedom to these people and all that. But we were not only in there for that. We were in there for economic reasons and we were protecting those economic reasons, etc. Let's lay all the cards on the table and then the American people can give you a better opinion. You can't get an opinion from people when you only lay a few cards on the table. I think that is part of the mistake they made. They have got to come out and say, you know, "Here's all the reasons we were in there. Let's look at all the reasons."

Q: Do you think the protests had an effect on the war? Was it just poor government management that created the protest? That's what I am kind of reading into what you are saying.

CG: Oh, I think yeah. The people were not getting the full story of what we were doing. The war was not fought right, therefore it got prolonged. The protests started, and I think that prolonged the war. I think that was one of the staying powers at least from where I was, and we will talk about that a little later if you want about me as a prisoner. But they were very much aware that they drugged the French out for a long time until the French people didn't want it and that is what they were going to do. And every sign from America, from the people that protested and everything, that was to strengthen their case as they went along.

Q: I have another theoretical question, should the press be censored during wartime?

CG: I think only when it pertains to information that is going to bring harm to the fighting forces. In other words, let's go to the Grenada example. There was a criticism that they didn't know ahead of time. Well, if everything was known ahead of time, you would have lost a lot more people. I think America has learned in the long run, if you lay all the cards on the table you come out a lot better. And I am not saying you want to give away military secrets and things like that with the press and that is where I would put the limits. Again, you have to draw the line somewhere. It's easy to classify everything as top-secret stuff.

Like in Thailand, nobody would officially say we flew in Thailand. Everybody knew what we were doing, and the Thai government said they didn't want it announced. They were trying to maintain their rapport with the people in Southeast Asia.

Q: You do make a point of credibility, because let's face it credibility does become one of the major issues of a war. Do you want to talk a minute about the mission that lead to your capture?

CG: Okay, on March 11, 1967, I was assigned to fly an F-105 on an afternoon raid on a Thailand steel mill thirty miles north of Hanoi. The **(@24:29 unclear before prep)** prep and everything had gone well. We had been on a raid the day before. We had bombed the steel mill the day before. That steel mill was like a whole city or a town. I mean it was a massive number of buildings that took up a large amount of land. So it was going to take more than one mission. The day before we had about forty airplanes raiding on it. I was the fortieth plane in on it so I couldn't even see it. There was a lot of smoke.

The next day, I was to be on the first flight in on a flight of four. I was number four man and we were doing flak suppression which means we were carrying a different kind of weapon. And at the time it was a very unpopular weapon, it was a cluster bomb. We were to go after anti-aircraft sites, any site that was actively shooting or whatever. So we were suppressing the guns and the flak. We would select one. The mission briefing and everything went fine, no problems and there were no problems with the airplanes. Except in the flight of four, we had carried pods (electronic countermeasures) to jam their gun radar. My pod was not working, and I know another guy's pod in the flight was not working. I was with the Wing Commander, he was leading the flight. He was a Colonel.

So we flew anyway. This jamming pod wasn't a reason for aborting. It was uneventful. We went up, refueled with the tankers and again, it was a forty airplane raid with some other groups coming in to help cover the MIGs and look at those SAM sites. We went up north in Thailand and we approached the target from the north coming down towards Hanoi.

There was no problem, we were coming in at around five thousand feet. Probably doing five hundred and forty or six hundred knots, so we were in about a six hundred mile an hour range. As we came in, you can't deliver the ordinance from the four thousand five hundred feet range, you really have to pop the airplane up to twelve thousand feet. You have to bring the airplane around and look for your target and then come down. Just as we came down, another flight who was sneaking in from a different direction, which was planned, came over the target so the flak started going off. It was like the Fourth of July, by that I mean they were shooting everything.

We popped up with our flight of four to go up to the twelve thousand feet when they launched two SAM missiles at us from down towards the Hanoi area. The missiles picked up, leveled off, and were tracking on our group. At that time, I was number four. My lead is the number three man. He decided he would take it back down to get rid of the missiles. So he went back down as number one and two kept going. The missiles didn't track them, they were tracking us. We took it up through the flak, now we are coming back down through it to get away from the missiles. We lost the missiles, swung around and came back up through the flak.

We split off on individual targets. I delivered some CPUs (Combined Effects Munition-cluster bomb) on a flak site that was active site, north of the steel mill and north of a bend in the river. When I came off that and swung around to the left, to go back – you want to get back together with your group of four as fast as you can – I took a hit. It didn't seem bad, I could feel the hit. I had flak all around me, but I could feel the hit.

Everything was still working so I started to swing around to the right to pick up my number three guy. I swung around to cut him off when I took another real, real bad hit. It was somewhere close to the cockpit area. Because, at the time, all my air conditioning is shut off. We cut that off when we got into the combat zone. Your air conditioning comes out of the engine. If you take a hit in the engine, you don't want the smoke all to come into the cockpit

so you shut it off in the combat area.

In that second, it was pretty severe. Immediately smoke and all of the fire lights on the dashboard, all the red gear warning lights came on, like the landing gear was down. And the cockpit filled up with smoke like that (Charlie snaps his fingers). So it had to have ruptured the integrity of the cockpit.

I was going pretty fast at the time. I must have been doing five hundred and fifty miles an hour. I finally got to the point where I could not see in the air. The engine was not running the aircraft. I could not stop the engine, I couldn't get going. I made one radio transmission, I told them I was getting out. I told them I had to eject. Getting ejected at a high speed is a pretty shocking event. Instead of my parachute opening like this, (his hands stretch up and down) it opened this way (his hands stretch length wise) as I came down. Luckily, I didn't blow any panels out.

I was a little bit west of the target. There is kind of a hog-back range of mountains that comes down, it had the nickname of "Thud Ridge". A lot of airplanes had gone in on that ridge. I got a good parachute. All my training that I had with the military was working. I did everything right that I was supposed to do. I did lose my helmet even though I had the chin strap on it. The oxygen mask and helmet ripped off.

I got a good parachute and was able to steer it. I got my radio out and tried to talk on my radio except the parachute has a beeper that goes off so that makes it difficult to talk.

Spending so much time doing that, I almost landed on the top of the only tree that was on the side of a hill. I was able to slip the parachute over the top, but at that time I could see the military people and the peasants were coming to get me.

So I hit the ground running, I took off leaving all my survival gear behind. I had an emergency radio and some extra batteries, and a thirty-eight revolver that was about it, except what I could carry in my pockets. I knew that where I was, there was no helicopter coming. I was north of Hanoi and if you take in the Northeast railroad and the Northwest railroad going out of Hanoi towards China, and if you are in between there, they don't even try to pick you up. It's mostly flat land and just suicide for helicopters.

So I left what I had there and ran. I had already made my mind up that I was not going to shoot my way out unless I saw the helicopter coming and it was only one or two people between me and them. There was no sense, it was suicidal so I decided, well, I don't want them to have the gun so I decided to take the shells out of the gun and started getting rid of that kind of stuff. I also destroyed the radio because they were known to get those radios and try to use them to get our helicopters in to pick you up. So I got rid of all that and was captured by the military which in a sense is a blessing in disguise.

If the peasants get a hold of you, they work you over, if not kill you. And it was a problem, I would find out later, with peasants killing the pilots who were ejecting. I guess they were given two hundred pounds of rice as a reward to turn them in alive.

I was captured by the military and trucked away. It wasn't too long after I was captured that they took me to like a headquarters area, and it came to my very much surprise that I had been captured by the Chinese. I was well into North Vietnam, but I was captured by the Chinese.

They took me to a headquarters area and kept me there. They tried to interrogate me with a young kid that spoke a little bit of English. They weren't very successful in trying to interrogate me, and they gave me something to eat. They continued to offer me wine and cigarettes and stuff like that, I turned the wine down. I guess if I did it again, I would probably take the wine. (laughs) I did take a few cigarettes. One of the things that got me through all this was having a sense of humor. They tell you not to take any alcoholic beverages from your captors you know. They are just trying to get you drunk to make you talk

at that time. They weren't successful with me at all.

But the next day, they took me to the anti-aircraft sites they were manning telling them the story that "Here's the pilot you guys shot down! A real live pilot!" This lead to be a blessing in disguise for me being captured by the Chinese. They also took me around village to village and let the Vietnamese people have their licks on me. They very much controlled the people, I don't know if you have dealt much with the Communists at all but they have an on and off switch control. They would get the people all harangued, get them going and they would come over and throw some rocks or bricks or whatever at me. They would let a guy break through the crowd with a bamboo stick and beat on me for a while. Then he would just shut them off like that (Charlie snaps his fingers) and he would back off. So that went on. I thought at that time I said "goodbye Charlie", he is going to ship me to China and that would be it. That was where I was headed.

Surprisingly, within a little over twenty four hours they turned me over to the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese took me and had me in a shack for a while and then put me in a hole in the ground that was probably about six feet by six feet high with an entrance way coming down with a dirt roof. I still had a flying suit at the time and a set of boots. Previous to that, when I was captured, they had stripped the flying suit right off me and sliced the boots right off with a knife or a machete.

This was one of the times I had seen some compassion from the Vietnamese. While I was down in that pit, this woman came down there and she shook her fist at me, you know like this, (Charlies waves his closed fist in the air) and gave me all this. Then she gave me a bundle of cookies which were commercially made sugar cookies, probably a dozen of them to eat. I wasn't that hungry at the time (laughs) so I had them in my pocket.

The next day, I was put into a car for a short period of time. I was never driven anywhere, just put in the back of an old black car, probably French. Later I was taken out of the car and put in the back of a Jeep-type vehicle in which there was another American who was injured. Any attempt at conversation was met with a punch in the face, or a good smack, or whatever. I was later to find out that there was an individual who was shot down on the same mission I was shot down on. They shot down three our planes on that mission. Two of us ended up as prisoners, one person was killed.

I was taken then to Hanoi and put into what we called Heartbreak Hotel which was the main prison. We called it the Hanoi Hilton and one section was Heartbreak Hotel. I was also interrogated in a section called New Guy Village. We had names for all the prisons. The initial interrogations were very severe because they are after military information. The value of military information is, it's valuable today, it is not valuable tomorrow. As time passes, it is tomorrow's target that is very valuable to know today. Tomorrow it is not of any value at all. And that is primarily a lot of the stuff they were after.

I used my training and thank God for all the training I got in the Air Force, the training was excellent. You almost thought you were back in Survival School, where you got this type of training. You could see the tactics they were using. You could see it coming before it would come. The good guy/bad guy routines and the other different routines. I thank God for that training. It was difficult though because they were really adamant about getting information. They had taken the individual who had a broken leg, who was shot down with me and on the same mission. They came in one day who was leading the flight that I flew in, and they were right. I later found out how they got that information was they took the guy who had the broken leg and twisted the broken leg until he told them. So it was pretty tough.

I had cuts on my feet from when the Chinese blindfolded me and were leading me with a rope and running me on the rocks. I had a cut on my head up here (Charlie points to his forehead) and just a few other marks, but no broken bones. I was lucky. I was thrown in a cell with

nothing at all. During interrogation you didn't go anywhere, you just stayed on the cement floor. They worked you over twenty four hours a day. They kept that up. They used a little trick with the ropes, they would tie your upper arms behind your back until your shoulder blades were touching and by jumping on the side of you they cinched that all up. And you were lying on your stomach with your legs tied with the rope around your neck. So if you put your legs down, it would choke your neck. If that didn't work, they would hook you up and hang you from something. They would just leave you like that. After that, you were beaten up, or kicked. They would do whatever they wanted to do. So they worked you over pretty good.

You could stall them, and you could give them answers that weren't true. But they wanted a list of my whole squad and I finally gave them the names of my high school basketball team. But you had to give them something you could remember. You learned that in training, see. Instead of trying to remember every single name I give them, I gave them my high school basketball team, I could remember those guys names. So I didn't have to remember ten names, I just had to remember that was who I gave them because they might come back later, you know? So I got worked over pretty good, but I don't think they got any information they could use from me.

I think I gave them some information that probably hurt myself more than anybody. So I got worked over, and because of my attitude I was put in leg irons for about four or five days. Your hands were handcuffed to the leg irons. I was able to pick the handcuff lock and get out. But you could not sleep because you were just doubled over. You tried to get what sleep you could. The Thai meals were not appealing at all, just some rice and watery soup. Or they would take that away from you. If you were being punished, they would make sure that you knew the other prisoners got a banana and you did not get one. (laughs)

Anyway, I was forty-five days in solitary confinement, then I moved into the prison system. For the most part, it was to consolidate. There were no communications. It was solitary confinement or isolation. By isolation I mean that you live with two or three other prisoners and yourself in your cell. You were not to communicate with anyone else in the cell block. We did things by rank. The high ranking people were kept in solitary confinement.

They would call you out for different programs. When I first got into the prison, what I call the prison system, I moved into a place called Las Vegas. They had different names for the cell blocks like The Stardust. I found out how extensive the communication system was. A simple code system. One-one was an A, five-five was a Z, one-three was a C, two-two was a G which they could sweep with a broom. So there would be somebody sweeping in the yard telling them - Charlie Greene is a new prisoner who just came in and he is in solitary. I would get messages back from people I knew in there like "Hi Charlie, welcome aboard." or whatever. So the system we had was pretty well extensive. We had people who collected names of known prisoners. We got the names of people who might have seen the ID cards during the interrogations, so we had a very extensive communication system going. Plus sending out information about new prisoners and what the higher ranks were saying about what you could do.

At that time they had an education program going on to educate each prisoner. There were two roads you could take. The road to freedom or the road to death. The road to freedom, was to write letters to Ho Chi Minh and the GIs and tell them the war was wrong. And to apologize and confess you were a criminal and all that baloney. The road to death was not to do that. When they finished that, I don't know, some two hundred prisoners were asked what road they took and everybody took the road to death. I don't think they realized the extent of the communications that were going on.

Q: How did the prisoners learn this when they went in?

CG: We had different ways surprising enough. The interrogating room had an old, wobbly stool in it which is typical. On the top of the stool it said "turn over", and when you turned it over the code was in it.

Q: Right in the interrogation room?

CG: Yeah, right in it. Or we would take cigarette ashes or some other way to make ink. And we would write on paper that we would steal. Or a pen, or a tiny piece of lead or something we would write the code and then go out at meal time where there were new guys and we would put the code inside the rice. They would have a bowl of rice and we would just stick our finger into the rice with the paper on the end and push it down so when you would eat the rice, you would get it. Or you would try and talk to them, we made great efforts to talk to people too. With this code, you could tap on the wall, there were all kinds of ways you could do it. And that was how we could do it by tapping on the wall so they could pass the information all through the prison.

Q: (at 41:45 question is unclear)

CG: There were a lot of different prisons throughout Hanoi, okay? In that Hilton, there was a lot in different sections. In the one area I was in there probably was about eighty or ninety prisoners there. Another one I was in later on probably had about two hundred or something.

Q: Basically up North, were the prisons up North (unclear @42:10)

CG: The prisons up North were basically fighter pilots for the most part. They were pilots or crew members you know like a navigator or weapons system operator or something like that. There were very few enlisted men. Not that the people who were up there were treated themselves well, but you when you get fighter pilots, they are a cocky bunch and they are going to be hard to deal with.

They were the most highly educated group of prisoners anybody ever had. I don't think they could ever cope with that. They struck out most of the time with a couple of rotten apples in the barrel. But the argument was not persuasive enough to an educated person to go along with them.

I could tell you their argument for World War II. This is what they teach their people. You know what the Americans did? They rushed in at the end of the war, dropped an Atomic bomb on the poor yellow people to gain world prestige. When, in fact, the Vietnamese People's Army and the Chinese People's Army won World War II. The Americans just rushed in at the end. That is what they teach the people. That is it in a nutshell. I can still remember we were told that. (laughs)

Q: It is funny how you can change little things though!

CG: The thing too is, when we were being interrogated they were trying to educate us. See, after the initial interrogation for military information, then there was the constant interrogation and harassment to convince you that you were to write a war crimes confession. Or you had to write a confession to Ho Chi Min. Or you had to get on the camp radio and denounce the war and you had to make a broadcast. They were always pushing you for something.

The surprising thing that you learn right away is if you draw the line right here, right at the very beginning, they are going to work you over and beat you up. You always want to get back to that side of the line. If you said "well, I will write a little bit, I'll do a little bit of this" then

they get right down to the point of “Ok, now you are going to make the broadcast to the GIs in South Vietnam.” and you don’t want to do it. They beat you up just as bad down here as they would have up here. So you might as well tell them “No” up here. And that is the approach you had to take.

The other thing when they were interrogating you was that they would be telling you stuff that was all baloney, if you want to look at it that way. You just kept nodding your head like you understood. They thought that you believed it. You really had to tell them “I don’t believe it. I don’t buy it at all.” So my life as a prisoner was going through that isolation. I was moved to a lot of prisons. I was moved around a lot.

Q: Was that done intentionally?

CG: Oh year, they would always blindfold you. I don’t know why I was in a group of prisons. Some people stayed in the same prison the whole time. I got moved around. I got moved to some new prison that just opened. I lived right next to the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant through August of 1967. We had twenty two air raids in one day on the power plant in that area. So I’ve been on the receiving end of that. I was later to live in Son Tay prison. I don’t know if you know the history of the war, but Son Tay was a prison that Nixon sent the troops in to raid it about some time around, oh boy I am going to miss the year here well probably I think 1970 or 71. They came in the fall, actually sent a raiding party into the prison and were successful to get into the prison. They took it over, but we were moved. So that was the Son Tay raid. It is chronicled in a book called The Raid (by Benjamin Schemmer).

A very interesting book, it would have worked. They just could not keep the information flow, there was enough delay in the information flow of where we were that they thought we were there when they came even though we had moved out approximately three months before that. Somebody said how can’t they tell if there’s anybody in there? Well first of all, you don’t want to keep reconnaissance going over the place all the time because you give away what you are coming for. Caught them completely by surprise, it would’ve work

Q: A common tactic of the North Vietnamese, you said one time, was to put prisoners near strategic sites?

CG: Yeah, I think that is the reason we near the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant which was very valuable to them. It was one of the main electrical power sources North of Hanoi. I think we were placed there and we were visible on the streets. We were taken out on the streets to go get drinking water or whatever. I think that we were there so that some diplomat from some country would see the prisoners in that area and the information would trickle back to the US like “I saw prisoners in the area that is near the power plant.” Hopefully to keep us from bombing it.

Q: You mentioned a couple of times, I think everybody who has been in that situation, if it happened to them, I always come up on the wrong end of that Charlie, I’m afraid. How did you get through it?

CG: You get through it – you don’t have a choice I guess! (laughs). To start off, I had a lot of survival training as an Eagle Scout. I will go all the way back, you know. The training I was brought up as an Eagle Scout, the training I had in the military, plus the training as a fighter pilot. You are a cocky bunch who is willing to accept a challenge.

I found out the people I thought were most successful in the POW environment had played athletics in high school, believe it or not. They had been in some competitive sport of some type. Either individual competitive sports or a teamwork competitive sport be it football, baseball, track or whatever. They had been challenged before, okay? They had the desire to

win and this was a challenge, you are up against a challenge. You are physically fit to do it. Hopefully, you don't get sick. Some people there did and you did the best you could but the other thing is, you don't have a choice. If you are a survivor, you are going to survive and you take one day at a time. So you roll with it.

I had mentioned earlier that being captured by the Chinese was a blessing in disguise. It was better off not to be a known prisoner, believe it or not. Even though your family knew, and you got to write them and some people wrote in the beginning. You would be a known prisoner, but you were the one who had to go down to see the delegation who came in from Poland, or the Polish Red Cross. Or a delegation similar to Jane Fonda coming. You would be selected to go and see them and now you are going to tell them how good the treatment is. You would say "No, I'm not going to tell them that." They would say "Yes, you are going down to tell them that the treatment is good." They would torture you until you agreed to go. And they would say "Now you are going to tell them this." "No!" Then they are going to torture you some more.

Then you go down and you tell the truth, that you were being tortured and everything. Then you get beat up on the way back. So you would get it in both directions.

All I had to say to them was, "If I go downtown and see anybody, I'm gonna tell them I was captured by the Chinese." And that would be the end of it right there. (Charlie snaps his fingers) They did not want that known. But that is the accomplishment of military training, find something you can use against them.

The joke always went around between the Air Force and the Navy pilots that when they called you up to ask you about this, you'd say "We don't do that – the Navy does it." And the Navy would say "We don't do that – the Air Force does it." (laughs)

Q: So you said the trick, well not trick, was that if the people outside knew you were a prisoner....

CG: If they decided to announce that you are a prisoner, then you got extra pressure put on you to do all these other things. You have to remember that not knowing what the consequences would be, the time to escape is right after capture. You want to escape early. They told us if you want help to escape to North Vietnam, you have to deal with older people. Younger people have been on the Communism side too long. This guy spoke French so right after being captured he was dealing with all the people speaking French trying to get some help to escape. It went on his record that he spoke French, so anytime a French delegation came out he went.

Q: Did anyone successfully escape that you were aware of?

CG: There were escapes, but none that were successful back to American hands. It was very difficult. You are in a country that is thousands of miles away. It's not like in World War II where you read about escapes and there was an underground that was gonna help you. You are in a country where you are a Caucasian, you are taller than they are, they were usually shorter. You are in a country where probably the countryman himself cannot travel for more than two villages before he is questioned, you know?

Once you get to a certain level, you can only travel on the roadways. A good friend of mine John (**@50:55 last name not clear**) escaped, made it and walked all the way to Hanoi wearing a disguise. He was the right stature and got into the river. They were going to go down the river and try to make it out to the ocean, but they didn't get good cover in the morning and the consequence of that was they got beat up so bad that the person with him was beaten and tortured to death.

Q: At any point, did they just simply leave the prisoners alone?

CG: There was a point near, sometime after the Son Tay Raid that they kind of backed off. One of the things the Son Tay Raid did for you, even though the raid was not successful, was that it scared them so bad that they were afraid. So all of these outlying prisons that they had, they moved us all into the Hanoi area. Mostly into the Wild Bill prison, which is what we called it. Now instead of three or four people in a cell block, you had forty in one great big cell block. So it allowed education to take place. They backed off a little, but they were still trying to stop the communications and they were still working over the leaders pretty much. There was a big lull in the war too. Some people were pretty angry at Johnson around 1969. That area of 1969 -1970, there was a big lull in the bombing. We were aware of when bombing took place. When it was going on and when it wasn't, plus there weren't any new prisoners coming in. I was out of Son Tay when they landed on the moon. We didn't find out about that until six months later.

Q: You mentioned Jane Fonda. Were there any prominent American delegations in North Vietnam?

CG: Not that I know of, I didn't have to deal with any. But those delegations would come in, oh yeah. There were prisoners that had to go see Jane Fonda, or whoever.

Q: How did you get out?

CG: Through the negotiations that (@53:00 unclear) were carrying on there was an agreement that the hostilities would cease and there would be a release of the prisoners. We had decided, the prisoners had decided that the Sikh and the Hindu would go first. Then you go in the order that you were shot down. So they took me.

I have my dates off, but sometime in 1971 I think. There was a fear that if the Vietnamese didn't get things straightened out, there was some Hawks (protest group in favor of the war versus the Doves group who wanted end and peace) talking that we were going to go in there with the Marines and get our prisoners. That scared them. They took over two hundred and fifty of us to the Chinese border to a prison about three miles away, way up in the mountains. We knew right where we were when we got there, but it was a long truck trip. There was a ransom, they were going to keep us.

So, when we were up there, they finally called out one person from each cell block into one group meeting. Well first off, they don't normally do that. They did not mix the cell block people together. The individual who came to talk to them said he was a high official from Hanoi. He referred to Doctor Kissinger and President Nixon. You know the minute you have a guy talking like that something is off because it was always that son-of-a-bitch Johnson and that bastard Nixon when they would talk to us.

You know, like that killer Johnson. So we knew that something was up. He said there were agreements being signed and later we moved back to the Hilton area. Then they started their release program.

Q: Did the prisoners received medical treatment from like, the Red Cross?

CG: No nothing from the Red Cross at all. The mail from what I understand went directly through Communist hands, you ended up with sympathizers in this country and whatever. In fact, my wife was harassed to the point where she had to change her phone number because she would not deal with these fringe groups. Someone would come in here and say "I know your husband is a prisoner of war and if you want to get mail, you have to deal with me." And they were anti-war people etc. In other words they wanted to take the letters she would write

so she would not be able actually mail them directly through the mail. I got some letters, but not too many. Later on, about 1971, they let us all write.

Q: When did you finally get out?

CG: I got out in 1973. My family found out I was a prisoner thirty three or thirty nine months after I was captured. I forgot what it was exactly. I think it was thirty three months.

Q: How long were you a prisoner?

CG: Six years. I got out on the 4th of March, I got captured on March 11th, so one week short of six years. They made a big to-do about releasing us. We got brand new clothes the day before. We had a little lunch with a beer. A bunch of baloney. (laughs) They tried to bring in their version of the Bob Hope show and put a show on for us. But we totally rejected it and said no. Not after the way we had been treated, you are not going to come in and do that.

Q: What was their version of the Bob Hope show?

CG: Well, they had a traveling version of a military show. The Air Force was well prepared for the it (@ 56:41 unclear). They flew C-148 for Medevac planes and took us all in those straight to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. We were checked into the hospitals there. They had a person who was one of your contemporaries. Usually somebody with the same rank who had gone through pilot training with you, whatever. They were assigned to take care of any problems you had. They took us shopping at night at the PX. They had arrangements all made to call your family and get in touch with your family. Any bad news they had for you, they would take you aside and pass out whatever that was. They did a quick medical check on you, and maybe a little dental work or whatever had to be done. If you were physically fit to go, they could get you to a hospital near Albany.

I checked out from the Philippines at Clark, but we flew from there to Hawaii and directly from there on to Andrews (Maryland). I was picked up on another Medevac flight to Westover, Massachusetts and my family came from Schenectady. We got a welcome everywhere we went. Clark Air Base gave us a huge welcome, all the school kids were out there.

Even though I was in the third group coming home, there was a large group, a small group, and another large group, I was in the second large group. Even though that all took place everywhere you went, they were still out there when we got into Hawaii at about three or four o'clock in the morning. The place was mobbed. Anybody you knew in the military usually would come and talk to you.

It was a little overwhelming at first, but at least you got that welcome home. It was probably the first time in a long time the country had been united about anything to do with Vietnam.

Q: What year was that again?

CG: 1973, it was just about the time we were starting to withdraw.

Q: Do you hold with the idea that there are still prisoners of prisoners of war?

CG: It's very difficult. I've talked very frankly with some people who I think would have the information. And the information I get is there is no hard evidence. It's not an issue I think you should forget about. It just seems that it is a shame that the Vietnamese have remains, a sizable number of remains. We know that, around four hundred remains that they could go into a warehouse, and take them off the shelf, and send them home. They have them, we know that for sure.

Live prisoner sightings? It's hard. You get the refugees come out, they claim to see sightings

and they want preferential treatment. So they are telling you the story you want to hear and it is difficult, it really is. Then on the other end, can you say the issue is something we should forget, and you don't want to talk about it? It's a dead issue. All the prisoners have died. They are all dead, they were all killed in action. Why don't you get off the issue? I have heard that argument. But wait a minute, I am not going to give that message to my kid who might serve in the military. I'm not going to give it to the other young Americans who may someday serve in the military. I'm going to tell them, boy if you are in that situation, you've got a country who is going to hang in there forever until we find out where you are and what you are doing. Because that is what sustained us. They would tell us if we were going to be here twenty or thirty years, you are going to die here. Your country doesn't care. They will not know. No! My country will know, they will make sure. And that is the message we gotta give. I see a lot of people on the Donahue Show (Phil Donahue-American talk show host 1970-1996) and on other shows where they say they have hard evidence and data, but I haven't seen it.

Q: There was that guy a couple of years ago. I can't remember his name who attempted POW rescues.

CG: Bo Gritz was his name. Well, there is a group now putting up some big reward money so we might see something there.

Q: Why do they keep the bodies?

CG: The story I get is they want big bucks from the US. In the negotiations there were certain things to be met such as billions of dollars in aid. Their economy was devastated. They need it. The country is in total economic devastation. They want that commitment, that aid, and the bodies are the last thing they can hold on to. Plus, it keeps the issue going. They keep sending a few remains home, they don't just find them. You know, they send a few home, they send a few home, they don't just find them.

There is a lot to do here but I think the big thing is they want big bucks from the US. I didn't get into the whole negotiations of what was agreed to in Paris when they finally came up with all the agreements, but I think if certain conditions were met and all this, then big bucks were coming.

Q: Before we got started, you made a great point about the fact that you had to be a prisoner of war to be welcomed back to the United States?

CG: Yeah, I probably don't suffer from what the other guys suffer from, even though the conditions I went through. I used to tell the guys "I would not do your job in South Vietnam, shuffling around the jungle or the point man or something like that." And of course they tell me they would not pick my job as a fighter pilot. But we were not rejected when we came home. I was welcomed by a Veterans group, by the VFW. I understand there was some rejection of the Vietnam vets by those groups at the end of the day. They would say "You guys didn't win, you lost!"

I know that you had mentioned what I thought of Westmoreland (General William Westmoreland commander of US forces in Vietnam 1964-1968). I've heard Westmoreland speak, he points the point. Our guys fought just as well as any fighting man has ever fought for America. They fought just as well as the guys in World War II. The heroes are still there. They won every single battle they fought. The war was lost at home by lack of support from the government and from the people. I think Westmoreland is another Vietnam vet like everybody else. I think he went over there and did his job. If you are number one in West Point, you are not a dummy, you know?

Q: I saw him speak a couple of years ago. He was very impressive.

CG: He is a very articulate man. He was given a very difficult task to do and he was not given the full tools to do it. He tried to motivate soldiers who weren't really told why they were really here. The American people weren't really told why we were here. The war was dragged out for a long period of time, a lot longer than we wanted it to.

Q: Were Air Force pilots into that "One year - One day" mode?

CG: No, we were in a Mission mode. After one hundred missions, we would go home. At some periods in a war, you could do that in three months.

Q: So you had a positive goal that you could achieve. One thing that I am picking up and kind of reflected on was during World War II basically a soldier went there and stayed until they won?

CG: Oh yeah, you fought and the war was over. A lot of people said that was the biggest mistake we made in Vietnam was to tell somebody you would go over there for a year and come home. So everybody was waiting to stay the one year.

Q: Yeah, get their year in and get out.

CG: The thing is, this had been done to pilots before, like in Germany it was twenty five missions.

Q: That's common right?

CG: Yeah, that is common with pilots.

Q: At least you had a positive goal of one hundred missions as opposed to a negative hope and negative goal of trying to get through the year, you know. You have heard that before?

CG: I've heard people say that maybe the war would have been a lot shorter if we told everybody, you don't come home until you win it! But again, for the Vietnam War it would have been unfair because we weren't given the tools and the capability to win it.

Q: In 1964 or 1965 maybe we could have pulled them out?

CG: If I blame somebody, I blame President Johnson for really bungling it. He was told, in all honesty in my reading about the war and everything, he was told pretty much what the situation was. The Communists were deep into the grassroots. That you needed a significant commitment right now if you wanted to do it. He was told what that commitment had to be by the military and the CIA. He was also told if you don't put that commitment in it, you might as well throw it in, let it go.

He chose not to take that advice. He chose to go in piecemeal, a little bit, a little bit more and escalated. By the time you get up to the full commitment of troops, they have hardened themselves into a resistance force that is not going to give up. As I said, they were pretty much geared on the fact that they strung the French out. They were going to string the Americans out. Of course they are not telling their people how many of their people were getting killed either. They even told us during interrogations that you don't tell the people what's gonna make them unhappy. You only tell them what is going to make them happy.

Q: As you look back over twenty years, has your attitude and feelings towards the war changed at all?

CG: My only problem with the war was the way it was fought. And I am upset the way the

country treated the Vietnam veterans. I really thought they got a raw deal. It seems to me in some places you got treated better if you went to Canada than if you went to fight in the war. And I think we need a commitment from the federal government that we are going to keep the medical facilities in the VA strong and healthy to help these guys. We need to do something about Agent Orange (chemical warfare agent) that is for real and I understand the government's problem with Agent Orange. How do you determine who is affected, and who isn't? But you ought to do something about it. Not just a token effort, but something for real. There has to be programs out there so the government can get the trust back. The government has lost the trust with these vets. They are real people just like the rest of us and served this country just as any other vet. They should give out Medals of Honor, and Silver Stars and those kinds of things in Vietnam too.

Q: Is that what you see as the biggest problem (**@1:07:24 unclear rest of question**).

CG: I think it's coming around. I've been to a few ceremonies where Vietnam memorials are being put up by communities and things are being done. They that and they need a little more. They need love and a job, you know? If they could get that, it would go a long way. Hey, the Vietnam vets built their own monument in Washington, D.C. (The Wall). They went together and built it so it shows they can get together and do things. And I think it is probably the most visited memorial in Washington right now.

That's the whole thing, if the government isn't going to help us, you better go help yourself and we better do what we can for each other. I think they felt that is what they had to do and that is why they formed the Vietnam Veterans of America Tri-County Council and why they form separate groups. I would like to see them get more involved with the VFW and those groups because they have the power base. And I think those groups are ready to welcome them. I think they found out that that little snubbing that took place in the beginning was wrong. These guys were real veterans just like they were.

Q: That is what some guys told me here. That they are starting to become more involved. **(@1:08:45 rest of comment unclear)**. Last question, I promise. Since hopefully, some of these tapes will be seen in high schools in the Capital District, are there any lessons from Vietnam to share?

CG: I think I'll go back to what I originally said. The tragedy, I think, that we are going to face in the future about Vietnam is that we are going to be afraid to be committed when we really should be committed to some cause. That we are going to say "It's another Vietnam, don't get in it." There are some good things going on in the world today with things that are happening in Russia. And things that may be happening in China and things like that. But you saw the true face of Communism in China. They really stepped on that movement and squashed it very severely.

I have been in East Germany and I have been in the hands of the Communists for six years. They are very severe when it comes time and they are threatened. And I think their role is world domination. It is written in their writings. It is in their teachings and you gotta understand that. I'm afraid there's got to be a commitment. We are going to have to make a commitment one of these days. If we say "It's another Vietnam, don't get in it!" we are going to miss out helping somebody we should have helped. Or saving some situation that's going is going to turn against us in the long run. I think you have to look very carefully at it. That is the theory I have, you know. We backed off when we shouldn't have.

And we need good leaders to make that decision. If you tell high school kids today what you should do, well there is nothing wrong with a career in the military. It is a very exciting

career. There are good leaders in the military and good people. We did just see now a young General moved from out of the streets of New York to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – General Colin Powell. He is a brilliant man. A young General who has come on up. He has a distinguished military career. It is a good service for people. And it's a good service to go into the government. I think kids shouldn't be afraid to go into government work. We need good heads to make these decisions and maybe we won't make a bad one.

I think we didn't make the commitment to Vietnam. I think it was right to go but we did not commit ourselves fully to it. And I hope we learned that lesson. Don't send our people to do a job if we are not going to back them up. That's it. You are welcome. (Charlie shakes hands with Joseph and smiles).

Q: A remarkable story from a remarkable man. Thanks Charlie. **TOTAL RUN TIME**
1:11:50