NEW YORK NATIONAL Guardsman

MAJOR GENERAL FRANKLIN W. WARD—1870-1938

General Ward Dies

Proposed Infantry Division

Characteristics of Modern War

In Line of Duty

APRIL 1938

New York National Guardsman

Circulation 21,000 *Established* 1924

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APRIL 1938

The names of all characters that are used in short stories, serials and semi-fiction articles that deal with types are fictitious. Use of a name which is the same as that of any living person is accidental.

THE NEW YORK NATIONAL GUARDSMAN is published monthly by the State of New York at 80 Centre Street, New York City, N. Y. Printed in New York City, N. Y. The only publication authorized by the National Guard of the State of New York. Lt. Col. H. E. Suavet, Editor; Lt. Col. E. Bowditch, Associate Editor; Lt. Col. W. J. Mangine, Advertising Manager; Major E. C. Dreher, New York City, Advertising Manager.

Single copy, 10 cents. Subscription price in the United States $1.00; Canada, $1.50; foreign, $2.00 a year. Subscriptions payable in advance. Advertising rates on request. Listed in Standard Rate and Data Service.

MEMORIAL RESOLUTION

Introduced by—Assemblyman John P. Hayes of Albany, on March 19, 1938, in tribute to the memory of Major General Franklin W. Ward, Retired, late Adjutant General of the State of New York who died March 17, 1938.

Whereas, the Assembly has learned with deep regret and sorrow of the death of Major General Franklin W. Ward at his home in Albany, New York, and

Whereas, the late General Ward was born in Philadelphia, Pa., some sixty-seven years ago and served his country well as a soldier and patriot in the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Mexican Border in 1916, and also throughout the World War. He was Chief of Staff of the 27th Division overseas and he commanded the 106th Infantry in the Hindenburg operation September 26th and 27th, 1918. He was appointed Adjutant General by former Governor Alfred E. Smith and served with distinction and honor until he retired in December 1934; and that in his passing the people of Albany and the State of New York have lost a good soldier and a patriotic and useful citizen; And be it resolved

That when the Assembly adjourns today it do so out of respect to the memory of Major General Franklin W. Ward. and

Be it further resolved, that a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the members of his family.

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Major General Franklin W. Ward

IN the shadow of the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and with full Military honor, the body of the late Major General Franklin W. Ward was laid to rest in Arlington National Cemetery.

General Ward died on March 17th after a brief illness and immediately on receipt of the news, Governor Lehman ordered flags at the State Capitol and armories throughout the State to half staff.

On Monday, March 21st, a Solemn Mass of Requiem was celebrated at the Church of St. Vincent de Paul, in Albany, which was attended by hundreds of General Ward's friends in military and civilian life. Among the Honorary Pallbearers attending the service were: Major Generals William N. Haskell, John F. O'Ryan, Ransom H. Gillett; Rear Admiral Frank R. Lackey; Brigadier Generals Walter G. Robinson, J. Leslie Kincaid, Louis W. Statesbury, William F. Schohl, Edward Olmsted, Bernard W. Kearney, Fred M. Waterbury, Charles E. Walsh; Colonels William A. Taylor, Frank C. Vincent, Mills Miller, Charles N. Morgan, Joseph A. S. Mundy, Willard H. Donner, Ogden J. Ross; Lieut. Colonels J. Tabor Loree, William J. Mangine, C. Pemberton Lenart. D. W. McGowan; Majors James F. Rooney, John A. Coffey; Lieut. Commanders John M. Gill and F. Kenneth Gundlach. Enlisted men from the 53rd Brigade Headquarters Co., 10th Infantry, 105th Infantry, 102nd Medical Regiment and 121st Cavalry were the pall bearers.



AT THE CHURCH OF SAINT VINCENT DE PAUL, ALBANY

At the conclusion of the service the procession moved to the Albany station where the body was placed on the train for transportation to Arlington. During the services planes of the 27th Division Aviation circled overhead.

On arrival of the funeral train in New York City it was met by Major (Chaplain) A. C. Dineen, Headquarters, 27th Division and a detachment from the 244th Coast Artillery consisting of Lieutenants L. W. Chapin, Frank Comiskey and five enlisted men.

Chaplain Dineen invoked a blessing and the detachment formed a guard of honor until the departure of the train.

At Washington the funeral arrangements were under the supervision of the Commanding General, Washington Provisional Brigade.

An escort composed of troops, from the 3rd Cavalry and 16th Field Artillery and the 3rd Cavalry band, under the command of Colonel Jonathan M. Wainwright, accompanied the body to the cemetery where a salute was fired by Battery A, 16th Field Artillery.

(Continued on page 28)

PROPOSED
INFANTRY DIVISION



ORGANIZATION OF PRESENT INFANTRY DIVISION

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

Note: Attached Chaplains and Medical Personnel included in Command, Combat and Service Echelons.

Comparison of strength of (1) *Proposed and* (2) *Present Infantry Divisions. Other comparisons: An average day's march* (1) 300 *miles,* (2) 12 *miles; Average rate of march* (1) 27½ *miles per hour,* (2) 2½ *miles per hour: Time in which rear element can come up with front element in march of one column* (1) 3 *hours,* (2) 3 *days; Transport* (1) 1,600 *motors,* 0 *animals,* (2) 6,827 *horses and mules;* 784 *ambulances, cars and trucks;* 276 *motorcycles;* 93 *tractors.*

The Proposed Infantry Division

(Prepared under direction of Colonel H. W. Fleet, 9th U. S. Inf., formerly chief instructor N. Y. N. G.)

FORT SAM HOUSTON, the Army post that has cradled two of the Army's infant fighting units in the last century has again witnessed the testing of a new unit that may again change the organization of the whole army—the Proposed Infantry Division or "PID" as it is called.

The test of the proposed division, considered to be the most important military experiment since the World War, is a milestone in United States military history, marking the transition from outmoded methods of warfare to modern conceptions.

Present day military experts believe that the wars of the future will be fast-moving, not stabilized like the World War. Hence the War Department experimented with the new unit with a view to the adoption of a smaller, more mobile fighting force capable of greater flexibility while on the march and one that can be maneuvered easily during battle—a unit capable of making up for its lesser numbers by the application of greater fire-power brought about by the superiority of modern weapons.

Industry has been modernized by the adoption of scientific improvements for weapons, vehicles and machinery. Gasoline motors have been improved to the point that they can be relied upon more than ever before. Steels have been lightened and made more durable and reliable. Fighting weapons have been improved and new types capable of delivering greater fire-power have been developed.

The adoption of some type of fighting unit designed to take advantage of and to keep step with the rapid strides taken by science and industry has brought about the Army's decision to organize a modern division to supersede the cumbersome division now in use which was developed as a result of experience gained in the World War.

This action on the part of the United States has come almost simultaneously with steps taken by the majority of foreign powers to modernize their military forces.

As a result of several years of careful study made by the War Department General Staff and the service schools, the War Department in its tentative tables of organization for the new division set up a unit composed of 13,552 officers and enlisted men at war strength, as compared to the war strength organization of 987 officers and 21,060 enlisted men. The new division was provided with a total of nearly 1,600 motor vehicles and no animals, whereas the division now in use has only 750 motor vehicles and 6,800 animals.

The proposed division was not motorized completely although half the prescribed force of 13,552 were transported organically in motor vehicles.

In spite of the numerous changes being made in the Infantry the United States did not follow the foreign military thought that has caused some foreign powers to build their basic organization around an automatic weapon, such as the light machine gun. The United States still believes that the rifle in the hands of a good American marksman is the deadliest of weapons and that the rifleman is still the basis of all organization.

The basic infantry unit, the infantry rifle squad, under the new division set-up had nine riflemen all armed with the .30 caliber semi-automatic rifle whereas the present squad is composed of eight men, only one of whom is armed with the automatic rifle. There was also a light machine gun squad composed of eight men, armed with three .30 caliber light machine guns, one rifle and four pistols.

The rifle platoon no longer was divided into two sections of three squads each, but was reduced to three squads, two rifle squads and one light machine gun squad.

The new infantry rifle company had three platoons and a light mortar detachment. The mortar detachment's armament was one 45-mm mortar. The 81-mm mortar, formerly an infantry weapon, was transferred to the artillery in the new division.

The rifle grenade was eliminated. The rifle company had five officers and 139 enlisted men, this force having been reduced from 200.

The new infantry battalion consisted of four rifle companies with a total manpower of 24 officers and 580 enlisted men, reduced from 852.

An organic part of the infantry regiment of the new division was a light machine gun battalion of three companies. Under the old divisional set-up one machine gun company was a part of each infantry battalion, but under the new



(Courtesy U. S. Army Recruiting News)

Motorcycle drivers and passengers take no chances of being gassed

organization these machine gun companies were consolidated in the machine gun battalion which had 22 officers and 462 enlisted men.

Each machine gun company consisted of three platoons, one platoon of four .50 caliber machine guns and two platoons armed with .30 caliber machine guns. The company's manpower was 6 officers and 146 enlisted men, compared with the present company's strength of 6 officers and 182 enlisted men. The units were motorized so that motors now carried men and weapons instead of having only the weapons drawn by mules as is provided in the present division.

The size of the infantry regiment was reduced from 3,106 to 2,362 enlisted men and 110 officers. Each regiment consisted of three rifle battalions and a machine gun battalion. The regimental howitzer company which was formerly armed with the 37-mm gun and the three-inch trench mortar or 81-mm mortar was eliminated from the infantry regiment. The regimental band was also scrapped, one band being provided for the entire division.

There were three infantry regiments provided in the new division, superseding the two infantry brigades of the present division which have two regiments each. The brigade organization was eliminated.

The new divisional organization also called for considerable shuffling and rearrangement of the artillery forces.

The old field artillery brigade of three regiments and one ammunition train was reduced to one field artillery regiment and the brigade organization scrapped.

The new field artillery regiment consisted of four battalions, three for the direct support of the three infantry regiments and one for general support of the division. Each of the three direct support battalions had three batteries. One battery was armed with twelve 81-mm mortars, formerly an infantry weapon, and two batteries were armed with four of the new 75-mm howitzer for each battery. The general support battalion had three batteries of four 155-mm howitzers each. The regimental ammunition trains were eliminated, this work being handled by Ordnance Department troops.

A new communications plan was tried out in the test division. Combat troops were no longer called upon to maintain their own communications. Signal Corps personnel were attached to each regiment and assumed the functions of the former communications sections. Responsibility for Field Artillery fire control installations, however, remained with that arm.

One essentially new unit was added to the division, a cavalry reconnaissance squadron of two troops armed with light and .50 caliber machine guns. It was completely motorized, utilizing scout cars and motorcycles.

Other changes in the division organization included the pooling of special troops responsible for supply, evacuation, motor maintenance, etc., in a service echelon. In this group was placed the service troop headquarters, quartermaster motor battalion, quartermaster light maintenance company, quartermaster service company, ordnance company, medical battalion and division band. The medical, engineer and quartermaster regiments of the present division all were reduced to battalions in the proposed division.

The signal company and the engineer battalion were in the command echelon under direct division control.

The new division eliminated the regimental field trains. A service echelon replaced the slow, plodding mule-drawn escort wagons. The formation of the service echelon did not mean, however, that regiments and other component units of the division were relieved of all responsibility for supply service. Each component regiment, or similar division group, still had its combat train vehicles that carried a day's supply of ammunition and the portable kitchen equipment. In some situations a regiment was required to form a truck train similar to the old field train to carry baggage and rations. No unit was constantly called upon to have in its columns enough trucks to perform all the duties now carried out by regimental combat and field trains. Different situations called for different supply methods. The whole idea was to eliminate the necessity for any combat unit's habitually burdening itself with an excess of supplies and impedimenta. Combat groups must be free to move easily and with rapidity from one scene of action to another. The speed of present day vehicles greatly facilitated the delivery of supplies and cut down on the amount which must be carried in a troop column.



(Courtesy U. S. Army Recruiting News)
Truck-drawn Field Artillery—155-millimeter howitzers

The purpose of the test was:

1. To test the organization of the proposed division, and that of its component and attached units; to determine their suitability to execute division missions in accordance with modernization tactical doctrines;

2. To develop the technique of employing a division and component and attached units organized under the new division set up, and to conduct practical experi-

Courtesy U. S. Army Recruiting News

The "Streamlined" Division on the Move

ments with a view to determining facts and recommendations upon which the War Department may prescribe an organization best suited for the Army's purposes in modern warfare;

3. *a.* To determine if the proposed division is materially better than the present division organized for war at an approximate strength of 22,000, and if so to what extent;

b. To determine if the proposed division is better than the present division if the latter were modernized and motorized, and reduced in strength to approximately 13,000 officers and men without a change in organization.

The tests were given in the form of controlled field maneuvers and differed from the usual conception of the routine maneuver in that there was no question raised as to the adequacy of leadership and the training of the participating troops. The solutions were known in advance and the troops merely executed the various movements as if they were part of a scheduled demonstration. This eliminated the factor of human error in so far as possible.

The test was divided into three phases:

1. The training of the several arms in the new organization and tactics, and in the technique of their new weapons.

2. The training of combat teams in the elementary stages of the tactics of combined arms.

3. The division operating as a unit as part of an army corps.

The Second Division of the Regular Army was designated by the War Department to conduct the tests. To provide sufficient personnel to make up a division of 13,552 it was necessary to attach units from the Second, Fourth, Sixth and Eighth Corps Areas.

The assembly of the divisional components at Fort Sam Houston in September, 1937, marked the completion of the first phase of the test.

The second phase of the test, the testing of the combat teams, began September 27. Each combat team consisted of one regiment of infantry, one battalion of field artillery and necessary service troops. Each was tested in the following maneuvers:

1. Defense, wide front, withdrawal and delaying action;

2. Attack, wide front;

3. Attack, wide envelopment by day;

4. Strong defense.

The third or final phase, the employment of the division as a unit of an army corps, was divided into four operations:

1. A large scale defense that included defensive maneuvers on a wide front with a delaying action under which the main body could withdraw;

2. An attack on a wide front in which the enemy was routed in an aggressive drive;

3. An attack in which an interior front-line combat team engaged as a part of the division was withdrawn and moved circuitously on a wide arc and attacked the rear of the enemy placing the hostile force between two fires;

4. Motorized march of the division of 656 miles.

The final phase of the test, a motorized march of the division from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, to Mineral Wells, Texas, was intended primarily as a supply problem. First day distances involving movement by three columns on three roads were negotiated with an average speed of 27½ miles per hour. The maximum front was 50 miles. Each column was 10 to 12 miles in length and required a maximum of from 16 to 17 minutes to pass any given point. After detrucking troops at bivouac areas the first day, and as a part of the supply and transportation phases of the test, trucks returned to the railhead at San Antonio for supplies. The average distance marched the first day was 80 miles.

During the second day in which really bad weather was encountered, the longest march, 140 miles,

(*Continued on page* 26)

Characteristics of Modern War

PART I.

*Edmond C. Fleming**

UNDER this title General Ludwig Eimannsberger, the eminent Austrian artilleryman and author of the world's best seller on Tanks, wrote recently a very refreshing study of the probable character of the next war in Europe. Presenting the subject with masterly simplicity he has attempted to give a reasoned answer to the universal question of what the next war will be like.

The study appeared in the March, 1937, number of the *Militaerwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen* (Vienna). Translated I give it unabridged below.

THE PROBLEM

The characteristics of the next war should properly be easy to recognize. Since the army manuals must tell each army how it has to fight, they contain the important theory of the conduct of the fighting in the next conflict. Unfortunately in transition periods like the present the information is lacking, because official doctrine lags behind development. And published opinion in the periodicals is as confused and contradictory as can be.

Some look for the decision in the next war mainly through a single weapon, such as the plane or the tank, chemical warfare or industrial paralysis.

Others are advocates of career armies as the core of the military force.

Others again, perhaps the most numerous, would conduct the war with the entire nation itself (totalitarian war).

This enumeration of views can of course be almost endlessly continued: the World War completely destroyed the uniformity of military outlook

There are two reasons herefor, it seems to me. First, the late summer of 1914 showed that views of fighting which the entire world might hold to be right could nevertheless be false. Secondly, two new weapons have been added: the airplane and the tank, both still in the proving stage and incapable of proof in peacetime.

Finally, it must be remembered that the greater the differences possible in armament the more media of combat does military science develop. In large scale warfare these media are tolerably offset, otherwise war could not even start, but in colonial wars wherein backward peoples fight for their freedom, extremes are reached and thereby also a quite special warfare, as two historic examples will show.

Iraq—meaning Great Britain—found it necessary in 1931 to pacify the trouble-making Kurds of the mountainous northern border in order to rid the Kirkuk oilfields of a continual menace. Ground troops encircled the tribal country practically without fighting, and then the settlements and herds were bombarded daily from the air for more than a month until the last tribesmen had betaken themselves across the adjacent Turkish border.

That is doubtless purest Douhet.[1]

And in Morocco in 1934 the French brought the last of the unruly tribes to subjection by holding them fast in front with ground troops while auto columns pushed through the desert to envelop the rear.

That seems to me pure Fuller.[2]

Those are extremes in the conduct of warfare, and were possible only owing to great contrasts in armament—not in civilization. They will not be treated in the following study, which will analyze only a great war in Europe between nations on the same plane of development. One comes then to a second question, the question that will be the events fixing the initial form of the war; and those have to be examined in order to find the characteristics of the war.

As already stated, all questions of warfare are today in controversy. If, however, one limits the study to a war in Europe, it can be said that this struggle, fought out in a confined area, must follow the old rule, the fundamental rule, that short wars must be

[1] The late General Douhet of the Italian Army is widely regarded as the leading doctrineer of The Aerial War.—E.C.F.

[2] Major General J. F. C. Fuller of the British Army is the acknowledged founder of the school of The Machine War.—E.C.F.

decided by arms, that battle thus is the high point of warfare and in it must the decision be sought.

If one sees in the battles the only form of decision of short and conclusive campaigns one arrives at the further conclusion to see in tactics the key to the questions of modern warfare.

Fundamentals of strategy change just as little as those of tactics; they remain always the same. But the means for transposing these fundamentals into reality are continually changing and thus altering the view of war through all times, just as the outlook of mankind also is ever changing.

This enables the problem of this study to be stated more strictly: it is a matter of discovering here which are the likeliest main forms of combat in the next conflict.

Emphasis must be laid on the point that here only the important generalities can be dealt with, the fundamental questions and more particularly those which are arbitrarily settled by the fighting equipment. Any effort to establish more than this would convert the work at once into a military horoscope. Thus that is the problem.

Its solution can at best lead to a probable truth. One must strive to stay as far as practical and as long as possible on the bed rock of experience and of reality. Thus the tactical characteristics of the World War and the reasons for them have to be examined.

One must then establish, as well as may be, what tactically is the belief today—a belief which, now 20 years after the War's end, is already interwoven with academic thought and with theory. When necessary this opinion must be rounded out, and one must endeavor to appraise the influence of new weapons on the fighting.

This study will finally yield a theory about the probable tactical styles, from which then the characteristics of the warfare can be determined. The result will again be a theory—a phantom truth, to be sure. But the real truth, certainty, will only be yielded by the next great conflict. Then it will be too late.

THE WORLD WAR

Infantry entered the war as the most important arm. Its dashing attack was going to lead it irresistibly to the enemy in the fight for fire superiority; the artillery would have to help with its fire.

Whether fire alone would be enough for victory or whether the bayonet would have to help in the end remained in dispute between different armies.

The enemy was to be engaged in movement wherever he showed. Since the tactical decision was expected quickly—at latest in a matter of days—a series of battles were to be fought in Europe. The whole campaign would require the uttermost exertion of all forces, but its duration would be very short.

This is approximately the picture of war Europe had before August 1914. The early battles demonstrated at once that the army manuals had considerably underestimated the fire of the magazine rifle and were entirely silent about automatic arms. The consequences were terribly costly to the infantry; the best fell at once. That could not go on. Infantry needed substantial relief, and the character of the fight had to be completely changed wherever possible. Engagements were therefore undertaken in limited areas where a decision was sought, and elsewhere action was buried in trench warfare.

The heroic era of the World War ended in the late fall of 1914. It had cost the contenders their infantry. What came after was militia.

On the west front began the great problem of the British and French to find an effective sort of attack against the impenetrable German wall, that is to say against the machine gun. For the Western Powers this problem became until the end of the war more and more a question between life and death.

In the West this became especially impressive from the start, but the problem was in no way confined to the West. Everywhere the automatic weapon obstructed the attack, as much in the plains of Russia as in the wooded mountains of Serbia and later on the Isonzo.

Warfare on all fronts told the same thing; infantry must no longer advance against infantry in the manner that the army manuals had taught before the war! An infantry attack is possible only when the machine weapons of the enemy have been almost completely suppressed. This basic fact is grounded on countless experiences of fighting and is undoubtedly correct. One cannot overemphasize that this is the pivot of all tactics since 1914.

Development of effective countermeasures were complicated through simultaneous and continuous increase of machine guns on both sides.

Relief could be given only by the second arm, the artillery, which had to provide the necessary preparation for the attack. This problem was made uncommonly difficult by reason of the fact that the targets were taken away from it. Because nobody knew where the machine guns were hidden in the complex pattern of trenches or later in the deep defense zones, there was nothing else for the artillery to do than to spray the whole ground.

The performance grew to be gigantic. The moderate organization of artillery could not overcome the impossible; it had to be multiplied not only in numbers but also in munitions. It became necessary to assemble such a mass of shells before every attack on any considerable width of front that the munitioning extended over a couple of weeks.

The infantry attack had to be preceded by an artillery preparation fire which, for instance before the big Battle of Flanders, lasted for weeks. The Germans were the first to revise this procedure by compressing a preparatory fire into a few hours and contenting themselves with a moral effect.

The effect of the artillery mass was limited of course to the area covered by its chief weapons, the field guns. Its tactical accomplishment was the moral and phy-

sical shattering of the enemy infantry to such a degree that during the ensuing storm nearly all the machine guns would be silenced. Where this was achieved, the push broke into the enemy position; how deep it went, then determined the success.

If the position were broken through, the attacking infantry went beyond range of the mass of guns it had brought up, and the massed artillery fire ceased. The infantry then had to help itself, supported by a few batteries taken forward. That problem already in 1914 had led to failure and now could only lead to success when the troops under attack had been morally paralyzed.

The experiences on the other fronts were the same. Certainly, successful battles could follow a break-through and then perhaps a month of "war of movement", as at Gorlice in 1915. But such a war of movement had also wholly special properties. On the one side it was a staff-directed retirement on positions prepared in the meantime; on the other side it was a prudent pursuit and quick concentration of superior forces in a selected area for the break-through of position. Thus, from the tactical point of view, not a real war of movement.

Towards the middle of 1918 the Allies applied a very effective method against recognized preparations for an attack. They withdrew a little—perhaps between one and two miles—and let the artillery preparation fall in a void. The attacking infantry then encountered an unshattered enemy, as at the Piave or on both sides of Rheims.

Summing up the combat experiences of the infantry in these battle attacks, it must above all be established that notwithstanding the artillery preparation there remained plenty for the infantry to do. But its heaviest task came after breaking through the position, when it had reached the zone where its massed artillery could no longer reach in front of it. Then the infantry had to push on almost alone and push fast, faster than the enemy could occupy new defense zones. By all accounts this seldom happened; it could not properly succeed because it was beyond the power of man: the machine gun was bound to win.[3]

In the later period of the war the Allies introduced a new means for speedily and fundamentally eliminating the weapons of the infantry: this was the tank. Since these steel boxes could not be made impenetrable to artillery fire, their advance had to be strongly protected by their own artillery. If, however, this requirement was fulfilled, the tank worked out astonishingly well tactically, far better than artillery preparation, because it was mobile and followed on the battlefield so that it could perform quick and useful work.

So long as the tank remained dependent on the effect of the massed batteries, its capacity for breaking through was limited. To say more about the success of the slow war tank would be superfluous.

The consequence of this tactical impotence on the striving for success in the warfare was sad, but nothing could be done about it so long as the tactics could not be changed. When the combatants were compelled to accumulate supplies in their position for two weeks before they could advance, the course of the war had to drag. And when the break-through was confined to a superiority within range of the massed artillery and moreover the defenders immediately drew their strength back, the chance for a big decision was very small.

The tank brought about a considerable saving of time in the execution of the attacking operation and of the break-through, but so long as it depended on the artillery it was unsuitable for the exploitation of the break-through. That is as far as the experience of the World War went.

The machine gun, and only the machine gun, had broken down the attack.

Operations ceased. There remained a war of position. If it demanded little creative thought, it demanded so much the more blood.

(To be Continued)

"Ready — Aim — !"

[3]This lesson is very strikingly illustrated in an excellent narrative of the German July Offensive at Rheims in 1918, told by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, F.A., in the Jan.-Feb. 1937 number of *The Field Artillery Journal* (Washington).

Observations in Spain

by Edmond C. Fleming *

(*Concluded from March issue*)

DEEP AIR RAIDS

In the French publication *L'Air* attention is drawn to a couple of aspects of military aviation which have not previously been illumined by any light of experience. The French writer stresses the significance of long distance raiding groups and the importance of ground intelligence work coupled with the need of radio communication with the air force.

On both sides, he states, deep air raids have been made behind the front on columns and concentrations, the most notable having been the bombing of the White mechanized force at Guadalajara. They have been successful although no special ships were available, which tends to show, he continues, the great prospects which lie before air groups organized and trained for raids.

This form of air activity exerts a demoralizing effect on the enemy and is recommended for that result in itself, apart from the losses in men and material that may be inflicted on the enemy, he argues.

The importance of a well organized ground net of air observation, with sure and speedy transmission of reports, was shown early in the war, when both sides lacked any such organization. The aviators at that time nearly always attained surprise and the anti-aircraft measures consequently were engaged too late to attain full effectiveness.

For the consolations of the general staffs of all countries, the Frenchman adds, it must be emphasized that the circumstances prevailing in Spain were quite special: the activity of the air forces was confined to relatively small areas, of radio equipment there was none, the personnel was untrained and the command was not unified.

That all helps considerably to explain the heavy losses and the bloody bombardments that were recorded without enemy resistance in the early days. Such occurrences are not likely to be repeated in wars between well organized powers, where an efficient anti-aircraft system will generally balk surprise.[3]

AIR FORCES EXPAND

One of the most striking observations on aviation in Spain is the comment of General Armengaud directing attention to the notable extension of aerial warfare during the conflict. The value of this reminder is not affected by the question of where the increasing number of planes and pilots in the Spanish Civil War have come from. The fact must always be borne in mind that in any armed conflict between industrialized nations the expansion of the air forces will be sought by every means at the command of both sides.

What has been demonstrated and is being demonstrated by aviation on active service is that the more the fiction of the irresistible supremacy of air forces is destroyed the greater is seen to be the value of the air weapon in cooperation with the other arms. Planes and pilots and crews will be sought as never before in support of the ground arms and of their operations.

Quite a number of problems concerning types of planes have been raised by events in Spain and are being debated inconclusively. The only observations I have noticed of general interest to officers of all arms and services are that the pursuit plane has not shown itself incapable against the fast modern bombers and that the demand for adherence to simplicity is strong.

Bombardment planes may be as fast as pursuit planes and they may be armed with all sorts of guns to stand off attacks, but they are vulnerable in the air unless they are escorted by combat planes to engage the enemy pursuit ships.

Speed is only one factor: the modern bomber has it. Maneuverability is another: the modern bomber is without it, if the standard of maneuverability is that of the pursuit plane. Just as the humming bird will engage a crow or the kingbird (which is smaller than a robin) will fight a large hawk, the pursuit plane will attack the bristling bomber.

The humming bird and the kingbird are aerial acrobats of such agility on the wing that they can remain in attack over their enemy's back and behind his head no matter how he changes position in the air.

[3] It is believed that the German Army, above all others, is developing the organization of the ground net of air observation essential to effective counteraction of enemy air activity in the zones of military operations. In relation to the protection of the civil population against air attacks the British observation net for the defense of London is a highly developed organization.

(*Continued on page 24*)

New York National Guardsman
718 STATE OFFICE BUILDING
80 CENTRE STREET
NEW YORK CITY

"For the propagation of one policy and only one: 'Better Guardsmanship and Better Citizenship!'"

VOL. XV, No. 1 NEW YORK CITY APRIL, 1938

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VOLUME XV

THIS issue of THE NEW YORK NATIONAL GUARDSMAN is Number 1 of Volume XV—quite a long period in anyone's life and especially so as publications go. The style of the magazine has been changed from time to time to keep it abreast of developments but its objective, "Better Guardsmanship and Better Citizenship" has ever been kept in mind.

To this objective we shall continue to direct our efforts and at the same time endeavor to present to our readers an interesting and instructive publication.

PRELIMINARY PRACTICE

THE first of April generally marks the opening of the preliminary practice season for small arms in the New York National Guard and with the necessarily curtailed time available for practice during the field training period, this preliminary practice assumes a growing importance.

In order to realize the full benefits from this practice it is necessary that all details be carefully planned. No man should be permitted to participate who has not thoroughly mastered the operation of the rifle, positions, etc. These are subjects which can and must be covered in the armories—it is a waste of time to bring a man on the range to give him this instruction—he is on the range to *shoot*.

Competent coaching is a most important factor in preliminary practice and coaches must be carefully selected. The fact that a man has qualified with a weapon does not necessarily qualify him as a coach—he must possess the quality of patience and the ability to impart his knowledge to the firer.

The time element, while of great importance, should not be stressed too greatly during this instruction period; save time by careful organization—assign men to targets and orders before they go on the range so that there will be no lost motion—keep your firing points filled—have your ready line in operation—check sight settings and sling adjustment before the man reaches the firing point—these measures all save time but not at the expense of the firer.

Another phase of instruction which should be covered during the armory training period is range operation—marking and scoring, target operation.

Each year, during the field training period, numbers of men report for duty as markers or scorers without the remotest conception of what their duties are and yet they have presumably all participated in preliminary practice. It will be time well spent to hold a school before going to the range and instruct the men in the value and use of marking discs, use of the spotter and operation of targets and will result in considerable time saving on the range—again not at the expense of the firer.

Finally, don't waste the time of the men (for after all, most of the preliminary practice is in addition to the regular drills) by having them sit around behind the line between strings with nothing to do—give them score book instruction, bolt manipulation, sling adjustment, positions or any subject related to shooting while they are waiting their turn to fire—but don't have them idle.

PROVISIONAL ORDNANCE DETACHMENT

PLANS for the 1938 Provisional Ordnance Detachment are being prepared and this message is a preliminary to the circular on the subject which will be sent shortly to all organizations.

The detachment will perform duty from June 3rd to September 18th—such duty to consist of the usual range details and participation in the various field exercises.

Base pay of grade, transportation and subsistence are provided and from the number of alumni who return each year, it is evident that the members of the detachment enjoy their associations and the operations of the unit.

TEN YEARS AGO THIS MONTH IN THE NEW YORK NATIONAL GUARDSMAN

APRIL, 1928

102nd Ammunition Train disbanded.

* * *

General George W. Wingate dies.

* * *

Regimental Historical Sketch—104th Field Artillery.

* * *

M. A. L. Novice Meet.

* * *

Musketry Problem described.

* * *

Military Day in Buffalo.

Poor Butterfly



by Harry Elmore Hurd

Author of *Possessions of a Sky Pilot, Mountains and Molehills, West of East,* co-author *Christ in the Breadline.*

WHEN the world ran amuck, in 1914, Jock McKinnon tossed his dinner-pail into the closet, kissed his family goodbye, and became one numeral in the giant war machine known as *The First Hundred Thousand.* By the time the Royal Scots reached the Dardanelles, Jock had become an expert ripper of guts. Being an heir of John Know, this individual *Lady From Hell* reverted naturally to the primitive business of killing. The whole ghastly process of letting blood out of the *Gott mit uns* alliance was a religion with him—a devout service of the orthodox variety. After letting the daylight into some Turk, he would burr, "I'll put kilts on Kaiser Bill if they ever move our outfit to France!" This was the nearest he ever came to bragging.

Most brave men have their weakness . . . sometimes it is women . . . with other men it is whiskey . . . the soft spot in Jock's psychology was a mania for always collecting butterflies. During the Boer War he had contracted the disease known as *diurnal lepidoptera.* The brilliantly colored scales of a butterfly's wings were wine to his blood: the slender six-legged thorax of a day-flier moved him more than the siren grace of a lovely lady. Where his buddies saw nothing but shell-pocked earth, he saw flakes of winged bronze, flying rainbows and animated fruit blossoms. His eyes were as sensitive to beauty as the forward, backward, upward, downward and outward vision of the multitudinous faceted eyes of the butterflies that he quested. He was in no sense a lepidopterist: he was more like the female butterfly who is able to select the plant which will best meet the needs of her progeny, without having received a botanical education.

The tragic storming of the Dardanelles has been interpreted by the connoisseurs of tactics as a headstrong waste of human life: to Jock the battering of Gallipoli was a service rendered to Jehovah and an adventure in loveliness. The squealing of high explosives was like the music of skirling pipes to his ears: the cloudless sulphur or the peacock iridiscence of a Hellespontian butterfly was manna to his soul. He thrilled equally to the capture of an enemy squad, alone, and to the discovery of an exotic specimen of segmented color.

When Jock was made a corporal, he celebrated his promotion by silencing a machine gun nest single-handed. His new rating was barely dry on the company records when an order rushed through to make him a sergeant. If the authorities had been wise enough to make him a general, Jock would have ended the war in ninety days.

Sergeant McKinnon never ran out of men to kill. His regiment arrived in Italy just in time to receive the brunt of the Austrian push. Each time another hometown buddy exchanged his helmet for a halo, Jock registered a new vow of vengeance and then proceeded to wipe out his personal loss with deeds of valor. The swelling tide of casuals made him almost a stranger in his own regiment but there wasn't a new recruit who didn't learn, after the first raid, that the recently promoted Sergeant Major was a one-man-army.

One day, on the warm margin of a pine wood, Jock captured several specimens of a huge white butterfly with needlelike costal apexes and spots of glimmering gold. He forgot the bitterness of Alpine temperatures upon discovering rare specimens whose ancestors had been stranded upon the top of the world by the retreat of the European glacier. During the charmed five years of his service in hell, he sent home enough butterflies to have supplied a small-town museum.

Two days before the signing of the Armistice, Jock wrote home from a candle-lighted dugout on the French Front:

"I am enclosing a beautiful butterfly which I captured this morning. It was fluttering against the shell-smashed face of the youngest man in my regiment. I shouldn't have done it, but I watched my chance and crawled over the parapet when the Lieutenant wasn't looking. A Heinie nearly sniped me but my iron hat ricochetted the bullet. I guess the bullet didn't have my name written on it."

He neglected to mention the trivial fact that he had recently been cited for the most precious piece of metal awarded by England to brave men. At the bottom of the mud-stained letter, he confessed, "It was a shame to have to kill such a nice looking butterfly!"

"In Line of Duty"

By Major Charles D. Bles, M.C., N.Y.N.G.

It is the belief of many National Guard officers that if any illness develops during a soldier's field training period, it should always be considered "in line of duty"—but twelve years service as Post Surgeon of the Post Hospital at Camp Smith has strengthened the impression that the main cause of dissention in cases of sick or injured is the indecision of the Board (appointed as per N.G.R. No. 62) as to what constitutes "in line of duty."

The examination at the time of enlistment in the National Guard is necessarily more or less perfunctory: while all questions on the physical examination form at time of enlistment may be filled out by the Surgeon, many conditions not noticeable at that time, may exist. A man may be suffering from a chronic or sub-acute kidney condition he may have no knowledge of same and the examining surgeon will be unaware of it without an urine analysis which is not required by Regulations in the examination of recruits for the National Guard.

In the case of hernia (rupture) a decision rendered by the Surgeon General, U. S. A., is that "a hernia is a congenital condition in which the peritoneal sac is, and has been, from birth, protruding through the inguinal canal." The fact that, due to a strain, the intestine may protrude through the internal inguinal ring is admitted—but the moment that the gut has been returned into the abdominal cavity, the condition returns to its original status. While on examination the surgeon may find a weak inguinal ring—it is a matter of personal opinion whether the applicant should be rejected, particularly if (as is usually the case) he denies the descent of the intestine in the inguinal canal. In the records of the Post Hospital only one case of hernia was found to be a primary one—all the others acknowledged that protrusion to gut had sometimes occurred previous to the entry into the Service.

If a kidney condition existed, as cited above, an acute exascerbation taking place while on field training would be due to a pre-existing condition, and "not in line of duty," and for which field training could not be considered responsible. The same holds good for a hernia where the congenital weakness is the main factor and where the same condition might arise any time during civilian occupation. While this decision may seem arbitrary to the line officer, the medical personnel will readily see the justice and fairness of such a conclusion. In the Regular Army a hernia developing in the first year of enlistment is considered sufficient cause for the discharge of a soldier on an S. C. D. (Surgeon's Certificate of Disability). Only in cases of strangulated hernia where the ring contracts on the protruded gut, thereby causing gangrene of the intestine, and requiring immediate operation, will the Government consider hernia as "in line of duty."

Recently the Comptroller General has even decided that not all injuries incurred WHILE ON LEAVE are to be considered "in line of duty." If the injured party was, at the time, in a situation that might have dangerous possibilities, his claim could not be considered. This also might seem arbitrary, but if one stops to realize that a soldier "on leave" meets with an accident in an automobile that is being driven at an excessive rate of speed (while he himself is the driver or being driven by another) it is scarcely just to hold the United States Government responsible for an injury due to lack of judgment or precaution.

In cases of sickness, where the condition is an acute one (where there is no previous history of disease), or injury incurred, where the injury was sustained due to some military occupation—whether it be during recreational activities or on ordered duty, the Government will accept the responsibility.

Some years ago a member of one of the regimental bands reported at the Regimental Infirmary the first day in Camp with a bandaged finger, which had been injured a day or two prior to coming to Camp. The

finger was dressed by his regimental medical officers in the most approved fashion, but a few days later he was sent to the Post Hospital with an infection involving his hand and forearm. Incision and drainage were performed and the man made an uninterrupted recovery.

Another case was one where a man had a running sore on his shin; he was sent to the hospital for treatment and gave a history of having had a fracture at a previous time, and shortly thereafter the sore developed. This proved to be a case of osteomyelitis (an infection of the bony structure) and the man was returned to his home station.

The point the writer wishes to emphasize is that in these two cases, while both men were able to come to Camp, and that while in Camp these conditions developed, neither case was "in line of duty" both being due to injuries received prior to field training. While the two cases stated are surgical conditions, it can be readily understood that purely medical cases can run the same course. Certain diseases have an incubation period and the patient only develops acute symptoms after a certain length of time, and where, had a physician been called on the first day he could not have made a diagnosis until such time as definite symptoms presented themselves.

While many officers are of the opinion that, if a man is able to come to Camp in apparently good health, any illness developing subsequent to his arrival should be the responsibility of the Government, a more thorough understanding of the predisposing factors and causes of said diseases will clarify the situation.

In all cases of disease and injury National Guard Regulations require that a Board be appointed to investigate and a report of that board on Form No. 60 be forwarded through channels to the N. G. Bureau, where they are reviewed by the Chief of the Medical Section and payment to the State of New York for care and hospitalization of the soldier is either approved or denied. If denied, the costs are to be born by the Regiment of which the soldier is a member, if the Reviewing Officer refuses to accept the claim "in line of duty." The Reviewing Officer at the N. G. Bureau, in turn, must forward the Form No. 60 to the Comptroller General, who may, or may not approve the findings of the Reviewing Officer. It necessarily behooves the N. G. Bureau to be very cautious in their decision for the reason that, should they approve the payment of a Claim, which would be paid by the U. S. P. & D. Officer to the State of New York, and then their decision be reversed by the Comptroller General, the U. S. P. & D. Officer would be liable for the amount paid and his only recourse would then be to endeavor to obtain a refund by the State.

It is suggested that all cases of injury or disease be thoroughly investigated, and that where the authenticity of the claim may be questioned, a statement as to how and when the injury or disease was incurred be attached to the report of the Board. Such a procedure would obviate much trouble and correspondence and would simplify the work all along the line, viz.: from Regimental Surgeon, Post Hospital, Division Headquarters, Adjutant General, U. S. P. & D. Officer, the N. G. Bureau, Comptroller General—and return, with endorsements!

There is at present no provision made by the State for injury received while on Field Training. The Federal Government allows for those cases definitely "in line of duty" six months pay of grade and allowances while hopitalized or rehospitalized and hospitalization until maximum improvement has been attained. In cases where a permanent injury occurs there is no provision for any compensation except by special act of the Legislature. This allowance is not sufficient to make up the difference between pay of grade and the earning capacity of the soldier during his illness, and it is herewith strongly recommended that Group Insurance—which can be obtained at a nominal cost—be taken out, either by Company or Regimental commanders. It is a matter of personal knowledge that carrying such insurance has stood in good stead to many members of the Guard, who, due to fractures or protracted illness, were confined to the hospital for a number of weeks. It is the understanding of the writer that in cases of permanent injury or death the insured or his beneficiary receives a lump sum from the Insurance Company.

Having endeavored to explain the medico-military status of the guardsmen "in line of duty" it is hoped that clearer understanding will result.

"I Always Tell'em Ghost Stories — That Keeps 'Em Awake!"

Gunnery at Yorktown

by Lieutenant Lee G. Crutchfield, Jr.
CWS, Reserves



Before and after. 12-pound solid shot (lower) as recovered by excavation from Yorktown Battlefields, (above) after cleaning and preservative treatment for museum display.

WHEN Fighting George Washington—later to be known as the Father of His Country—applied lighted match to touch-hole of twelve-pound smooth bored cannon, aimed at Cornwallis' red-coated grenadiers in Yorktown, back there in October, 1781, he had a crude instrument on which to play his explosive symphony of of destruction.

And yet, despite the lack of range finders, improved sights, and their pitiful range, the field guns at the siege won the day for our side. They did some amazing and admirable work—sometimes.

Washington's first shot of the siege, it is reported, smashed into the house which was its target, the headquarters of the 76th Highlanders—an early edition of the Ladies From Hell—killing their kilted Commissary General and wounding the Quartermaster and Adjutant. Nice work, General!

Some other gunner, name unknown, among the Continental gun pointers, neatly took off the head of a British officer, Major Cochrane, who stood on the parapet beside Lord Cornwallis to watch the fun, the diary of a brother officer sadly laments.

And an even more accurate, but equally anonymous Frenchman smashed six consecutive round shots into the same enemy embrasure. Those French always *could* handle a field piece, even then!

Those old boys at Yorktown chopped away at the British earthworks principally with solid shot, such as those in illustrations 1 and 2, ranging in diameters from one to six inches, and in classification from grapeshot to eighteen pounders.

These solid iron balls were hard and tough, made of grey iron. You will find it a tough job, with modern tools, to cut one in half.

In 1781, the prescribed method of artillery fire was "en ricochet." That is, the ball was aimed so as to land just short of its mark. Then it would roll and bounce along the ground, taking off legs, heads, arms, etc., before its momentum was spent.

Mortar shells also had their place in the siege. (Illustrations 3 and 4.) These cumbersome hollow shot, as large as nine inches in diameter, were fired, close range,



Photograph demonstrating the various sizes of solid shot fired by the French, American, and British batteries at the siege of Yorktown, October, 1781. The shot, of solid gray iron, range in size from approximately one to six inches and from grapeshot to eighteen pounders.



Mortar shell and shell fragments from siege of Yorktown, 1781. Revolutionary mortars had a short range, and were customarily fired from close up, after the parallels had been advanced. The handles on the illustrated unexploded shell from Yorktown were for the insertion of tongs, so that the heavy shell could be lifted into the gun.



Park Photo Service.

Hollow shot from Yorktown, 1781. These shells were equipped with a wooden fuse, which was lighted as the shell was rolled down the barrel of the previously aimed and loaded field piece. The fuse could be adjusted so that the shell would burst in the air. So that the shell would not fail to explode on landing, if such was the intent of the gunner, it was customary to have the weight concentrated on the bottom or side, so that the shell would land "right side up." The shell to the left has the weight concentrated on the side, and but for the haste in manufacture both shells would have the weight thus distributed. The bottom object is a bar shot, used to cut rigging and spars of naval vessels.

after the entrenchments of the attackers had been pushed well forward. Some of them had "handles" for ease in lifting them into the gun muzzles. Their flight was high and arched, so that they might fall within the opposing lines, where their explosions did much damage. "Time fuses" for air burst consisted of wooden tubes or prepared bits of quill, which could be cut to regulate interval between firing and explosion of shell.

The weight of these mortar shells was concentrated in their bottoms, so that they might land "right side up" with the sputtering fuse in undamaged condition. However, the shells were not all perfect—they still dig up duds in old Yorktown, even as in La Belle France.

A neat little trick practiced by the Allied artillerymen was to heat a solid iron shot red-hot in a "shot oven"; put it quickly in a cannon, on top of damp hay wadding, and cut loose with this early incendiary at the "lobster backs." Such a shot fired by the French batteries ignited the 44-gun English Frigate, "Charon" at anchor in the river. The ship burned and sank.

Still another little artillery gadget found at Yorktown by digging archeologists is the "bar shot" which resembles a dumbbell. This projectile, when fired into the rigging of a ship, cut off mast, lines and everything clean as a whistle, and brought the whole works tumbling down around the ears of the poor sailor boys. (Pictures 5 and 6.)

In retaliation, the jolly Jack Tars might reply with a charge of



Fragments of mortar shells fired by French batteries on the English defenders of Yorktown, October, 1781.

(Continued on page 26)

Our Relief Society -

Notes and News

No comment is needed on the following excerpt from a letter written to the National Guard and Naval Militia Relief Society by a young widow with one small child whom the society is assisting: "I received the Society's check this morning. I had been so worried, for I did not know what to do, as I had no money, and my rent was due. I don't know how to express my feelings and appreciation for all you and your Relief Committee have done for me."

* * * *

A Branch President wrote us recently: "A suggestion has been made that the Secretary of the Society might be a clearing house in sending out, from time to time, any original or special plans used by other organizations for raising membership subscriptions or extra donations for the Relief Society." A fine idea!

Last October the Officers' Wives Section of the 165th Infantry Branch held a bridge, the net profits of which were generously donated to the Society.

Then, on February 19th, 21st and 22nd, a W.P.A. circus was held in the White Plains armory under the auspices of the Officers' Association of Company "C" and Headquarters and Service Company of the 102nd Medical Regiment, which are the units housed in that armory. One-quarter of the net profits were turned over to the Relief Society as extra contributions, over and above the 100 per cent membership subscriptions already given by the members of the companies.

* * * *

An Annual Meeting of the members of every Branch is in prospect for every one of the twenty-seven Branches which comprise the Society. Branch officers are requested to consult the Constitution and By-Laws of their Branches, to refresh their memories on when the election of Branch officers takes place.

* * * *

The Treasurer of the Society is gratified to report that the following Branches have approached or reached the "quotas" which were suggested for them. (The figures are those of March 16th, and in some cases may be considered incomplete:)

Branch	*Membership Contributions*
Headquarters	$1,067.50
10th Infantry	1,029.24
101st Cavalry	689.50
104th Field Artillery	623.70
105th Field Artillery	548.00
106th Field Artillery	600.00
108th Infantry	1,108.00
121st Cavalry	515.00
174th Infantry	1,100.00
212th Coast Artillery	738.69
245th Coast Artillery	784.00

For the 102nd Quartermaster Branch and the 156th Field Artillery Branch we reserve an especially warm word of thanks for having contributed in excess of the amounts they set as a goal—the 102nd Quartermaster Branch with $400.00, and the 156th F.A. with $735.22.

The 1937-38 fiscal year closes on April 30th.

* * * * *

The thanks of the National Guard and Naval Militia Relief Society of New York go to all members of both forces who have helped in the work.

Again an invitation is extended to anyone seeking information about the Society to communicate by letter with the Secretary, who may be addressed at Room 756, 80 Centre Street, New York, N. Y.



"I think Hopkinson's got something there!"







EASY **ROLLIN'**, EASY **DRAWIN'**, EASY ON THE **POCKETBOOK**— SOLDIER, THAT'S PRINCE ALBERT, MY 'MAKIN'S' TOBACCO!

MONEY-BACK OFFER FOR PIPE-SMOKERS

Smoke 20 fragrant pipefuls of Prince Albert. If you don't find it the mellowest, tastiest pipe tobacco you ever smoked, return the pocket tin with the rest of the tobacco in it to us at any time within a month from this date, and we will refund full purchase price, plus postage.
(*Signed*) R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Winston-Salem, N. C.

MONEY-BACK OFFER ON "MAKIN'S" CIGARETTES

Roll yourself 30 swell cigarettes from Prince Albert. If you don't find them the finest, tastiest roll-your-own cigarettes you ever smoked, return the pocket tin with the rest of the tobacco in it to us at any time within a month from this date, and we will refund full purchase price, plus postage.
(*Signed*) R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Winston-Salem, N. C.

70 fine roll-your-own cigarettes in every 2-ounce tin of Prince Albert

50 pipefuls of fragrant tobacco in every 2-ounce tin of Prince Albert

PRINCE ALBERT

THE NATIONAL JOY SMOKE

A FAMILY AFFAIR



Red Legged Devil Photo
Pvt. John; Pfc. Arthur; Sgt. Thomas and Sgt. Joseph Murnane

FOUR brothers in one company, a rarely equalled record, is the proud boast of Company E, 14th Infantry, N. Y. N. G. The boys in question are Sergeants Joseph F. and Thomas P. Murnane and their brothers, Arthur and John.

The senior member of the family, Joe, is now Platoon Sergeant of the Second Platoon. He enlisted in Company E on April 19, 1928, and will qualify for the State ten year long service medal next month. Shortly after his enlistment Joe was promoted to Private First Class and in 1929 he was made a Corporal. He won his Sergeant's stripes in August, 1932, which rank he has held till the present time. The perennial captain of Company E's indoor baseball team, he led and pitched the Company to the Regimental championship in 1936. He also is the handball champion of the Company and annually vies with his brother Tom for the distinction of making the highest score on the rifle range in camp.

Tom is two years Joe's junior. He enlisted on January 20, 1930, and was promoted through the grades until he was made sergeant in 1933. Marksmanship runs in the Murnane family, for Tom is also a crack shot, only excelled, if at all, by his brother

(*Continued on next page*)

COLONEL MUNDY COMMANDS 369th INF.



THE assignment of Colonel Joseph A. S. Mundy, Chief of Staff, 27th Division, to temporary command of the 369th Infantry (in addition to his other duties) vice Colonel John G. Grimley, discharged, was announced in S.O. 42, A.G.O., February 23, 1938.

Coloney Mundy has had wide experience in the Infantry, having enlisted in Company D, 23rd New York Infantry in 1901 and commanding that company on the Mexican Border and during its World War service.

He holds the Silver Star Medal of the United States, having been twice cited for his services in France, and the Conspicuous Service Cross of the State of New York.

Colonel Mundy is a graduate of the Army School of the Line, Langres, France, and of the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth.

A FAMILY AFFAIR

(*Continued from preceding page*)

Joe. Tom is also one of the mainstays of the Company baseball team.

The third brother Arthur joined on September 9, 1935, and is now a Private First Class. He also maintains the shooting standards of the family by being a qualified marksman.

The rookie of the family John, came of enlisting age last fall and promptly joined Company E on September 20, 1937, prepared to live up to the high standards of accomplishment of his brothers. Arthur and John live with their mother at 1709-84th Street, Brooklyn.

CHAPLAIN TREXLER NOW LT. COLONEL

THE Adjutant General has announced the promotion of Chaplain Charles D. Trexler, 101st Cavalry, to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

Chaplain Trexler was ordained as a Lutheran minister in 1906. He founded and organized the Church of the Good Shepherd in Brooklyn and was its Pastor for twenty-four years.

Upon the return of the old First Cavalry from the Mexican border, he assisted Chaplain Keever while the First Cavalry was stationed in Bay Ridge.

At the beginning of the World War, the Church of the Good Shepherd gave him an indefinite leave of absence "for the duration of the War" to go as Chaplain. He was assigned to the 320th Field Artillery of the 82nd Division and served with them at Chateau Thierry, the Toul Sector, the Meuse-Argonne, and at Saint Mihiel.

After the armistice he was promoted to Corps Chaplain of the 8th Army Corps and then to the 7th Corps in the Army of Occupation.

In 1920, he became Chaplain of the 1st Cavalry which now is the 101st Cavalry and has been with this organization since that time.

In 1930, Chaplain Trexler became the Pastor of Saint James' Church at Madison Avenue and 73rd Street, Manhattan.

Beside his military activities, he has served for two terms as a member of the Executive Board of the United Lutheran Church in America and for three terms as the President of the Greater New York Federation of Churches.

The honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity was conferred upon him in 1930.

He comes from a military as well as a clerical family, three of his ancestors having fought in the Revolutionary War, one of whom was a Lieutenant Colonel on General Washington's Staff.



"What! No Pretzels?"





A Loyalist tank. (*World Wide photo*)

OBSERVATIONS IN SPAIN

(*Continued from page* 11)

More attacks by pursuit planes against bombers returning from an expedition have been observed than against loaded bombers outward bound. This fact stimulates a riot of thoughts and you are welcome to indulge. The governing reasons are probably tied up with the intelligence service, to which I made reference above.

In so far as the call for simplicity is concerned we must remember that it is an indispensable quality of every soldier's weapon. During 20 years of peacetime development it would be surprising if the technicians of the research laboratories and the calculus hounds of the design staffs had not gone beyond the bounds of the simplicity which active service in the field has always shown requisite.

In the domain of tanks and armored cars the recall to basic principles is as pronounced as in the realm of aviation.

A contributor to *La France Militaire* (Paris) flays the hypnotism of tank superiority in these scathing terms:

"The expectations and conclusions in regard to tanks, based upon experiences that demonstrated nothing in peacetime maneuvers, have burst like soap bubbles in the raw winds of the Sierras.

"Twenty years after, the war of position shows the same ugly aspect as in the World War. Notwithstanding the fast, efficient and strongly armored tanks engaged in Spain, the infantry on both sides advances at the same slow tortoise pace as we experienced in the World War. . . .

"The charred tracks of the modern tanks litter the Castilian plateau, sacrifice offerings of false notions that awakened only illusions."

More temperately a writer in *The Times* (London) holds that the general test in Spain has made clear that in the past the value of the tank has been overestimated. The battlegrounds of that unfortunate country have been proving grounds as much of the anti-tank guns as of the tanks. What is known of the experiences there may not be all there is to be known, but it is very illuminating, he thinks.

This much he regards as certain, that the tank is no longer the unique dominating arm which quite automatically assures victory under any and all circumstances whatsoever.

A.-T. GUNS EFFECTIVE

From the experiences of both sides it can be asserted, he contends, that wherever tanks in attack have encountered anti-tank guns they have either been destroyed or put out of commission before they were in position to accomplish their mission. Conversely, wherever special anti-tank equipment was lacking the tanks reached their objectives without difficulties.

Louis Garros, in the *Revue de France* (Paris), sums up the contest between armor and guns with the remark that the fast light tanks of the German and Italian types were riddled by the Red 25mm. guns, while the more powerful and more heavily armored tanks of the Russian type were pierced by the White anti-tank guns (which included the German 37mm. piece).

In Spain there have been no independent massed attacks of tanks such as those staged by the Allies in the last months of the World War. The writer in *The Times* doubts whether they ever will be seen again, so much has the picture been altered by the development of the anti-tank gun.

It must not be forgotten, he urges, that the extraordinary successes obtained by the British and French tanks at Cambrai, Soissons and Amiens depended entirely on surprise. They were, and could be, obtained against a defense that practically did not exist or was improvised only with primitive means and moreover had no experience at its disposal. They were developed to a decisive outcome because the tank at that time was still shrouded by the curtain of "tank scare."

Today tanks do not scare an enemy. They have lost the aura of invincibility. They have suffered numerous setbacks, the two most notable of which in the first year of the Spanish Civil War have been:

1. The indecisive result of the attack launched south of Madrid on October 26, 1936, when the Reds launched 40 of the 12-18 ton Russian tanks against

the White troops. The Red artillery and aviation did not cooperate closely in the attack.

2. The Battle of Guadalajara in March this year, about which we have previously written at length. When the White mechanized column was halted by a washed-out bridge and found itself incapable of movement in the field mud, the Red air force engaged the light tanks and motorized troops and almost routed them before the Red ground force was moved up. Some 200 tanks were engaged and a large number put out of action.

Garros' comment hereon is: "Their riddled carcasses will remind us that mass attacks are not to be launched without air superiority and without effectively supporting mechanized outfits with tractor-drawn artillery and entrucked infantry."

(*World Wide photo*)

Russian tank captured by the Rebels.

The same lesson was drawn by the Italian writer, P. Pallotta, in his conclusion of the "great possibilities of mechanized units and *limitations of their use (roads, flanks, vulnerability from the air)*, limitations which impose a close coordination between the action of the motorized units and the action of the air force."

FAST TANKS FIRE POORLY

According to the writer in *The Times* (London) it has been definitely established by fact that the benefit of the higher speed of the light tanks is offset by the reduction of its fire effectiveness to a minimum when traveling fast. This I have foreshadowed in all comment on the fast tank.

He reports that this has led General Franco to the risky expedient of holding back the tanks until the infantry had gone forward quite a way and only then starting the tanks at full speed to overtake the infantry at a distance of 300 yards from the enemy lines and be in position to engage their guns at the moment of the actual assault.

It may not be judicious yet to draw final conclusions from Spain, he declares, although the conception of the superiority of anti-tank fire will perhaps be established by future experience.

Inasmuch as the anti-tank guns have been widely spaced on the Spanish fronts, seldom attaining more than one-tenth of the concentration of one gun every 200 yards, which seems to be the figure that the strong military powers are aiming at, I think they have demonstrated they have the edge over tanks in the present stage of the contest between the armor and the gun.

Nothing has been learned about the anti-tank mines. They have not really been tried out because tank attacks have been too thin and anti-tank mining is prodigal of men and material and transport.

Definite successes, however, have been attained by obstructions, the English observer informs us. Principally these consist of deep trenches parallel to the front of the main defense lines and broad enough and deep enough to trap light and medium tanks. These trenches have steep sides and are covered over for concealment. By systematic use of such trench works the defense can in many cases render the attacking tanks impotent.

From all of which one may judge that as safe and sane a conclusion as can be made is that of *Deutsche Wehr* (Berlin), "no reasonable soldier will go so far as to maintain that the tank is just a bogey," "The tank fills a need," and "no modern army will be able to neglect the introduction and further development of the tank without penalty."

L'UNION FAIT LA FORCE

Assuredly the tank is a weapon, but like every other weapon it must be fitted into its place in the whole plan of cooperation that represents an army's work. So too with the plane and with the whole roll call of modernity. *It is the liaison of arms that counts.*

The object of their (Pacifists) philosophy is to bring peace by making all men virtuous, whereas our real problem is to keep the peace amongst men who are not always virtuous.—*Vestal.*

PROPOSED INF. DIVISION

(Continued from page 7)

was easily completed in 7 hours. Night marches presented no difficulty. The tactical exercises incident to the march were accomplished with the ease and professional poise of garrison troops at the ceremony of guard mounting. In fact, the conduct of the final phase was illustrative of staff and line operating with the proficiency of skilled artisans, all emergencies anticipated and remedies applied before their necessity became apparent. The return from Mineral Wells to San Antonio, a distance of 326 miles in 12 hours and 55 minutes, constitutes a record unparalleled in our military history. To illustrate the extent of mobility, it might be stated that the present division requires 3 days for its rear element to catch up with its leading element. The PID was able to do this in 3 hours. An entire combat team in the PID, motorized with 328 vehicles, could pass any given point in 22 minutes. The entirely motorized division could pass any point in one hour and forty-five minutes. It can move 300 miles in one day. The old division could only move 12 miles in one day.

Conclusions as to the suitability of the proposed unit would be futile until the War Department acts upon the final reports of the division tests, but as an indication of just how the wind is blowing, Major General J. K. Parsons, commander of the Second Division, who had the test in charge, had this to say when interviewed by press representatives upon completion of the maneuvers:

"The tests have shown," General Parsons said, "that the organization of the PID is fundamentally correct. We shall probably recommend modifications that will tend to reduce the division in size and increase its mobility, such as reduction of the number of motor vehicles, reduction in the supply echelon and in the amount of baggage carried.

"Fundamentally this division is

New 50-calibre machine gun ready to repel hostile air attack

good, and far superior to any division we have had since motorization came into existence. In other words we have gone back to a modernized Civil War doctrine. Stonewall Jackson's mobile, hard hitting foot cavalry is today's streamlined division."

GUNNERY AT YORKTOWN

(Continued from page 17)

grape, encased in a canvas bag fastened to a wooden block. (Illustration 6.) This forerunner of our modern shrapnel harassed charging infantry no little.

The guns in 1781 had a very short range. The commissioners who drew up the Surrender Articles, ending the Siege of Yorktown, had to retire only *one mile* from the batteries to be absolutely safe. Nobody could reach 'em.

Their field guns won the day for our forefathers, all right. On October 11th, fifty-two pieces were playing on the British fortifications in the town, and the enemy guns were nearly silent. At noon, Lord Cornwallis wrote thus to General Clinton, in New York: "We have lost about 70 men, and many of our works are considerably damaged. With such works, on disadvantageous ground, against so powerful an attack, we cannot hope to make a very long resistance."

Let us not be too scornful of those early guns that killed men just as definitely, if not as effectively, as any '75 ever made.



Ordnance equipment from the Siege of Yorktown, 1781. The two dumbbell-like objects are bar shot. They were fired from cannon, and, whirling in the air, did great damage in cutting and destroying rigging, spars, etc., of shipping, against which they were chiefly directed. The can at the top is a powder measure, used to measure out propellant charges. The bottom object is a cluster of grapeshot. Iron balls were surrounded in a canvas bag which was attached to a wooden block. The whole was fired from a cannon, and was very effective, much like modern shrapnel.

HOW OHIO DOES IT



INSTALLATION OF THE REEL UNIT, RL-31, ON A RECONNAISSANCE CAR IN THE STATE OF OHIO.

MAJOR GENERAL FRANKLIN W. WARD

(*Continued from page 3*)

The officiating clergyman at the interment was Chaplain John F. Monahan, U. S. A., and the Honorary Pallbearers were: Hon. James W. Wadsworth and Hon. William T. Byrne; Major Generals Milton A. Reckford and Albert H. Blanding; Brigadier Generals John W. Gulick and Frank T. Hines; Colonel Howard McK. Snyder; Lt. Colonel William J. Mangine; Captain George G. Berry.

Numerous messages of sympathy were received by the family of the deceased from his many friends in civil and military circles including President Roosevelt, Governor Lehman, former Governor Smith, and Major General John F. O'Ryan.

General Ward, who retired on December 4, 1934, after 46 years of service, had a most distinguished record.

Born in Philadelphia, Pa., he attended school in that city and at the age of 17 enlisted in the Pennsylvania National Guard. During his nine years of service in that organization he progressed through the various grades to the rank of first sergeant.

Having moved to New York City, at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the 109th New York Infantry. In January of the following year he was assigned to the 9th Infantry, N.Y.N.G., and in the same year was promoted to First Lieutenant. In 1902 he was made a Captain, and in 1907 a Major. In 1908 the regiment was converted to Coast Artillery and his progress in this branch was such that he was detailed as a member of the State Examining Board for Artillery Officers.

In 1912 he was assigned to the Division Staff with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and in 1916, on the mobilization of the National Guard for the Mexican Border Service he preceeded the Division to the Border and arranged the preliminary details for the arrival of the troops.

When the New York National Guard was or-

ganized as the 6th Division, he became Assistant Chief of Staff. It was during this service that he organized the *Rio Grande Rattler,* the first of our New York National Guard papers and became its Managing Editor.

The World War mobilization found Ward as Division Adjutant and later Acting Chief of Staff during the training at Camp Wadsworth and for a short time abroad. In July of 1918 he attended the Army School of the Line at Langres from which he graduated with honors and was designated for the General Staff College. At his request, however, the designation was withdrawn and he returned to the Division.

Promoted Colonel of Infantry, he commanded the 27th Division Trains and Military Police in the Somme Offensive and the 106th Infantry in the battles of St. Souplet and Arbre Guernon.

Upon the return of the Division to the United States in 1919, he was appointed Chief of Staff, and early in 1920 was assigned to duty with the War Department, General Staff, during which time the important work of reorganizing the Army of the United States under the National Defense Act was accomplished.

In 1922 he was commissioned Brigadier General and assigned to command the 53rd Brigade. From 1924 to 1926 he served as Assistant Adjutant General, being appointed Adjutant General in 1926. He was promoted to the rank of Major General in 1930.

Among General Ward's decorations were Distinguished Service Medal, U. S., Silver Star, U. S. Officer of the Legion of Honor, France; Croix de Guerre with Palm, Belgium; Commander, Polonia Restitutia, Poland; Grand Commander, Order of the Crown, Roumania; Conspicuous Service Cross, State of New York.

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TAPS

GENERAL HASKELL SCHOLARSHIP AWARDED TO PVT. RICHARD JAMES DARDEN OF THE 14TH REGIMENT

THE annual competitive examinations for the General Haskell Scholarship at Brooklyn Academy were held at that Academy, Montague and Henry Streets, Brooklyn, N. Y., January 22, 1938.

Responding to an order sent out from Headquarters November 24, 1937, twenty-five Guardsmen from various parts of the state filed applications for these examinations. They were under the supervision of instructors of the West Point-Annapolis Department of the Academy, assisted by Captain Stevenson of the 14th Regiment who was appointed by Colonel Joseph A. S. Mundy, Chief of Staff, to represent the N.Y.N.G. Headquarters. When the final ratings were announced from Headquarters, it was found that the three Guardsmen having the highest standings were as follows:

James R. Darden, Co. A, 14th Regiment.
William H. Greenhalgh, Battery E, 156th F.A.
Paul G. Chase, Co. G, 106th Infantry.

The winner of the Scholarship receives a certificate from General Haskell, Commanding the N.Y.N.G., stating that he is entitled to one year's free tuition at Brooklyn Academy for intensive training in preparation for the National Guard examinations which will be held in November, 1938, and for the West Point examinations in March, 1939.

All the previous winners of this coveted Scholarship are making good.

Roderic Dhu O'Connor, Battery E, 105th F.A., the winner of the Scholarship in 1935, entered the United States Military Academy in 1936 and is making an excellent record.

Raymond I. Shnittke, Battery C, 258th F.A., stands among the highest in mathematics in the West Point plebe class.

Leon E. Bilstein, Headquarters Detachment, 27th Division, the present holder of the Scholarship, stood first in the National Guard examinations in November, 1937, and is all primed for the West Point exams. beginning March 1.

On the occasion of the presentation of the first certificate General Haskell stated that the Scholarships were established to encourage the young men in New York State who have aspirations to enter the United States Military Academy, to become members of the Guard and in this way obtain their initial experience of army life.

Pvt. Darden joined the Guard in December, 1937, with the idea of competing for this Scholarship and the National Guardsman wishes him success in his determination to be admitted to West Point as a Guard appointee.

The Admiral Lackey Scholarship which was established in 1935 has the same idea as its objective—to encourage young men who desire to enter the United States Naval Academy to join the Naval Militia as a desirable step in attaining this goal. Examinations for the Admiral Lackey Scholarship were held at Brooklyn Academy October 2, 1937. The winner was Dominic Tamburrano, 11th Fleet Division, 9th Battalion, N.Y.N.M., of Buffalo, N. Y. This young man entered Brooklyn Academy the latter part of October and will take the entrance examinations for Annapolis in April, 1938.

OUR CONTRIBS

Arch D. Anderson

ARCH D. ANDERSON, born in the town of Mayfield, Fulton County, New York, September 25, 1887, of Scotch ancestry. Attended public schools at Gloversville, New York. Married to Lorena E. Radley of Amsterdam. No children.

Joined Company H, 2nd New York National Guard, Amsterdam, in April, 1914. Served on Mexican Border, 1916. Called on in World War, March 26, 1917, later transferred to 27th Division Headquarters. Served in Belgium and France as Sergeant 1st Class attached to Divisional Ordnance Officer. Received citation for "Meritorious Service and Devotion to Duty" and Conspicuous Service Cross. Discharged at Camp Upton, April 1, 1919. Enlisted for one year in Company H, 105th Infantry to help rebuild company. Received commission as Lieutenant, 81st Division Infantry Reserve, after moving to North Carolina. Is at present Commander, James J. Bergen Post No. 39, American Legion; Patriotic Instructor, Amsterdam Post No. 55, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Chaplain, 27th Division Association, all of Amsterdam. Americanism Chairman, Montgomery County Branch, American Legion. General Chairman of the Sir William Johnson Bi-Centennial Celebration for 1938 and Custodian of the old Fort Johnson, N. Y., where he receives thousands of visitors annually from all over America, Canada and abroad and which will hold a prominent place in the Johnson Bi-Centennial next year.

"Hullo, Smith, old man! Haven't seen you for some time."

"Been in bed seven weeks."

"Oh, that's too bad! 'Flu, I suppose?"

"Yes—and crashed!"

Doctor—Have you any organic trouble?

Patient—I think I have. I can't even carry a tune.

AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF ATTENDANCE

MONTH OF JANUARY, 1938

AVERAGE ATTENDANCE FOR ENTIRE FORCE (January 1-31 Inclusive).....90.61%

Maximum Authorized Strength, New York National Guard	1499 Off.	22 W. O.	19500 E. M.	Total 21021
Minimum Strength, New York National Guard	1467 Off.	22 W. O.	17467 E. M.	Total 18956
Present Strength New York National Guard	1417 Off.	21 W. O.	18537 E. M.	Total 19975

NOTE

(1) The small figure placed beside the bracketed figure shows the organization's standing on last month's list as compared with its present rating. (2) The "How We Stand" page has been condensed into the "Average Percentage of Attendance" page by showing, beneath each organization's percentage, its maintenance and actual strength.

121st Cavalry 95.21% (2)[3]
Maintenance..... 571 *Actual*..... 606

245th Coast Art. 92.91% (3)[15]
Maintenance..... 739 *Actual*..... 773

212th Coast Art. 92.65% (4)[5]
Maintenance..... 703 *Actual*..... 744

165th Infantry 92.56% (5)[8]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*..... 1056

106th Field Art. 92.50% (6)[9]
Maintenance..... 647 *Actual*..... 694

71st Infantry 92.37% (7)[10]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*..... 1083

102nd Q. M. Regt. 92.23% (8)[2]
Maintenance..... 235 *Actual*..... 317

105th Field Art. 92.07% (9)[17]
Maintenance..... 599 *Actual*..... 630

369th Infantry 92.01% (10)[4]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*..... 1118

102nd Engineers 91.02% (11)[18]
Maintenance..... 475 *Actual*..... 481

108th Infantry 90.90% (12)[24]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*..... 1101

102nd Med. Rgt. 90.88% (13)[21]
Maintenance..... 588 *Actual*..... 681

174th Infantry 90.77% (14)[11]
Maintenance.....1038 *Actual*..... 1092

105th Infantry 90.63% (15)[23]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*..... 1051

27th Div. Avia. 90.15% (16)[6]
Maintenance..... 118 *Actual*..... 131

244th Coast Art. 90.04% (17)[7]
Maintenance..... 648 *Actual*..... 657

101st Cavalry 89.91% (18)[14]
Maintenance..... 571 *Actual*..... 637

156th Field Art. 89.67% (19)[12]
Maintenance..... 602 *Actual*..... 618

HONOR ORGANIZATION	No. Dr.	Aver. Pres. and Abs.	Aver. Att.	Aver. % Att.
101st Signal Bat. 95.26% (1)[1]				
Maintenance..... 163 *Actual*..... 168				
HQ. & HQ. CO.....	5	24	24	100
COMPANY A.....	5	66	63	95
COMPANY B.....	5	69	65	94
MED. DEPT. DET...	5	10	9	90
		169	161	95.26

14th Infantry 89.43% (20)[22]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*..... 1081

104th Field Art. 89.01% (21)[19]
Maintenance..... 599 *Actual*..... 624

Spec. Troops, 27th Div. 88.40% (22)[13]
Maintenance..... 318 *Actual*..... 347

258th Field Art. 88.08% (23)[20]
Maintenance..... 647 *Actual*..... 681

10th Infantry 87.75% (24)[16]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*.....1070

107th Infantry 87.05% (25)[26]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*..... 1046

106th Infantry 85.41% (26)[25]
Maintenance.... 1038 *Actual*..... 1027

State Staff 100.00% (1)[1]
Maintenance..... 78 *Actual*..... 74

Brig. Hq.C.A.C. 100.00% (2)[2]
Maintenance..... 11 *Actual*..... 11

93rd Brigade 97.50% (3)[5]
Maintenance..... 27 *Actual*..... 39

Hdqrs. 27th Div. 97.01% (4)[3]
Maintenance..... 65 *Actual*..... 68

51st Cav. Brig. 96.10% (5)[7]
Maintenance..... 69 *Actual*..... 78

54th Brigade 95.65% (6)[4]
Maintenance..... 27 *Actual*..... 47

53rd Brigade 93.47% (7)[9]
Maintenance..... 27 *Actual*..... 46

87th Brigade 93.33% (8)[6]
Maintenance..... 27 *Actual*.....) 45

52nd F.A. Brig. 89.79% (9)[8]
Maintenance..... 36 *Actual*..... 50

BRIGADE STANDING

51st Cav. Brig. 92.69% (1)[1]
Hdqrs. & Hdqrs. Troop
101st Cavalry
121st Cavalry

Brig. Hq., C.A.C. 91.99% (2)[3]
Hdqrs. & Hdqrs. Detachment
212th Coast Artillery
244th Coast Artillery
245th Coast Artillery

87th Inf. Brig. 91.74% (3)[2]
Hdqrs. & Hdqrs. Company
71st Infantry
174th Infantry
369th Infantry

93rd Inf. Brig. 91.10% (4)[4]
Hdqrs. & Hdqrs. Company
14th Infantry
165th Infantry

52nd F. A. Brig. 90.28% (5)[5]
Hdqrs. & Hdqrs. Battery
104th Field Artillery
105th Field Artillery
106th Field Artillery
156th Field Artillery
258th Field Artillery

54th Inf. Brig. 89.16% (6)[7]
Hdqrs. & Hdqrs. Company
107th Infantry
108th Infantry

53rd Inf. Brig. 88.32% (7)[6]
Hdqrs. & Hdqrs. Company
10th Infantry
105th Infantry
106th Infantry

MEL KOONTZ—FAMOUS HOLLYWOOD ANIMAL TAMER—WRESTLES A LION!



Here is Mel Koontz alone in the cage with four hundred and fifty pounds of lion. The huge lion crouches—then springs at Koontz. Man and lion clinch while onlookers feel their nerves grow tense. Even with the lion's jaw only inches from his throat, Mel Koontz shows himself complete master of the savage beast. No doubt about *his* nerves being healthy!

"I'll say it makes a difference to me what cigarette I smoke"

says **MEL KOONTZ** to **PENN PHILLIPS**

PEOPLE DO APPRECIATE THE
COSTLIER TOBACCOS
IN CAMELS

THEY ARE THE
LARGEST-SELLING
CIGARETTE IN AMERICA

MEL KOONTZ was schooling a "big cat" for a new movie when Penn Phillips got to talking cigarettes with him. Perhaps, like Mr. Phillips, you, too, have wondered if there is a distinct difference between Camels and other cigarettes. Mel Koontz gives his slant, above. And millions of men and women find what they want in Camels. Yes, those *costlier tobaccos* in Camels *do* make a difference!

Camels are a matchless blend of finer, MORE EXPENSIVE TOBACCOS — Turkish and Domestic

ONE SMOKER TELLS ANOTHER...

"Camels agree with me"

"We know tobacco because we grow it.....We smoke Camels because we know Tobacco"

TOBACCO PLANTERS SAY

"I know the kind of tobacco used for various cigarettes," says Mr. Beckham Wright, who has spent 19 years growing tobacco—knows it from the ground up. "Camel got my choice grades this year—and many years back," he adds. "I'm talking about what I *know* when I say Camels sure enough *are* made from MORE EXPENSIVE TOBACCOS."

Mr. George Crumbaugh, another well-known planter, had a fine tobacco crop last year. "My best yet," he says. "And the Camel people bought all the choice lots—paid me more than I ever got before, too. Naturally, Camel's the cigarette I smoke myself. *Most* planters favor Camels."

"I've grown over 87,000 pounds of tobacco in the past five years," says this successful planter, Mr. Cecil White, of Danville, Kentucky. "The best of my last crop went to the Camel people at the best prices, as it so often does. Most of the other planters around here sold their best grades to Camel, too. I stick to Camels and I *know* I'm smoking choice tobaccos."

"My four brothers and I have been planting tobacco for 21 years," Mr. John Wallace, Jr., says. "Camel bought up every pound of my last crop that was top grade—bought up most of the finer tobacco in this section, too. I've been smoking Camels for 17-18 years now. Most other planters are like me—we're Camel smokers because we know the quality that goes into them."